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ABSTRACT
The post-World War II global economy is characterized by two broad phenomena:
liberalization of tariﬀ barriers that restricted trade across a broad swath of industries
and countries, and the expansion of global direct investment and the rise of supply
chains in goods trade. However, the secular decline of tariﬀs has not meant universal
liberalization. In some industries, tariﬀs and tariﬀ-like policies still restrict trade. In
others, measures that are unlike tariﬀs have either become more prominent as tariﬀs
fell or have risen to provide alternate protection.
Work in political science and economics has advanced a wide variety of explana-
tions for the transition from tariﬀs to non-tariﬀ measures generally, or for the presence
or absence of speciﬁc non-tariﬀ trade instruments in particular. A more limited body
of work has examined the substitution across policy instruments, but has not at-
tempted to generalize beyond the policies under consideration. We assert that part
of the limitation in this work arises from the traditional dichotomy of tariﬀs versus
non-tariﬀ measures.
To resolve this shortcoming and advance the discussion of trade politics and
trade agreements, this dissertation advances a new framework for considering trade-
distorting policies that apply both at- and behind-the-border. Policies are categorized
according to how they apply costs - according to the location of a good's production,
the content in or process of production, or the ﬁrm that produces it. Policies that
raise costs indiscriminately are also considered.
We explain the logic of this typology and the distributive consequences of each
policy. Then, we explain the distributive consequences of imposing these policies in
xvi
a single-country and two-country interaction. From these distributive outcomes, we
introduce a theory of protection-seeking where ﬁrms in a given industry lobby for lev-
els and varieties of protection that serve their interests in light of the preferences of
other politically-salient ﬁrms. Industry characteristics like foreign investment, prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, industry concentration, and ﬁrm eﬃciency all work to shape the
types of trade-distorting instruments which industries may obtain from responsive
governments. With this lobbying logic established, we test that theory against data
from the United States in 2012. Comparing industry characteristics against the pres-
ence or absence of the four types of policies across more than 3000 types of products,
we ﬁnd support for some implications of the lobbying theory, but also ﬁnd areas for
further inquiry.
This dissertation contributes to the wider discussion of evolving protectionism in
political economy through clariﬁcation, by advancing a new logic of protection- or
liberalization-seeking coalitions that considers multinational ﬁrms, and through an
investigation of the contours of protection in the United States, a critical power in
the global goods and investment market. In doing so, it moves the discipline closer
to understanding the deep links between global investment ﬂows and the politics of
global trade and trade policy.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction: A Global Economy with National
Policies
The second era of globalization, following the Second World War, has been char-
acterized both by an increase in global trade, due in no small part to reductions
in tariﬀs, and an increase in global capital ﬂows as ﬁrms have built global supply
chains and distributed production across national borders. There has also been a
signiﬁcant increase in intraindustry trade  cars from Europe being exported to the
US while cars from the US are exported to Europe, for instance  and intraﬁrm
trade  companies acting as exporter on one side of a transaction and importer on
the other  that has made the global goods trade look somewhat diﬀerent than the
wine for cloth of classical trade theory. To the same extent, as the nature of trade
has changed, so too has the nature of trade protection.
As tariﬀs across many products have been reduced to zero or near zero, the focus
of many recent trade agreements have turned to the non-tariﬀ measures that distort
or restrict trade. These policies, which have risen as a consequence of greater domestic
regulation and alternative attempts to protect ﬁrms have distributive consequences
that may be like or unlike those of tariﬀs. The work that follows is comprised of three
papers that examine the issue of non-tariﬀ barriers and their comparison to tariﬀs.
These papers introduce a new framework for considering trade-distorting policies,
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develop a new theory of industrial demand for diﬀerent kinds of policies, and then
test that theory using a database on non-tariﬀ measures.
In Chapter II, we introduce a new way of classifying policies based not on whether
the policy is a tariﬀ or not, or though identifying each trade-distorting policy as
unique, but rather by how additional costs imposed by the policy apply to a product.
This new typology considers policies as one of four types: location-discriminating,
characteristic-discriminating, ﬁrm-discriminating, and indiscriminate.
Location-discriminating policies are those, like tariﬀs, which impose additional
costs or restrictions on a product based on where it is produced. These kinds of
policies drive price wedges between goods that are produced in diﬀerent places.
Characteristic-discriminating policies are applied based on how something is made
(process) or some element of that good's content. The product standards, environ-
mental standards, and labor rules that are becoming more frequent components of
trade agreements, are some examples of this type of policy. These policies drive price
wedges between diﬀerent varieties of good within the same broad category, or restrict
sale of some varieties altogether. Firm-discriminating policies are those that add cost
on the basis of who makes a product. Targeted subsidies, licensing laws, preferential
purchasing rules, and the like, which give beneﬁts to certain ﬁrms, add costs to all
other ﬁrms' products on the basis of the ﬁrms' identity. These policies can be persis-
tent costs or can apply in such a way that ﬁrms must pay the cost upon entry to a
market, regardless of where or how they produce a good. These policies drive price
wedges between diﬀerent ﬁrms' goods, regardless of how or where they are produced.
The ﬁnal kind, indiscriminate cost policies, raise the costs for all producers. While
these policies may have diﬀerent eﬀects across products due to diﬀerences in ﬁrm size,
eﬃciency, or output, these costs apply to all. Policies that require product testing, or
speciﬁc labeling, or some kinds of broader economic policy like consumption taxes,
can have the eﬀect of distorting trade. By moving beyond a discussion of tariﬀs and
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not-tariﬀs, the diﬀerences in the trade-distorting eﬀects of diﬀerent policies, and
similarities of policies within the same category, is made clearer.
From this typology, we then consider the distributional consequences when these
policies are implemented. First, we consider a single-country case where a government
raises a hypothetical policy that applies costs of only one type of cost. For a location-
discriminating cost, the winners and losers from the policy divide on where a product
is made. For a characteristic-discriminating one, it is the variety of good produced
by a ﬁrm, and whether or not it is targeted by the policy, which determines whether
it beneﬁts or loses from imposition of the policy. For ﬁrm-discriminating costs, being
targeted for additional cost makes a ﬁrm a loser from the policy, but other ﬁrms are
winners. Indiscriminate cost policies divide industries on how well a ﬁrm can absorb
the additional costs. Some ﬁrms may be forced to exit by the extra costs, while others
may bear it.
The more interesting outcomes come from considering a two-country case, where
policies of each type are raised by one or both countries. While for some policies, like
location-discriminating ones, familiar patterns of winners and losers arise, dividing
on exporting versus importing ﬁrms, for others there are novel implications. In some
cases, when governments raise costs on some varieties or some ﬁrms, the winners
and losers divide within industries and across national borders. For considering the
implications of trade agreements that harmonize standards, or that confer reciprocal
access to speciﬁc ﬁrms, these intraindustry divisions are important. When raising
indiscriminate costs, in one or both countries, the eﬀects expected in the single-
country case are intensiﬁed. By identifying what policies apply diﬀerent kinds of
costs, and what the eﬀects on diﬀerent ﬁrms within and beyond a country should be,
we move one step closer to understanding the politics of trade barriers in this era of
global capital.
In Chapter III, we use the typology introduced in Chapter II to derive a theory
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of protection seeking by ﬁrms. A signiﬁcant portion of existing theory on protection-
seeking has considered only tariﬀs or tariﬀ-like policies. More recent work looking to
non-tariﬀ measures has usually considered them an additional ﬁxed cost of market
entry. This theory instead considers how ﬁrms may choose to lobby for protection
across a variety of policies. While each ﬁrm would prefer policies that make it an eﬀect
monopolist, that is not likely to occur. So, ﬁrms consider what policies to demand
in light of what other ﬁrms in their industry might demand or oppose. Building
oﬀ familiar endogenous tariﬀ theory logic, we consider how demands for location-
discriminating, characteristic-discriminating, ﬁrm-discriminating, or indiscriminate
cost policies will change in light of industry characteristics.
Diﬀerent features of an industry will shape demands for policy, such that diﬀer-
ent ﬁrms should demand diﬀerent kinds of policies, especially in light of competition
from outside ﬁrms. We assume that a variety of ﬁrms  domestic ﬁrms produc-
ing for the domestic market, domestic exporters, and foreign ﬁrms with a domestic
presence  all have the opportunity to lobby for policy. This lobbying will reﬂect
the preferences of these ﬁrms over the set of potential policies. As a result, when
an industry has deeper integration with the global economy, through foreign direct
investment, that industry should demand (and obtain) fewer location-discriminating
policies. When industries produce homogeneous products, they are unlikely to de-
mand characteristic-discriminating policies, but when goods produced are heteroge-
neous, politically-salient ﬁrms will demand policies that privilege the varieties they
produce. Industries where a few ﬁrms are large  highly concentrated industries 
are likely to be distorted by ﬁrm-discriminating policies, and where concentration is
low policies may arise to block new entrants. The presence or absence of indiscrimi-
nate costs is determined in part by the eﬃciency of ﬁrms in the industry. When the
most eﬃcient ﬁrms in an industry might beneﬁt overall from these kinds of policies,
they will lobby for them. However, when there is not a suﬃcient mass of compara-
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tively more-eﬃcient ﬁrms, these sorts of costs should not be demanded, which makes
them less likely. Finally, all of these policies, by adding costs to a good, should limit
the use of others, to some degree. While they are not substitutes to the same degree
that policies within the same type are, governments are constrained such that ﬁrms
must consider which policy they prefer most (rather than demanding all) when lob-
bying. This logic reﬂects some existing theory, but also builds on the new framework
to advance new hypotheses for when protection arises and what form it takes.
Chapter IV tests the theory of Chapter III using data from the United States
in 2012. We adapt existing data on non-tariﬀ measures from UNCTAD's TRAINS
database and examine which industries obtain diﬀerent kinds of trade-distorting poli-
cies. We also use disaggregated data on industry characteristics to identify when
producers of diﬀerent products are more or less likely to demand diﬀerent policies.
Across more than 3000 product-lines, we compare industry characteristics of the pro-
ducing sector and the number of policies of each type that aﬀect those products.
The results from these empirical models suggest some support for the protection-
seeking politics discussed in Chapter III. As expected, the presence or absence of
FDI is associated with greater or fewer location-discriminating costs. However, FDI
also appears to have signiﬁcant relationships with other types of costs. Industries
that produce heterogeneous goods appears to obtain diﬀerent forms of protection
than do those producing homogeneous goods. Overall industry size also covaries with
the number of policies in place. There appears to be consistent evidence that the
presence or absence of one form of policy is associated with more or fewer policies
of other types. While this was not expected by theory, it does open avenues for
further inquiry. These results provide a ﬁrst picture of the relationship between the
characteristics of industries and the kinds of protection they obtain.
Taken together, these papers identify the more complex politics that underlie
agreement on reducing trade barriers beyond tariﬀs. They also clarify when some
5
policies act as substitutes for tariﬀs, while others act as complements or imperfect
substitutes. As trade agreements like TPP and TTIP focus more on policies that are
not tariﬀs and policies that apply behind the border, a deeper focus on these sorts
of policies, and the more complex distributional consequences thereof, is warranted.
This new framework, then, helps to explain some of the reasons why protectionism
in the global economy has taken the form it has, and what areas for liberalization
should be possible going forward.
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CHAPTER II
A Typology of Trade Barriers: Understanding the
Eﬀects of New Protectionism
2.1 Introduction
Tariﬀs today are at or near zero across many products and countries. With the
exception of agricultural and textile products generally and some speciﬁc products or
industries in each country, import duties no longer pose a signiﬁcant barrier to trade.
However, several stylized facts about international trade suggest that the progress
made in liberalizing trade through reduced tariﬀ barriers has been oﬀset by new
forms of protection. These non-tariﬀ barriers distort global goods ﬂows in a variety
of ways. Some of this protection appears to be quite similar to tariﬀs, while other
barriers work quite diﬀerently. The change in protection from tariﬀs to non-tariﬀs
has meant liberalization in some industries, or for some products, and not for others.
In explaining the pattern of imperfect liberalization, it is necessary to understand
when these policies are substitutes for tariﬀs and when they are not. The presence or
absence of trade protection is motivated by the distributive consequences of policy.
Policies that distort markets may divert beneﬁts from consumers towards a protected
group of producers, and may redistribute among groups of producers, along factor,
sector, or intra-industry lines. Comparing unlike polices or discriminating between
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policies with similar consequences obscures the changes in beneﬁts that accompany
the shift from tariﬀs to NTBs that has characterized much of global trade politics
since World War II.
The need to consider how domestic policy distorts trade ﬂows is even more impor-
tant in light of a few general facts about the global goods market today. Trade theory
has evolved in light of these facts, which has led to the new trade theories of Krug-
man and Melitz. These theories aim to explain the most striking fact about trade
ﬂows in the global economy: signiﬁcant ﬂows of intra-industry trade. Rather than
the wine-for-cloth trade of classical (and neoclassical) trade theories, some trade
appears to be like-for-like. The United States sends Boeing wide-body jet airliners to
European carriers, while Europe sends Airbus wide-body jet airliners in the opposite
direction to carriers based in the US, for instance. This intra-industry trade has been
a feature of the global economy throughout the past 60 years, rising in volume to its
recent levels. In 2011, intra-industry trade was between 25% and 75% of trade ﬂows
(in aggregate, not bilateral ﬂows) in various regions of the global economy, highest
among the most developed economies (Trade Analysis Branch 2013). The other strik-
ing feature of global trade in goods is the degree of intra-ﬁrm trade. This kind of
trade, where one economic agent is both the exporter from the sender country and
the importer in the recipient country, has become an important part of the global
economy. These ﬁrms sometimes produce multiple versions of similar products for
diﬀerent markets, as well. Global supply chains are a deﬁning feature of multinational
ﬁrms, and the rise of multinationals has also meant a rise in intra-ﬁrm trade.
Traditionally, the main distinction made in the study of trade barriers has been
between tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ measures. Given the historical dominance of tariﬀs as
a means of shaping trade ﬂows (and raising revenues), this distinction may seem ap-
propriate. However, placing all other measures that distort trade ﬂows into a single
conceptual category hides important diﬀerences among non-tariﬀ barriers and ob-
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scures similarities between tariﬀs and some non-tariﬀ alternatives. Existing research
often refers to non-tariﬀ measures in general while looking at only one policy in
particular, or attempts to create a synthetic measure for non-tariﬀ barriers that
computes a single at-the-border cost equivalent for the variety of policies that may
distort trade beyond tariﬀs. If we seek to explain the persistence of protection across
countries and industries, even in the face of secular tariﬀ declines, we must reframe
how we consider trade-distorting policies to clarify, both theoretically and empirically,
when policies are substitutes and when they are not. This paper introduces an alter-
native framework for considering trade-distorting measures that exist at and behind
national boundaries. This framework recategorizes policies as similar or diﬀerent with
regards to how costs apply to goods entering a market. In this framework, policies
may add cost based on location of production, the process or content of a good's
production, the ﬁrm which produced it, or indiscriminately across all varieties of a
good.
After reviewing existing discussions of tariﬀs and NTMs, both in measurement
and eﬀect, we outline the Market Access Costs framework and explain distributive
implications of policies and liberalization in a single-country and trading-partner con-
text. In introducing this new framework and highlighting some of the diﬀerences in
distributive consequences of diﬀerent types of market access costs, we aim to advance
our understanding and discussion of trade-related policies in the present era of global
markets and national policies.
2.2 Existing Research on Measurement, Eﬀects, and Politics
of NTMs
There is a large and well-established literature on the eﬀects of tariﬀs both in
economics and political science. There is also a robust literature on the economics
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and politics of non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs), but on the whole it is less prominent
than that of tariﬀs. This is likely in part a consequence of the relative recency of
NTMs' importance, but also likely due to NTMs being more diﬃcult to measure and
categorize, as well as theorize about, than tariﬀs are.
Even before NTMs became part of negotiations in large, multilateral trade agree-
ments, these kinds of policies were known to be distortionary. When, in the years
preceding the Tokyo Round of GATT, researchers began collecting information -
through surveys of member states - on other policies that hampered trade ﬂows, poli-
cies were considered individually and grouped into large summary categories that
were largely descriptive.1 Various classiﬁcations, with inclusion or exclusion of var-
ious policy types, have been used by individual researchers and intergovernmental
bodies as data collection and theory have improved.
As non-tariﬀ measures are primarily deﬁned by what they are not, there is a
wide variety of ways to measure and categorize NTMs. The precise deﬁnition of what
a non-tariﬀ barrier (or measure) is has generally converged on key components deﬁned
by Baldwin (1970). Walter (1972) and Walter and Chung (1972) expand on this with
a reﬁnement of Baldwin that focuses on the intent of policy as distortionary, noting
that some policies will be distortionary as an unavoidable spillover eﬀect. While
these deﬁnitions, generally taking the form of non-tariﬀ barriers are any policy that
distorts the natural ﬂows of goods across national borders also generally focused
on at-the-border measures, more recent interpretations have included behind the
border measures as distortionary and as NTMs (Laird 1997; Staiger 2012; De Melo
and Nicita 2018). However, as Deardorﬀ and Stern (1998) note, any taxonomy of
NTMs will be incomplete precisely because NTMs are deﬁned by what they are not.
1. In general, these early surveys focused on quantitative and at-the-border measures, but col-
lected information on a wide variety of NTMs as individual producer responses. The collection
of these measures in 1968 and 1969 produced around 800 NTM notiﬁcations, broken into ﬁve cate-
gories. This collection preceded the creation of the NTM-related codes in the Tokyo Round (General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade 1969, 1970).
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In discussing the measurement of speciﬁc NTMs or NTMs in general, the com-
parison has been to the eﬀects of tariﬀs, either in price or quantity distortions. A
general summary of measurement methods is outlined in Deardorﬀ and Stern (1998),
and summarized brieﬂy here.2
As NTMs often work diﬀerently than tariﬀs, one common method of evaluating
restrictiveness of NTMs is to count the number of policies and/or the degree of product
coverage of diﬀerent measures. By counting the number of policies, initially through
producer reporting of these barriers, but later through more comprehensive surveys
of regulatory and policy regimes, it is possible to evaluate the degree to which market
entry is hampered by policy barriers. However, not every policy acts in the same
fashion, and mapping these counts to measures of restrictiveness can be diﬃcult.
Other research has attempted to calculate ad-valorem tariﬀ equivalents of NTM
restrictiveness. In general, these measures use a model of trade ﬂows based on models
of international trade and/or direct measurements of prices in the protected market
versus global prices. Measurement of trade volume distortions, rather than price
distortions, are an alternative measure of the eﬀects of NTMs. Kee, Nicita, and Olar-
reaga (2008a) does this as a ﬁrst stage for eventual computation of price eﬀects, and
later a total trade restrictiveness index across a variety of countries.3 However, Kee,
Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008b) looks only to core NTMs (quantitative restrictions
and tariﬀ-like NTMs) and domestic agricultural support. This is motivated by com-
parability to tariﬀs, but also highlights how other NTMs function diﬀerently, both
theoretically and empirically.
A more general method for evaluating the restrictiveness of NTMs is calculation of
a trade restrictiveness index, which may or may not include tariﬀs in the index. This
method focuses on the total distortions of trade for a particular product or across a
2. A more recent update and review of Deardorﬀ and Stern (1998) can be found in Bora, Kuwa-
hara, and Laird (2002), as well.
3. This requires use of import elasticities, which are estimated in Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga
(2008b), where the overall restrictiveness index is also computed.
11
whole economy, not necessarily the form this protection takes or the speciﬁc policies
that restrict trade. These are done in one of two ways, generally. One, building oﬀ of
the work of Anderson and Neary (1994, 1996, 2003) and Feenstra (1995), estimates
simpliﬁed barrier estimates motivated by the logic of general equilibrium models of
trade, but with the general equilibrium feedbacks ignored (Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga
2008a). Alternatively, a gravity model of trade can be used to estimate expected
goods ﬂows across borders, with tariﬀs, when known, included in the model and the
non-tariﬀ barriers derived from model residuals (Hiscox and Lastner 2008; Mayer and
Zignago 2005).
Each of these measurement strategies has strengths and drawbacks. Counts are
relatively easy to compose, although categorization and comparison can be diﬃcult.
However, simple counts of measures do not suggest the intensity of protection around
particular products within an economy. The calculation of ad-valorem equivalents
eases comparison to existing measures of protection (that are largely based on tariﬀ
rates, either bound or eﬀective), but require stronger assumptions and sometimes
are diﬃcult to compute for NTM regimes that work in ways diﬀerent from core,
tariﬀ-like NTMs.
The measurement challenges above have meant that, compared to tariﬀs, the pic-
ture of non-tariﬀ barriers' eﬀects on the global economy is somewhat less clear. Still,
there has been signiﬁcant research on the political economy of protection through
non-tariﬀ means. Some research has focused on one particular kind of NTM, or has
used one policy instrument as a proxy for NTMs generally. Other work has looked to
substitution across multiple instruments, or from tariﬀs to non-tariﬀ instruments. An
overarching theme of this literature is that the question of whether NTMs, or even
individual non-tariﬀ measures, are substitutes for tariﬀs or not remains unresolved.
Both at the theory stage, involving assumptions or arguments about actors' prefer-
ences, and at the point of measurement, examining the level or frequency of NTMs
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across countries and industries, there remains a lively debate as to who demands
protection in the form of NTMs, what form that demanded protection takes, when
governments provide that protection, and what eﬀect that protection has.
In focusing on a single kind of NTM, or comparing NTM politics to that of tariﬀ
politics, some progress has been made in understanding how these policies persist or
are eliminated. Core to these arguments are assumptions of preferences of diﬀerent
groups over these policies, or ways in which these policies work similarly to or dif-
ferently from tariﬀs. What follows is a sample of the literature discussing speciﬁc
non-tariﬀ trade instruments and NTMs in general.
Much early research on NTMs focused on comparing quantitative restrictions to
tariﬀs. A signiﬁcant portion of this discussion focused on the equivalence (or not)
of tariﬀs and quotas, in response to seminal work by Bhagwati (Bhagwati 1965,
1968). In responding to some of these arguments about the comparison of quotas
and tariﬀs, Deardorﬀ (1987) introduces the idea that quantitative restrictions are
used when actors don't believe tariﬀs will work. By using quantitative, rather than
price, measures, NTMs (quotas) may mitigate some of the short-run and longer-run
concerns that arise with price measures like tariﬀs. A more recent return to the
discussion of quotas and antidumping suggests that shift from tariﬀs to quotas to
antidumping measures is a natural progression in some industries, and is driven in
part by restrictions placed on trade distorting measures (Anderson and Schmitt 2003).
The use of subsidies to support domestic industry is another means by which
governments can distort trade. Rickard (2012) looks to subsidies as an alternative
to tariﬀs for domestic industrial support within democracies. In testing the protec-
tionist bias in majoritarian politics of Grossman and Helpman (2005) beyond tariﬀs,
Rickard ﬁnds that a similar logic holds for this NTM policy. Looking to the speciﬁcity
of subsidies within EU countries, Park (2012) argues that the sectoral targeting of
subsidies follows a diﬀerent logic than general state aid, and both are associated with
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the degree of labor and capital centralization.4 This issue of targetability in industrial
support is discussed and demonstrated elsewhere in broader discussions of industrial
protection and political incentives related to political geography (McGillivray 2004).
The role of geographic concentration in trade politics is another area where com-
parisons of tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ measures have been considered. In an eﬀort to
examine what industries receive protection and adjudicate a long-running debate in
the endogenous protection literature, Busch and Reinhardt (1999, 2000) turn to hard
core NTM measures across industries in the US, which suggest that geographically-
concentrated but politically diverse industries (industries that cover many electoral
districts, but are geographically concentrated) obtain protection more than other
industries. This ﬁnding is corroborated, albeit with additional complexity from con-
siderations of electoral institutions and party strength, by McGillivray (2004) using
European country industries.
More general discussions of NTMs as protection have focused on ways in which
NTMs in general are similar to or diﬀerent from tariﬀs. The interaction of institu-
tional settings and the ways in which NTMs may work diﬀerently (or are observed
diﬀerently) than tariﬀs is one avenue of inquiry. Two large cross-national studies of
poltical institutions and the provision of protectionism engaged directly with NTMs,
but treated them as related (not necessarily substitutes or compliments) to tariﬀs.
In looking to democracies alone, Mansﬁeld and Busch (1995) suggests that NTBs
are substitutes for tariﬀs, and are used when sectoral interests and societal interests
align. However, a look beyond just democracies to compare protectionist policy in
nondemocracies suggests that overall, tariﬀs are lower, but NTMs (especially qual-
ity NTMs like product standards) are higher in democracies, suggesting that the
Optimal Obfuscation of Magee, Brock, and Young (1989) may have some empirical
4. Speciﬁcally, Park ﬁnds that sectoral, targeted aid is lowest when centralization is very high
or low, but general aid increases with centralization overall, supporting the idea that the logics of
targeted vs general support are diﬀerent.
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support (Kono 2006).
In a broader discussion of the anti-protectionist pressure that accompanied in-
creased economic interdependence, Milner (1988) highlights the rising importance of
NTMs, although NTMs are not discussed independently of broader anti-protectionist
pressure that comes from ﬁrms with export or multinational interests. However,
the arguments therein are consistent with some of the more recent arguments on
anti-NTM pressure among multinational ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, Milner highlights intra-
industry divisions over protectionism, which have become an important part of the
NTM discussion as well. This ﬁrm-centric logic of NTM preferences also arises out
of political economy models based on new-new trade theory, which highlight how
industries divide over barriers to trade, both ﬁxed and variable costs (Osgood 2016).
Although they are not always as clearly perceived as barriers to trade, intellectual
property rights (IPR) policies have become part of the NTM discussion. (Shadlen,
Schrank, and Kurtz 2005) Osgood and Feng (2017) build oﬀ of existing literature
on the role of IPR harmonization in trade agreements in the US and the economics
of IPR in trade. These policies generally change standards in US partner countries.
Industries in the US, where ﬁrms are generally producers of new IP, are in support
of or indiﬀerent to new IPR policies. There is some evidence that consumers of IP-
intensive goods abroad may oppose these policies, but these appear to have diﬀerent
distributional consequences (and thus politial consequences) than some other NTMs.
Technical standards can also act as barriers to trade. Evidence from the use of
standards as protection in agriculture suggests that these regulatory rules function
as substitutes for other forms of protection, appearing more prevalent when other
forms of protection are lower (Long, Kastner, and Kassatly 2013). Another way of
viewing technical standards is as ﬁxed costs of market entry. If these policies act
as a ﬁxed cost of market entry, one might expect them to redistribute across ﬁrms.
Recent research, expanding on models of trade with heterogenous ﬁrms from Melitz
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(2003), suggests that it should be the most productive ﬁrms that prefer this form of
protection (Gulotty 2014; Abel-Koch 2013).
The use of policies that privilege domestic producers, sometimes called buy na-
tional policies, also distort trade. D.-H. Kim (2010) suggests that, compared to tariﬀ
barriers, where intra-industry trade may lead to lower trade barriers, the demands for
protection in public procurement are higher in cases of intra-industry trade, as ﬁrms
have fewer free-riding incentives in lobbying. In the context of international agree-
ments and trade liberalization, it also appears that these public procurement policies
are commonly used, in part because they are more opaque, making enforcement of in-
ternational agreements more diﬃcult (Rickard and Kono 2014). This relative opacity
also appears to make these policies more prevalent in democracies (Kono and Rickard
2014).
Others have used the topic of NTMs to examine questions in other areas of political
science. Grieco (1990) uses the negotiations over NTMs in, and evidence of subsequent
compliance following, the Tokyo Round of GATT as evidence of neorealist politics in
the international system. In focusing on each of the six codes on NTMs introduced
and examining the relative national gains or losses from diﬀerent potential outcomes
(and eventual compliance), this at once treats NTMs much like one might consider
tariﬀs - as barriers at the border for protection of national interest - and very diﬀerent
than tariﬀs, as each type of policy (national preference, subsidies, pricing rules, etc.)
was used to protect vital interest groups within the respective countries in diﬀerent
ways. The diﬀerences in compliance (and the logic for complying) across the codes
suggests that not all NTMs worked the same ways, and states complied with those
that suited their national interest (Grieco 1990).
More recent research has focused on the diﬀerences between diﬀerent kinds of
NTMs and the politics related to instrument selection. Evidence from Japanese trade
policy suggests that electoral competition and electoral incentives drive the choice of
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trade instruments among subsidies, voluntary export restraints, and GATT/WTO
legal measures. This look to multiple measures, protectionism by other means,
focuses on the politics behind using unilateral versus bilateral or international le-
gal protectionism. Naoi (2009) takes particular note of the issues that arise when
looking to only one measure, framing it as a selection bias, suggesting a degree of
substitutability. In particular, Naoi argues that import-injured ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
to the method of protection among the 3 discussed options, but that exporters dis-
prefer subsidies because of retaliation risks. The diﬀerence among the three is in the
institutions that shape their implementation, and the political incentives that arise
therefrom.
Existing research on NTMs has opened many avenues of inquiry. In examining
this literature, it is clear that there are some NTMs in particular that appear to
be substitutes for tariﬀs. But, there are also ways in which they are not. The
work discussed above makes a variety of diﬀerent assumptions and arguments about
how NTMs divide winners and losers. There are also disagreements over whether
NTMs represent public or private goods for those seeking protection. In some cases,
it appears to be the most competitive industries that seek out protection through
NTMs. In other cases, it is the less competitive producers who seek support. In
considering NTMs as a whole versus tariﬀs, it seems sensible to consider NTMs as
imperfect substitutes for tariﬀs.5 With this in mind, it may be time to change the
framing of the discussion and move beyond a logic of tariﬀs and everything that is
not tariﬀs.
5. This imperfection recalls Bhagwati's Law of Constant Protection and discussions in the lit-
erature cited above (Bhagwati 1988).
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2.3 Conceptualizing Non-tariﬀ Measures
While considering matters of measurement is critical for empirical analysis of
trade and trade politics, measurement issues alone do not motivate a rethinking of
trade policies. The state of current theory on non-tariﬀ measures highlights the
more important motivation for looking at NTMs in a new way: attempts to use the
existing tariﬀ/non-tariﬀ framework require assumptions that are imprecise and that
distort our understanding of the political dynamics behind the new debates in trade
liberalization. Discussions of ﬁxed versus variable cost, particular idiosyncrasies of
how an speciﬁc NTM is implemented, at-the-border versus behind-the-border costs,
and how NTMs cover or are observed skirt a real problem: some measures that aﬀect
trade ﬂows are very much like tariﬀs, while other measures are clearly not.
Theories about trade-distorting measures rely upon assumptions about how poli-
cies apply costs to certain goods within a market. Therefore, we must consider how
these assumptions drive our theory towards or away from a better model of trade
politics. For the study of tariﬀs, the assumption that import taxes applied some
additional cost to imported varieties, while domestically-produced varieties are ex-
empted, is quite reasonable. Tariﬀs are clearly a policy that adds costs to a good
once it crosses a border. But, the same logic does not clearly apply to other poli-
cies that are considered to be trade-distorting measures. The compromises to our
assumptions that must be made to accommodate both regulatory barriers, like safety
standards, and targeted policies, like export subsidies to certain ﬁrms, obscure our
understanding of both. The ways in which supporters and opponents of each policy
should divide within industries will be diﬀerent, and furthermore will be diﬀerent
from how industries divide on tariﬀ measures.
Improvement of our theories of trade politics requires a rethinking of how gov-
ernments can distort markets, and therefore can inﬂuence trade ﬂows. Policies that
appear to be barriers in some cases, but not in others, may be so because real-world
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markets, which are structured diﬀerently in diﬀerent economies, do not neatly reﬂect
the assumptions of our models.6 One knows a tariﬀ is a trade-distorting measure be-
cause aﬀects a foreign producer's access to a market, but does not apply to domestic
production. One need only look to tariﬀ schedules to know that a good, even one that
does not actually cross the border, would have restricted access to a given market.
There is no line in a tariﬀ schedule or roughly-analogous metric that applies for many
other measures. The ad-valorem equivalent cost of a requirement to pasteurize milk
that is used to produce cheese, or government policy that privileges domestic ﬁrms
in the distribution of market licenses is not always clear. Yet, diﬀerences in pasteur-
ization rules, or limits on which individuals or ﬁrms obtain licenses for sale in a given
market still distort cross-border ﬂows of goods. It will alter both the composition of
- eliminating import of some goods - and volumes of - reducing imports of prohibited
varieties with incomplete substitution - trade between two, or among many, countries.
They also distort production and sale of goods within that market.
Attempts to force all other measures at once into a like tariﬀs or not like tariﬀs
framework ignores important distinctions among non-tariﬀ measures. Assumptions
about other market-distorting policies that frame costs of all other policies in the
same fashion, be it as ﬁxed market entry costs for all producers, ﬁxed entry costs for
foreign producers, variable costs for all producers, or variable costs for only foreign
producers, lead to theories of trade, and thus theories of trade politics, that are
critically imprecise. As domestic and international trade politics reﬂects the new
reality of protectionism, that tariﬀs are generally in decline while a whole host of
other policies appear to distort trade, this inaccuracy prevents productive discussion
of the issues at hand.
6. This is not to say that models do not have an important place in our understanding of trade
politics. Simpliﬁcations are necessary. However, we must take care to consider which simpliﬁcations
clarify and which obscure.
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2.4 Motivating a New Typology of Trade Barriers
Each product in the market is deﬁned by a variety of characteristics. Individual
products can be deﬁned by size, aspects of quality, what materials were used in their
manufacture, country or region of origin, the ﬁrm that produced them, how they
are packaged, and other intrinsic features. Taken together, these characteristics are
what make an orange grown by Tropicana-aﬃliated growers in Florida diﬀerent from
ones grown by Tropicana-aﬃliated growers in Brazil, and also diﬀerent from oranges
grown by independent growers in either Florida or Brazil. Although these oranges
may be comparable, they are diﬀerent from each other in location of production or
ﬁrm associated with that production. In the eyes of some laws, and in the eyes of
consumers, these diﬀerences may matter. Taken to the limit, no two products on the
market are identical in every way.7
Diﬀerent theories of trade and trade politics consider some of these product char-
acteristics more or less relevant to understanding goods ﬂows. For most discussion of
trade barriers to date, the salient characteristic has been country of origin: whether
a good is produced locally or beyond a territorial boundary. In most models of trade,
trade barriers have been costs applied at the border only as a market entry cost
imposed on products produced outside the border.
Consistent with that at the border logic, the primary mode of comparison be-
tween tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ measures has been through the use of ad-valorem tariﬀ
equivalents. This works well for trade-distorting measures that function in a similar
manner to tariﬀs, restricting net imports in favor of domestic alternatives or sub-
stitute goods by creating price wedges between imports and domestic alternatives.
However, for other kinds of measures, especially those that create diﬀerences within
categories of goods, this comparison misses essential within-industry redistributions.
For instance, while restrictions on the sale of consumer electronics that create certain
7. This may be considered an extreme interpretation of monopolistic competition, in a sense.
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kinds of electromagnetic interference8 may raise prices or reduce trade by a certain
level for the industry as a whole they do not aﬀect all products in the market evenly. If
some varieties in the global market already meet the standard, they would enter with
eﬀectively zero additional cost.9 Other products not meeting that global standard
would require costly modiﬁcation before sale.
Existing measurement of trade barriers does allow for ﬁne-grained analysis of tar-
iﬀs. The Harmonized System, the common baseline for many countries' tariﬀ sched-
ules, contains narrow categories (USITC 2018; World Customs Organization 2017).
For home internet routers (wired and wireless), the speciﬁc tariﬀ line  8517.62.00.9010
 covers a wide variety of products that handle the transmission of digital data. Cer-
tainly it would be possible to further divide the category into Wireless Routers,
then Transmitting and Receiving in the 5 GHz band, then Producing RF Emis-
sions Above FCC Standards or Producing RF Emissions Below FCC Standards,
but the logical limit of this exercise is uniquely coding every potential variety of every
potential product that may be included in a tariﬀ schedule. However, these hypo-
thetical additional classiﬁcations are based on another policy: the FCC standards.
The way that RF emissions rules aﬀect the relationship between the US (or EU)
8. For instance, in the US and EU, consumer electronics must not generate more radio frequency
noise than a speciﬁed standard. The frequency ranges and maximum noise levels diﬀer in each
market, which requires manufacturers to change the characteristics of RF shielding to suit each
market's rules or surpass both standards. Further, it prevents some products from entering the
markets altogether, as modiﬁcation is not economically feasible. For example, for the production
of IT equipment power supplies, products sold in the EU must conform with CISPR 32/EN 55032,
while US products must comply with 47 CFR 15.109. Both regulations concern RF emissions, but
have diﬀerent frequency ranges - CISPR 32 has two ranges, Part 15 has 3 - and emissions levels as
speciﬁed at diﬀerent distances across product classes (Hegarty 2018). A product may be designed to
exceed the noise limits of both standards, but those standards would restrict diﬀerent non-compliant
products.
9. Additional testing to demonstrate this compliance to local authorities may add cost to imported
varieties, but it is likely this is a cost faced by locally-produced varieties, as well.
10. The full description of this 10-digit HS code is: Telephone sets, including telephones for cellular
networks or for other wireless networks; other apparatus for the transmission or reception of voice,
images or other data, including apparatus for communication in a wired or wireless network (such
as a local or wide area network), other than transmission or reception apparatus of heading 8443,
8525, 8527 or 8528; parts thereof: Telephone sets, including telephones for cellular networks or for
other wireless networks: Machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of
voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus: Other
21
markets and the global market for goods is complex. The requirements eﬀectively
prohibit the sale of some (non-compliant) varieties. This prohibition reduces trade
by the volume of modems not imported because of non-compliance. Some of that
is oﬀset by increased imports of compliant modems, even beyond what might have
been imported in the absence of the regulations.11 While in the aggregate, this may
be equivalent to the eﬀect of a modest ad-valorem tariﬀ, two issues arise. First, an
increase in some imports is not generally consistent with the logic of how tariﬀs aﬀect
markets. Increases in cost of market entry for imported goods should shift demand
towards alternatives unaﬀected by that additional cost. Second, the ad-valorem tariﬀ
equivalent would not necessarily divide the market in the same way as the regulation
does. Even when considering trade theory that focuses on the diﬀerential eﬀects of
trade barriers on ﬁrms of diﬀerent size or heterogenous productivity, the distortions
in the market for goods aﬀect ﬁrms based on the characteristics of the ﬁrm, not of
the product.12 This illustrates a problem with the division of all trade-distorting
measures into two groups: tariﬀs and not. In some cases, non-tariﬀ alternatives have
the same kinds of market-distorting eﬀects as import tariﬀs do, and so computing an
equivalent tariﬀ is a reasonable exercise. When onerous import rules on certain goods
slow time-to-market, or require importers to pay additional costs (either directly in
customs fees or indirectly to staﬀ or agents to administer the customs process), the
way it distorts markets works the same way as would an import tax of the same
magnitude. But for many of the non-tariﬀ barriers to trade used in the global goods
market today, measurement on the basis of a tariﬀ equivalent is at best imprecise and
at worst obscures important distributional outcomes, especially within industries.
Attempts to compare trends in non-tariﬀ barriers to trade to trends in tariﬀs
11. This is dependent on the degree to which consumers substitute between the non-compliant
alternatives and the compliant ones, given price, etc.
12. In these models, the heterogenity comes from diﬀerences in productivity of the ﬁrms - their
ability to turn the labor stock into the goods they produce, which they observe after an initial
investment. Melitz 2003
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have been sidetracked by the simple fact that non-tariﬀ measures are neither pure
substitutes nor pure complements to import duties. Some alternatives function in
much the same way as tariﬀs, cleanly dividing winners and losers along geographic
lines. Others, however, like the RF standards mentioned above, do not necessarily
have that eﬀect. There are wireless routers produced in China or Malaysia that
meet the standard and others that do not. It is not the fact that those routers are
produced in China or Malaysia that makes them subject to the standard. If they were
produced within the US or EU, they would still need to meet requirements. What
follows is an attempt to refocus the discussion of the political economy of trade-
distorting measures on the politics. To better understand the politics of demands
for diﬀerent kinds of policies, one must ﬁrst understand how diﬀerent kinds of rules
distort markets diﬀerently.
The extensive and mature political economy literature on trade politics has built
oﬀ economic theory to explain interactions between groups, the eﬀects of institutions,
and the role that global forces have played in shaping demands for and supply of
trade policy. Rogowski's seminal work on the factor-based political cleavages that
arise when exposure to trade changes relies on the economic theory of Stolper and
Samuelson13 (Rogowski 1987; Stolper and Samuelson 1941). Later work by Gilligan
(1997a) brought the Ricardo-Viner speciﬁc-factors model to bear on questions of po-
litical coalitions around RTAA. Other signiﬁcant work in economics, including on
endogenous tariﬀ theory and some work on non-tariﬀ barriers, also uses the speciﬁc-
factors framework to generate hypotheses about when protection should arise. (Ray
1981a, 1981b; Magee, Brock, and Young 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994) Subse-
quent work by Gilligan (1997b) turned to models of intra-industry trade, building oﬀ
the model of intraindustry trade under monopolistic competition introduced in Help-
man (1981) and Krugman (1979) to explain how lobbying for intraindustry protection
13. Stolper and Samuelson's work is, in turn an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, discussed
widely and by many. See Leamer et al. (1995) for a widely-read treatment and review.
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is a private good, signiﬁcantly changing the dynamics of ﬁrm-level trade preferences.
A recent wave of research in both economics and political science has looked to the-
ories of ﬁrm behavior over trade policy when ﬁrms are themselves not identical, and
the subsequent intra-industry cleavages over trade policy. Related work has focused
on the stark heterogeneities in tariﬀ protection across products of a single industry or
sector (Bombardini 2008; Bombardini and Trebbi 2012; Osgood 2016; I. S. Kim 2017).
This work builds oﬀ the work of Melitz and others and models of ﬁrm heterogeneity
and gains from trade (Melitz 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008).
Indeed, as Rodrik (1995) suggest, any political-economic model of trade policy
must explicitly specify individuals' (or actors') preferences over policy options.14
Looking to models of trade for these preferences is natural. However, it was not
always so. Schattschneider (1935) focuses directly on interest group politics at the in-
dustry and ﬁrm level and explains the pressure politics and coalition-building around
the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀs, laying the groundwork for future study of interest group
politics in trade. However, the work above has largely considered only tariﬀs, or
tariﬀ setting. As existing work has suggested the politics of NTBs is more complex,
with more complex distributional considerations, there is value in considering whether
adopting existing trade logic is the best avenue for considering the politics of NTMs,
of NTMs and tariﬀs together, of both in the presence of a complex, interconnected
global economy. Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at trade-distorting policies
and derive assumptions about actors' preferences from there.
Acknowledging the progress made in political economy to date, but also the dif-
ﬁculties in developing theory on NTMs in the same consistent way as with tariﬀs, it
seems one way forward is to reconsider how we codify barriers to trade. Instead of the
dichotomy of tariﬀs and not tariﬀs, or speciﬁc theories (with attendant preference
14. See also Alt et al. (1996) for a discussion of S-S and R-V models in political economy and an
introduction to the economics of, but not the politcal models using, Krugman's Increasing Returns
to Scale models.
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assumptions) for each particular kind of non-tariﬀ policy, it may be more productive
to focus on how diﬀerent kinds of trade distorting policies divide industries, putting
the cleavages at the center of the discussion.15
2.5 A Typology of Barriers to Trade
Governments use many diﬀerent policies to inﬂuence trade ﬂows and shape access
to their markets, often for the beneﬁt of groups of domestic actors. Referring to
these as either tariﬀs or not tariﬀs ignores key diﬀerences among the latter group,
and ignores what all such policies have in common: they are all barriers to trade.
Whether their primary intent is distortion of trade ﬂows, or the diminution of trade
is a secondary outcome, policies that prevent trade in goods that might otherwise
have ﬂowed between markets are a barrier. This section introduces and describes a
typology of trade barriers based on the manner in which they discriminate, rather
than whether they are import duties or not.
Some non-tariﬀ policies work very much like tariﬀs, imposing at-the-border costs
on a product that generate revenues for the imposing government. Even policies that
do not yield similar rents to governments work in the same manner as tariﬀs do, by
creating a price wedge between imports and domestically-produced alternatives. The
winners are deﬁned by the location in which they choose to locate production of their
good. But, not all policies work in this manner. Trade can be distorted by policies
that restrict market access on any basis, as long as those goods cross borders to enter
the market. Tariﬀs and tariﬀ-like policies are the most straightforward kind of trade
distorting policy, but they are by no means the only policies that can, intentionally
or incidentally, distort trade ﬂows.
To simplify comparison of policies and place tariﬀs within a single framework of
15. It is also possible that this change in perspective may help with measurement and modeling of
trade ﬂows, by indicating how trade ﬂows may be distorted, either in volume or composition.
25
trade-distorting policies, it is necessary to focus instead on how the policy adds costs
to the production of a good. Recall from above that each variety of good in a market
can be deﬁned by where it is made, how it is made (or what it contains), and who
makes it. These three dimensions cover the ways in which policy can be used to raise
the price of some goods (but not others) on a market. This increase can come about
because of increased cost of production, to comply with a policy or absorb fees, or
increased price to market because of policies which directly aﬀect ﬁnal prices. By
raising the price of some varieties, inducing consumers to change their consumption
behavior, governments can improve the fortunes of some producers, at the expense of
others.16
When those policies privilege varieties produced domestically, the eﬀect is the
expected decline in trade, speciﬁcally imports. Compared to a free-trade scenario,
the overall volume of trade is lower. Some goods may be more or less aﬀected by
the policy, but the policy is clearly a trade barrier. However, trade can also be
distorted through changes in the composition of trade ﬂows. Policies that privilege
certain varieties of goods17 can lead to patterns of trade where overall volumes are not
signiﬁcantly distorted, but where the variety of goods traded (or, more speciﬁcally,
imported) is reduced. Compared to that same free-trade scenario, the goods that
enter that market are qualitatively diﬀerent. Some varieties are blocked, in the same
manner that a tariﬀ or an import quota might block imports.
All of these policies can be trade barriers, if the additional costs prohibit trade
(goods ﬂows across borders) that might otherwise have occurred. The winners and
losers from barriers in each of these categories can be more diﬃcult to identify than
in the simple tariﬀ (or tariﬀ-like) case, but they do exist. Despite the additional
complexity, placing trade barriers in this larger framework has some advantages. The
16. The degree to which the winners and losers are politically salient depends on a number of
factors, including whether a producer is a ﬁrm located  either as a producer or with headquarters
 within political boundaries.
17. For instance, a ban on the sale of all electronics containing lead-based solder.
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distributive consequences (and thus the distributive politics) of trade barriers and
other market-distorting policies have the same logic: the proﬁts and losses of aﬀected
ﬁrms. Firms are not swayed by aggregate, economy-wide gains and losses in welfare
when making decisions about political pressure. It is the gains or losses to that ﬁrm
that are salient, and that drive those ﬁrms to pressure governments for relief through
policy changes. Competitors in a market are still competitors, regardless of where
their product is produced or how similar it is to a ﬁrm's own.18
This new typology divides trade barriers into groups based on how they raise the
market price of goods. There are four types of barriers:
 those that impose additional costs based on the location of production of a
good,
 those that impose costs on a good based on its innate characteristics or methods
of production,
 those that impose additional costs for some producers (ﬁrms) of a good, and
 those policies that impose additional costs on all goods sold in a market.
In the subsequent sections, we introduce the types of barriers with examples. we
then explain some of the consequences of each type of barrier when they are imposed
(or removed) as unilateral changes, then as changes in the context of a bilateral
relationship.
2.5.1 Location-discriminating Costs: Where it's Made
The most clear example of a trade distorting policy is one that imposes additional
costs that depend on the location of production of a good. By driving a wedge between
international and domestic market prices, these policies divert some consumption
18. While these characteristics may aﬀect competitors' costs, there is no reason to suspect that
ﬁrms have a particular preference for domestic competitors over foreign ones.
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away from foreign-produced goods towards domestic alternatives, when they exist.
Location-discriminating costs create a protected market within the boundaries of a
geographic area, and goods that are traded across that border arrive at a market at
a higher cost than they would otherwise.
Tariﬀs are clearly location-speciﬁc barriers, as they impose an additional cost on
each imported good. Whether calculated as a portion of an import's stated value
or as a speciﬁc cost on each imported unit, tariﬀs raise the cost of the good for
consumers.19 There are a variety of tariﬀ-like policies that have been used in place of
tariﬀs, often when tariﬀ protection has been prohibited by international agreement.
Quotas, by restricting access to markets and, in some cases, charging importers for
quota licenses, also increase the cost of a product traded across a border. Voluntary
export restrictions work in the same way, but are administered by the government
of the exporting market. Other policies look quite diﬀerent, but also discriminate
based on the location of production. Policies requiring a minimum of local (within
the customs area) content discriminate between products based on location of origin.
Onerous customs procedures, or special inspections for imported products only, are
also ways of imposing costs on only some products in a market: those produced
outside the borders.
Similarly, policies that indirectly raise the cost of goods originating outside na-
tional borders, such as currency manipulation, can generate location-discriminating
costs that act as barriers to trade. If, by distorting the local-market price of a prod-
uct, these sorts of manipulations make goods manufactured abroad more costly for
consumers, currency manipulation can impose location-discriminating costs, and thus
shape trade ﬂows. Other currency and capital controls, such as limited currency con-
vertibility, restrictions on repatriation of proﬁts, or measures that impose additional
19. It is also possible that producers may accept lower proﬁt margins on each unit, such that
imported varieties sell at the same price, but this is not necessarily the case for all producers. At the
margins, some producers will have proﬁt margins too small to absorb the additional costs imposed
by the tariﬀ.
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costs on the conversion of one currency into another, are another form of location-
discriminating cost. To access a market that is behind a barrier of this kind, produc-
ers who manufacture outside that currency area (and therefore in terms of a diﬀerent
currency) face additional costs that local competitors do not.
In addition to costs imposed by policy, other natural barriers to trade, such as
transportation costs, are a location-discriminating cost. In the same manner as tar-
iﬀs, import regulations, quotas, or location-speciﬁc import restrictions, transportation
costs can prevent goods from entering markets where they might otherwise ﬁnd buy-
ers. Although these are not costs that governments can impose on goods, they can act
as natural barriers, reducing the need for policy-based protection of local producers.
In all of these cases, market access is restricted is through increased product costs
applied diﬀerentially based on the location of origin. In thinking about trade barriers
this way, tariﬀs and some other non-tariﬀ barriers are clearly substitutes. A tariﬀ
can be replaced by a quota, or an import inspection, or currency manipulation that
generates similar costs on imported goods. In this case, the net eﬀect of the change
in policy should be minimal, as long as the magnitude of the cost increase on foreign-
produced products is largely the same. As will be explained in the next section, the
producers who beneﬁt from the protection aﬀorded by the tariﬀ will be the same who
beneﬁt from these location-discriminating alternatives.
2.5.2 Characteristic-discriminating Costs: How it's Made
A second manner in which policy can discriminate is on the basis of a prod-
uct's characteristics.20 These types of policies raise the market entry cost of some
varieties and not others, depending on how a product is made. Also, characteristic-
discriminating barriers impose costs that apply to varieties of goods with certain
20. These characteristics can be both the content of the product or the methods used in its pro-
duction. In the same way that a prohibition on a chemical in a particular product may the basis
for a market access cost, so too may the use of a particular technology, or laws on the labor used to
produce a good add cost based on how it's made.
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deﬁning features. Characteristics-discriminating barriers can aﬀect only products
considered to be low-quality varieties, only those considered to be high-quality
varieties, or a set of goods where quality ranking is not obvious.
Although canonical examples of these sorts of barriers take the form of safety
standards (and thus, exclude what might be considered low-quality varieties by some),
the deﬁning feature of these kinds of policies is that they separate market access on
the basis of a good's characteristics. Prohibiting the sale of certain kinds of cheeses
made with unpasteurized milk on safety grounds, for instance, may eliminate varieties
that are considered by some consumers to be high-quality varieties. It is not the case
that quality and characteristics are the same concept.
Other characteristic-discriminating policies may relate to the factors used in pro-
duction or the externalities generated in production. Labor standards, which are
regularly part of trade agreements, create restrictions on how a product is produced.
These policies, which often require standards in an exporting country to meet those
of the importing country, divide markets based on the process of production, and the
inputs used in production. Environmental standards, whether legislated or adopted
as an industry code, have similar eﬀects. When products produced in a manner in-
consistent with the standard face additional barriers, it is that manner of production,
not the location of production or who produced it, which matters. Usually, these
standards are implanted with the expressed aim of mitigating harmful behavior, but
the way they divide industries is primarily along lines of how the product is made.21
As these policies restrict market access based on product characteristics, they ap-
ply equally to locally- and foreign-produced goods. For example, a variety of ﬁreproof
door that does not meet a country's minimum safety standards will not be permissible
for sale whether it is produced within that country's borders or abroad. Regulations
that require that a food product be refrigerated from harvest to market apply to all
21. Put slightly diﬀerently, diﬀerences in production technology matter in these cases.
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varieties of that product, not just to those produced outside the country's borders.22
Characteristic-discriminating costs often take the form of ﬁnished-product standards,
but can also include policies restricting the sources of a product or the manner in
which it is produced, even if that has little or no eﬀect on the content of the ﬁnal
good.23 In addition, some forms of labeling standards  for instance, restricting the
use of the label ice cream to only desserts made with cream from cows milk  create
diﬀerences between products in consumers' minds on the basis of quality and com-
parability, eﬀectively changing the value (or, inversely, the price) of the good to the
consumer.
Characteristic-discriminating costs distort markets by either raising the ﬁnal cost
of some varieties of a product (the non-compliant ones), making them less appeal-
ing than other varieties, or blocking some varieties from reaching market (eﬀectively,
raising costs suﬃciently to ensure no consumer would ever purchase it) altogether.
When these varieties are unavailable, consumers will substitute among whatever al-
ternatives are available to them. Alternatives includes products within the same
category of goods (but of a diﬀerent variety) and all other goods and services.
The eﬀect of these kinds of policies, and the characteristic-discriminating costs
they impose, is somewhat more complex. When some varieties of a product bear a
policy-related cost before entering the market, the total cost of that variety increases.
Facing that increased price, some consumers will shift their consumption to other,
less costly varieties. Indeed, this very consumption-shifting behavior is sometimes
the goal of policy. If policymakers wish to discourage behavior, targeting products
(or varieties of products) with diﬀerential costs is one way of changing consumer
22. There are some regulations that are characteristic-discriminating, but directed towards imports
only, or imports of only some countries. These policies impose location-discriminating costs in
addition to characteristic-discriminating costs.
23. This is not to suggest that these diﬀerences do not matter, but rather to suggest that the
content of a ﬁnal good may be produced in more than one way. GATT does consider standards which
regulate content diﬀerently than those which regulate processes, with respect to considering trade
barriers. However, in this framework, the process and the content both make up the characteristics
of a good.
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behavior. However, not all producers (if each producer makes only one or a few
varieties) will be aﬀected in the same way by these costs. This division will arise
within industries and regardless of location of production.
Producers facing characteristic-discriminating costs in a market cannot avoid them
by changing the location of production. Instead, it is the product itself that must
change. If ﬁrms can alter their production to meet local-market requirements, and
thus avoid these characteristic-discriminating costs, then they are likely to do so.
However, the natural characteristics of the market (homogeneity of the product, pos-
sibilities for technological/product innovation), the legal framework around adapting
to new varieties (intellectual property law/patents, etc.), and the ﬁrms own ability
to change (capital necessary to change production, sunk costs, etc.) all contribute to
determine whether a ﬁrm can eﬀectively adapt to avoid characteristic-discriminating
costs. If they cannot, they may still attempt to enter a market with a non-compliant
good, and bear the costs thereof. However, that good's market cost will reﬂect the
non-compliance, and is likely to make the variety less attractive to consumers.
2.5.3 Firm-discriminating Costs: Who Makes It
Other characteristics of the policy environment create costs that apply only to
goods produced by certain ﬁrms or costs that apply to all producers except some ex-
cluded ﬁrms. These policies create diﬀerences in market access based on who produced
a good. Alternatively, these policies may impose costs, or exclude from additional
costs, products that are sold by or marketed by certain ﬁrms.
Firm-discriminating costs can take a variety of forms. Policies on import licensing
that provide speciﬁc importers with authorization to import, or to sell, are a common
one. Were two diﬀerent ﬁrms to attempt import of otherwise-identical products (for
instance, shoes made from man-made materials in China), the ﬁrm with an existing
import license would have an advantage over their competitor. Obtaining import
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licenses can be a costly and time-consuming process, which creates additional costs
for new entrants. Government procurement policies that require that the contractor
be a domestic ﬁrm, or that privilege the bids of domestic ﬁrms, set a price wedge
between diﬀerent producers. This kind of policy works diﬀerently than a location-
discriminating cost, as it is the ﬁrm, not the location of production, to which the
privilege or cost is tied.24 Alternatively, policies to support national winners or to
provide ﬁnancial assistance to certain ﬁrms (in the form of loans or subsidies) also
create ﬁrm-speciﬁc costs by lowering the eﬀective price-to-market for one ﬁrm. In
some cases, intellectual property laws can create ﬁrm-discriminating costs, restricting
market access on a particular variety of good to one or a small group of producers,
forcing others to either pay fees to license the IP or ﬁnd ways to produce a diﬀerent
variety which is not aﬀected by the IP rights.
When costs apply only to the goods of certain producers, the eﬀect on sales and
proﬁts is as expected: consumers will change their purchasing behavior to reﬂect the
cost diﬀerences, or ﬁrms will absorb some of the costs in the form of reduced proﬁts. In
either case, ﬁrm-discriminating costs can create diﬀerences in market competitiveness
between two ﬁrms producing identical (or nearly-identical) products in the same place.
The ﬁrm facing the additional costs cannot escape them by changing the location of
production or the characteristics of their goods. The costs of ﬁrm-discriminating
policies are tied to the identity of the producer.
2.5.4 Indiscriminate Costs
The ﬁnal category of costs are those that apply to all products within a given
category. These are costs, either ﬁxed or variable, that apply to any good enter-
ing a market. These can be considered indiscriminate costs because they impose
24. A simple example of this is US military aircraft purchasing, where the supply chain for some
aircraft produced by US ﬁrms include foreign suppliers and subcontractors, while aircraft produced
by foreign competitors may include US ﬁrms in their supply chain. Some policies also require
domestic production, although this varies from case to case.
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additional requirements on producers without conditions on location, the quality or
characteristics of the good produced, or the identity of the producer.
Labeling requirements, where goods sold must include additional documentation
on the packaging to inform the customer of the content and characteristics, are one
example of this kind of market access cost. If all varieties and producers must un-
dertake the same labeling process, it is a cost applies without discrimination. Cer-
tiﬁcations/inspections requirements that apply to all products within a category of
goods work similarly. If the certiﬁcation process is the same for all potential entrants,
then the cost of testing and certiﬁcation is an indiscriminate cost. Other policies,
like consumption taxes, can act as an indiscriminate cost, as long as they are applied
equivalently across all permutations of producer, quality, and location of origin within
a given category of goods. Consumption taxes make goods more costly for consumers
by raising the eﬀective cost of all goods (usually, in proportion to their sale price or
value-added).
These indiscriminate costs can take the form of a single, ﬁxed cost of market entry
- such as a testing requirement - or a per-unit cost paid by all varieties, like an excise
tax. In either of these cases, it is the application of the cost to all varieties that
matters. Indiscriminate costs of market access cannot be avoided. They apply to all
ﬁrms and varieties, and without regard to location of production. While the exact
nature of the requirements that generate the costs (testing, labeling, etc.) may vary
from market to market, for all producers seeking to enter a given market, those costs
must be paid. Whether the cost applies before the good reaches market (testing,
certiﬁcation, labeling) or at the time of sale (consumption taxes), the eﬀect on the
price of the good to the consumer is the same. Indiscriminate costs raise the price for
all consumers of all varieties, although not necessarily equally across varieties, and
aﬀect their consumption decisions accordingly.25
25. With ﬁxed costs, scale eﬀects are an important consideration, as a single, indiscriminately
applied testing cost adds a smaller cost to each of 1000 units sold than to a single unit sold.
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2.5.5 Limitations of this Typology
The four categories above span the variety of manners in which costs can be
imposed on goods that might enter a market. The typology does, however, have
some limitations. Some policies appear to impose costs in a variety of ways, or impose
costs that are conditioned on more than one aspect of a product's characteristics. For
instance, a temporary import restriction for sanitary and phytosanitary reasons may
be considered to apply both a location-discriminating (based on where something
is made) and a characteristic-discriminating (based on the process used to produce
the goods) cost. While this makes sense if conceiving of these costs as orthogonal
dimensions of a policy's total cost proﬁle, for simple categorization it can lead to
disputes or uncertainty about how a policy should be considered.
Similarly, this typology is generally agnostic with respect to two important features
of policy-induced costs: whether costs are a ﬁxed or variable cost and whether the
costs are revenue generating or not. For some models of trade, the distinction between
ﬁxed and variable costs of a given policy matter. If a cost applies only at market entry,
and not on a per-unit basis, then there will be important scale or productivity eﬀects
that are ignored here. A one-time cost of obtaining an import license or adjusting
a product's characteristics to meet safety or content standards is a relatively greater
per-unit cost when expected sales are low. In contrast, a variable cost will have the
same eﬀect on prices no matter the size of the ﬁrm or the volume of sales. Similarly,
for the study of tariﬀs vs non-tariﬀ barriers, the fact that tariﬀs generate revenue
(although the overall importance of these revenues has declined for some countries
in recent decades) is a key diﬀerence between them and many non-tariﬀ policies that
distort trade. When considering government incentives to implement diﬀerent kinds
of market access costs, this distinction may matter.
Despite these limitations, this new framework does what it aims to do. It clariﬁes
when policies are similar in their eﬀect on markets - tariﬀs, quotas, export subsidies,
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and currency manipulations all distort on location of production - and when policies
are diﬀerent in their eﬀects - tariﬀs and product standards create diﬀerent cleavages
- in a systematic way. In doing so, it puts the distributive politics at the center
of the framework, and highlights where changes in industries over time may lead to
diﬀerences in preferences over various kinds of trade-distorting policies.
2.6 Considering Winners and Losers from Market Access Bar-
riers - Single-Country/Unilateral Policy Change
Each of these kinds of market access barriers has distributive consequences: some
actors win while others lose. As it is the gains and losses from policy changes that
motivate political action (lobbying, supporting candidates, etc.) by market actors,
understanding the changes in distributive outcomes caused by each kind of market
entry cost is essential to motivating the explanation of the politics of this new pro-
tectionism.
Before moving to an explanation of the eﬀects of market access barriers when
raised or lowered reciprocally, we consider the eﬀect of each kind of barrier on a
domestic market when used unilaterally. These outcomes assume that, at least in
the short run, ﬁrms cannot change location, variety of production, or ownership/ﬁrm
structure. When these assumptions are relaxed, the complexity of tradeoﬀs increases
quickly. Further, the eﬀects discussed below are partial equilibrium outcomes. The
eﬀect of barriers on factor cost and quantity is not considered here.
When applied unilaterally, each kind of barrier has the eﬀect of dividing industries
into groups of losers (who see market access barriers negatively aﬀect their sales) and
winners (who gain some of the losers sales through substitution by consumers). These
winners and losers include ﬁrms headquartered within the boundaries of the protected
market, ﬁrms producing goods within the borders of the market, and ﬁrms that are
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located completely outside the protected market.
2.6.1 Location-discriminating Costs
When the market entry costs are applied according to the location of production,
winners and losers divide based on where a ﬁrm's products are made.26 This reﬂects
the classical understanding of the eﬀect of tariﬀs and the location-discriminating costs
associated with import duties. When location-speciﬁc barriers raise the market price
of foreign-produced goods, consumers will shift consumption away from the costlier
varieties (the foreign-produced ones aﬀected by location-discriminating costs) towards
less expensive alternatives (those not subject to the location-speciﬁc costs) produced
within the market or in other foreign markets.27 Producers in the domestic market
will, at worst, see no change in their sales/proﬁts, and may see an increase in sales
due to cross-variety substitution. Even if other foreign-produced alternatives exist
that are unaﬀected by location-discriminating costs, local ﬁrms are likely to be better
oﬀ when some foreign competitors' goods are made costlier.
2.6.2 Characteristic-discriminating Costs
Characteristic-discriminating costs apply costs (ﬁxed entry cost or a per-unit
variable cost) to the production cost of some varieties. Recall that Characteristic-
discriminating costs can be applied to any subset of varieties of a good. Thus, for any
policy that imposes costs on some varieties based on quality, there are winners and
losers among ﬁrms in that industry. Producers of varieties aﬀected by the policy lose,
as the increased cost of compliance or outright block on sales in the market leads to
26. Production discrimination is the goal for many location-speciﬁc costs, but some costs are as-
sessed based on the foreign location from which the product is shipped. Firms or importers use
this as a means of jumping the market access barrier by shipping the product through an interme-
diary market, but governments often use more sophisticated rules of origin to prevent this kind of
chicanery.
27. This substitution depends on cross-elasticities of varieties. When no locally-produced alterna-
tives exist, consumers will simply consume less overall.
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lower proﬁts and fewer sales. This occurs regardless of the ﬁrm's location (domestic or
foreign), the location of production (local or foreign), or the identity of the ﬁrm. Other
ﬁrms, producing varieties not aﬀected by the policy, will see gains in sales or proﬁts
as consumers alter their consumption and substitute unaﬀected varieties for the more
expensive, policy-restricted, alternatives. As with location-discriminating costs, the
cross elasticity of the varieties will determine the degree to which producers of other
goods will see sales and proﬁts rise. At worst, the exclusion of some varieties from the
market will not prevent consumers from buying the non-excluded ones. Thus, ﬁrms
whose products are not aﬀected by the Characteristic-discriminating policy will, at
worst, see no change in proﬁts.
2.6.3 Firm-discriminating Costs
Policies that discriminate with respect to the ﬁrm's identity create clear winners
and losers. When some ﬁrms must pay an additional cost to access the market, their
goods are more expensive, and they lose sales. The ﬁrms that are excluded from
those additional costs may gain additional sales or proﬁts from consumers' substitu-
tion. At worst, their sales and proﬁts are unaﬀected. Although they work indirectly,
and through more ineﬃcient means than a direct transfer, market access costs that
discriminate based on ﬁrm identity work the same way as a direct payment to the
winners. Alternatively, if some ﬁrms are privileged through subsidy policies or
other policies that provide special access, that ease of accessing the market or direct
payment to the ﬁrm represents a cost on all other ﬁrms. The eﬀect is the same as
imposing a market access cost on all non-supported ﬁrms, creating a cost diﬀerence
between the supported/privileged goods and those that are not. The resulting dif-
ference in proﬁts or sales (as costs are passed on through prices) yields the same
ﬁrm-versus-ﬁrm division of winners and losers.
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2.6.4 Indiscriminate Costs
When a policy raises the price of all goods in a market, all producers will see sales
and/or proﬁts decline. However, the degree to which these indiscriminate costs aﬀect
ﬁrms varies. For some ﬁrms, the additional cost pushes the cost of their product
above the price where consumers will purchase it. For these ﬁrms, the indiscriminate
costs lead to their exit. For other ﬁrms, the increased price of their product on the
market simply reduces sales or proﬁts.28
If the indiscriminate cost applies only to one kind of good (is applied indiscrimi-
nately across an industry, such as luxury taxes on all boats sold, regardless of size or
cost), then consumers may shift their consumption to other goods, with some loss of
utility. Alternatively, consumers may simply choose to consume less, diverting more
of their resources to leisure. In either case, as the costs of the goods increase because
of the market access cost, demand will fall. The impact of this cost on producers
depends on how close their market price is to the indiﬀerence point of consumers in
the market. Thus, costs of market entry that apply indiscriminately mean all pro-
ducers are losers, but it is possible (and in fact, likely) that the eﬀect on each ﬁrm
is diﬀerent.
2.7 Considering Winners and Losers from Market Access Bar-
riers - Two/Multi-country Policy Changes
The explanations above focused on the economic eﬀects of a policy change in only
one country in a hypothetical global economy. However, many conventional treat-
ments of trade barriers (and actual trade negotiations) focus on reciprocal changes
(usually decreases) in market access barriers. Consider a simpliﬁed world with two
28. In some models of trade, these indiscriminate costs can raise the proﬁts of some high productiv-
ity ﬁrms as lower productivity ﬁrms exit and consumers reallocate their consumption basket. Also,
for some producers of inelastically-consumed goods, higher consumption taxes may lead to increased
sales, as consumers reduce consumption of other goods and reallocate.
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countries, Country A and Country B. The eﬀect of each kind of market access bar-
rier depends not only upon the dimension along which goods entering markets face
additional costs, but also whether those costs are applied on both sides of a trade
dyad. To illustrate the eﬀects of diﬀerent market access costs within a trade dyad, we
consider the distortionary eﬀects of a policy change compared to a hypothetical free
trade counterfactual with no market-distorting policies. This discussion focuses only
on the eﬀects of policy changes, not on how they might arise. The focus, again, is on
the distributional eﬀects of policy changes.
2.7.1 Location-speciﬁc Costs
When the market access policies used by governments to regulate their domestic
markets impose location-speciﬁc costs, the eﬀects on domestic markets and on trade
are consistent with those suggested by existing theory of tariﬀs. Because these mea-
sures divide market access based on location, the winners and losers in each country
will divide on the basis of location of production relative to location of sale as follows.
2.7.1.1 One Country Raises Location-speciﬁc Costs
If, in a particular country pair, one country (Country A) imposes market entry
costs on the basis of location against goods produced in Country B, ﬁrms within the
protected market and ﬁrms in the market that remains access cost-free (Country B)
will experience diﬀerent distributional outcomes.
In Country A, the policy that raises costs of non-Country A varieties will aﬀect
both consumers and some producers. For consumers, the increased cost of Country B-
produced varieties will lead some to switch to Country A-produced alternatives. For
ﬁrms producing in Country A, that substitution brings the beneﬁts of increased sales
and the potential for increased margins. This may also have the eﬀect of bringing new
entrants producing substitutes for foreign-produced alternatives into the market. For
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ﬁrms that produce in Country A and export to Country B, those sales are relatively
unaﬀected, while domestic consumption may increase. In total, the location-speciﬁc
cost has the eﬀect of improving sales for those ﬁrms that produce in Country A.
In Country B, domestic consumption is relatively unaﬀected. As goods in Country
B do not have diﬀerent costs dependent on location of production, imported varieties
and domestically-produced alternatives remain at the same relative cost. Therefore,
no substitution across varieties should occur. Firms that produce only for domestic
consumption in Country B should see no change in their sales.29 However, ﬁrms in
Country B that produced varieties that were exported to Country A for sale in that
market will bear the eﬀects of the policies in Country A. These exporting ﬁrms will see
reduced proﬁts either because of reduced margins on their goods sold to Country A
or because of consumer substitution away from their varieties in Country A. In either
case, the net eﬀect for those ﬁrms will be negative. For some ﬁrms, it is possible that
the new costs for reaching Country A's market will lead them to exit, if they can no
longer sell proﬁtably in that foreign market.
2.7.1.2 Both Countries Raise Location-speciﬁc Costs
The case of two countries raising location-speciﬁc costs reﬂects the familiar re-
ciprocal tariﬀs case discussed in existing theories of trade barriers.30 The winners
and losers within Countries A and B will divide on familiar factoral, sectoral, or ﬁrm-
speciﬁc lines, depending on factor mobility and product diﬀerentiation assumptions.
The speciﬁc form of the market access costs can vary. One country may use tariﬀs or
quotas, while the other uses exchange rate policy or import-only restrictions. If both
countries use policy to raise the cost of some varieties based on location of production,
29. In some cases, it is possible that goods produced in Country B for export to Country A will
instead be diverted into the Country B market, potentially displacing sales of the domestic-only
Country B producers' goods and Country A's exports to Country B.
30. While the disucssion of reciprocal tariﬀs is usually in the context of tariﬀs on diﬀerent products,
those discussions also generally ignore intraindustry trade. In models of intraindustry trade with
heterogenous ﬁrms and monopolistic competition, tariﬀs are a general variable cost of import.
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the eﬀects are symmetric to the degree that the countries are similar. The winners
and losers among ﬁrms in both countries divide on the degree to which the policies
reduce their export sales (if they export) versus increase their sales in the market of
production, where access costs do not aﬀect total cost of their goods, but do aﬀect
the cost of imported alternatives.
2.7.2 Characteristic-speciﬁc Costs
When market access is restricted through increased costs for products with certain
characteristics, the logic becomes a bit more complex. In a given trade ﬂow dyad, it
is possible that costs are applied to the same (Countries A and B both raise barriers
to widgets made with material containing lead compounds), somewhat overlapping
(Country A raises costs on goods made with lead in any form, while Country B only
raises costs on varieties with more than a certain concentration of lead), or completely
diﬀerent sets of goods (Country A raises costs on lead-containing varieties, Country
B raises costs on varieties that contain arsenic). It is also possible that one country
may impose costs on certain varieties of goods, while the other does not (Country
A raises costs on lead-containing varieties, Country B imposes no additional costs).
In each of the markets, the additional costs will aﬀect the at-market cost of only
certain varieties, a subset of the potential varieties of the good. Consider two types
of a certain good: Type J and Type K. When governments raise market access costs
on one variety (for instance, restricting the sale of certain kinds of antihistamines
to prescription-only, or requiring that all tires meet a content standard), it has the
eﬀect of dividing winners and losers along lines that cut across industries, not across
geography.
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2.7.2.1 One Country Raises Costs on Some Characteristics
If Country A implements policy that raises costs on some varieties of a good based
on its characteristics or how it is manufactured, it will have eﬀects in both countries.
Consider a policy that raises the cost of Type J varieties. In Country A, consumers,
faced with higher prices on Type J goods (those aﬀected by the policy), will reduce
their consumption of Type J varieties. Some may substitute consumption of Type K
varieties, depending on the degree to which substitution is possible. In Country B,
consumer's choices will be unaﬀected by the new policies in Country A.
Producers within both countries will see beneﬁts or losses depending on whether
their goods face additional costs based on the characteristics that are targeted by
the policy in Country A. For producers of Type J varieties, higher costs mean lower
proﬁts or lower sales (as prices rise). If there are ﬁrms producing Type J varieties in
both countries, then the losers are not conﬁned to just those located outside Country
A. As consumers in Country A move away from Type J products, ﬁrms in Country A
selling only within Country A will be negatively aﬀected. Depending on the degree to
which the additional costs distort consumption, these ﬁrms may be forced to exit the
market. Firms in Country A that produce Type J products both for local sale and
for export will see their domestic sales fall, while export sales to Country B will be
unaﬀected. This can, in some cases, lead to ﬁrms producing only for export. Firms in
Country B that produce Type J products will see the opposite, where domestic sales
are unaﬀected, but export sales fall as costs distort Country A's market. For producers
of Type K products, the beneﬁts reﬂect the other side of the cross-Type substitution.
Firms in Country A that produce Type K goods and sell within Country A will beneﬁt
from the increased sales of their variety. Firms in Country B that produce Type K
goods will see some gains as well. For those ﬁrms that already export to Country
A, this means increased sales or proﬁts. For ﬁrms in Country B that produce only
for domestic consumption, there will be little eﬀect on sales, unless the new market
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conditions in Country A make exporting a viable option. In the aggregate, Type K
producers in Country B beneﬁt from the policy change in Country A, just as similar
producers in Country A do.
2.7.2.2 Both Countries Raise Costs on Diﬀerent Characteristics
If each of the countries implement policies that impose additional costs on diﬀer-
ent varieties, the diﬀerence between characteristic-speciﬁc and location-speciﬁc costs
becomes clearer. Consider a scenario where Country A raises costs on Type J goods,
while Country B raises costs on Type K goods.31 Under these conditions, the markets
in each country will have diﬀerent varieties of products in the same category of goods.
In Country A, the increased cost of Type J goods drives consumers to substitute to
alternatives, including Type K varieties. In Country B, the increased cost of Type
K goods drives consumers to do the opposite, substituting to Type J varieties. The
eﬀect on ﬁrms will reﬂect this diﬀerential substitution.
Producers of Type J varieties will see lost sales in Country A, while Type K
producers will see an increase in sales. For Type J producers in Country A, those
lost domestic sales are the cost of the policy change. If those producers do not export
to Country B, the reduced sales may lead them to exit. If the producers do export
Type J goods to Country B, the substitution behavior there will oﬀset some of the
losses. For those producers in Country B that export goods of Type J to Country A,
the new market entry costs will reduce proﬁts or sales, and the reduced exports may
lead them to exit the Country A market as well.
Producers of Type K varieties will lose sales in Country B. For producers of Type
K goods in Country B, access to the domestic market is restricted by policy changes.
If a ﬁrm only produces for domestic consumption, the lost sales in Country B may
mean exit, unless increases in sales in Country A (where consumers substitute to Type
31. This reﬂects a market where two countries have two diﬀerent standards for a given kind of
good.
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K varieties) are suﬃcient to lead them to export. For those producers in Country B
that produce Type K products for both local and export sales, the losses will come
from a reduction in local-market sales, with some relief from increased export sales.
For those producers in Country A that export Type K products to Country B, the
increased market access cost will have the eﬀect of reducing those export sales, as
expected.
Because of the way that these policies restrict market access in each country,
the division of winners and losers from this policy environment do not fall along
neat geographic divides. Within segments of a given industry (Type J and Type K
producers), ﬁrms have both domestic opponents and foreign allies.
2.7.2.3 Both Countries Raise Costs on Same Characteristic
If policies in both countries raise costs on the same Type of goods, the trade
dynamics look somewhat diﬀerent from the examples above, and become more de-
pendent on the distribution of producers in each country. An example of this is if both
countries adopt the same product standards, thus preventing sale of (or at least rais-
ing costs on) goods of Type K. In Country A, the increased costs on Type K variety
goods will drive consumers to substitute Type J variety goods and other alternatives.
Consumers in Country B will make similar substitutions, moving away from Type K
goods as prices rise due to the new policy-related costs. In each country, consumers'
behavior depends on their cross-price elasticity of demand, which may diﬀer in each
country. Given this simultaneous change in both markets, the winners and losers in
each country will be similar, although not necessarily identical.
Producers of Type K varieties in both countries will see lost sales or proﬁts as
consumers move away from their varieties to other, less costly varieties. These losses
will occur in both domestic-only sales and trade sales. For producers of Type K goods
in Country A, lost sales in Country A, combined with lost sales in Country B (for
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those producers who were exporters to Country B) may lead them to exit. Unlike in
previous examples, export sales will not provide an opportunity to mitigate some of
the lost sales in the home market. Similarly, producers in Country B will face the
same pattern of lost sales both foreign and domestic.
Producers of Type J varieties in both countries will see beneﬁts from the new
policy. These producers see gains both because of substitution towards their goods
in their home markets and because of potential gains from sale to the export market,
where consumers are making the same substitution. For Producers of Type J goods in
Country A, when consumers in Country A increase consumption of Type J varieties,
sales will increase. For those Type J producers in Country A that export to Country
B, the change in consumption patterns in Country B will bring additional beneﬁts.
The increased demand may also induce some ﬁrms to begin exporting, as well. A
similar pattern will occur for Type J producers in Country B. However, the degree
to which sales increase for producers in each market depends on how consumers
divide their increased consumption of Type J varieties between domestically-produced
goods and foreign-produced varieties. At the least, the substitution from Type K
consumption to Type J consumption will not decrease sales of Type J varieties for
individual producers.
Since both countries impose market access costs on the same type of goods (Type
K), consumption of Type J-variety goods in both markets increases while consumption
of Type K-variety goods decrease. This leads to a division of winners and losers
cleanly along lines deﬁned by which varieties a producer makes. Within each country,
the winners are those whose varieties are unaﬀected by policy-induced market access
costs, and they have allies among producers of similar varieties in the foreign market.
The same division holds true for the losers among producers.
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2.7.3 Firm-speciﬁc Costs
Governments may also implement policies that privilege certain producers over
others. In this case, it is useful to think of a highly-simpliﬁed competitive market-
place where each country has only two producers.32 In Country A, Firms F and G
produce goods within a given industry, while Country B hosts Firms Y and Z in that
same industry. For these examples, we assume that all four ﬁrms, in a free-trade
counterfactual, produce both for the domestic market and for export to the other
country.
2.7.3.1 One Country Raises Costs of Some Firms
If Country A implements a policy that raises market access costs for some ﬁrms,
the distributive eﬀects of the policy will split on which ﬁrms' goods enter the market
with additional policy-imposed costs. These costs can be imposed through prefer-
ential government purchasing rules, targeted production subsidies for some ﬁrms,
restrictions on business activities, or requirements on ﬁnancing for import or sale
that are tied to the ﬁrm/producer, among others. Consider a policy where Country
A raises costs on all goods produced by ﬁrms G, Y, and Z.33 In this case, the market in
Country B will be largely unaﬀected, while the changes in market access in Country
A will be signiﬁcant.
In Country A, the policy that imposes costs on good from Firms G, Y, and Z will
pass through to prices or reduced margins. Meanwhile, Firm F will have privileged
access to the market. The consequences are as expected. Some consumers will shift
consumption from Firm G, Y, or Z's products to Firm F's goods, with the commen-
surate eﬀects on the ﬁrms' overall welfare. This will lead both to a reduction in trade
between Country A and Country B, as exports from Country B (host of Firms Y and
32. In some cases, the same ﬁrm may produce goods in both markets, but we set aside this feature
for now.
33. This could also be considered a domestic subsidy or preferences for Firm F.
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Z) decline due to higher costs and prices, and an intra-industry redistribution within
Country A, as Firm F gains sales at the expense of Firm G. In this case, it is notable
that the losers from Country A's policies cross national boundaries and divide within
the industry. Also, had Firms Y or Z relocated production to Country A, the eﬀect
would have been the same. Consumers in Country A will also experience some utility
loss through substitution or reduced consumption of their preferred varieties.
In Country B, where there are no additional costs levied on ﬁrms, the eﬀects are
relatively benign. Firms Y and Z, facing higher costs to export, do not sell as much
abroad. However, their access to their home market is unaﬀected, and thus prices in
the home market should be unaﬀected. Imports of goods produced in Country A by
Firms F and G are similarly unaﬀected, and so sales should remain constant there,
as well. For consumers in Country B, there is no meaningful distortion that would
move them from their preferred consumption pattern.
2.7.3.2 Both Countries Raise Costs of the Same Firms
If, for some reason, both countries raise costs on the same ﬁrms, the single-country
eﬀect discussed in the previous paragraphs is intensiﬁed. Assume now that both
Country A and Country B raise costs on Firm F, rather than lower them through
subsidy or the like. The eﬀect on Firm F will be signiﬁcant. There will also be eﬀects
on consumers in both markets, as expected.
In Country A, as costs rise for Firm F, they will either incur loss through lower
proﬁt or pass on those costs to consumers as higher prices. If prices are raised, some
consumers will change their consumption to varieties produced by other ﬁrms (Firms
G, Y, and Z), which will have a similar deleterious eﬀect on Firm F. Also, consumers
in Country A will experience some disutility from the substitution away from their
preferred variety or the reallocation of their budget to continue consuming goods
from Firm F. In Country B, the same also happens. Firm F, if they are to sell in
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that market, must bear the costs of the ﬁrm-discriminating policy or pass them on to
consumers as higher prices. In the former case, the lost proﬁts hurt the ﬁrms. In the
latter, the familiar substitution occurs across varieties produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms.
For Firm F, there is a loss in both the domestic and export markets. For all
other ﬁrms, the opposite is true. For consumers in both countries, there is some loss
of utility from cross-Firm or cross-product substitution. The overall eﬀect on trade
is to reduce exports of Firm F's goods from Country A to Country B. While it is
likely that Firm G will export more from Country A to Country B as a result of the
substitution of consumers in Country B, it is unlikely that this substitution will be of
suﬃcient magnitude to fully oﬀset the loss of trade in Firm F's goods. This increases
asymmetries in trade within the industry, as well as altering the composition of goods
traded within the dyad.
2.7.3.3 Each Country Raises Costs of Diﬀerent Firms
If each country raises costs on diﬀerent ﬁrms, perhaps by selecting national win-
ners34, this will have a diﬀerent eﬀect on the market. In this case, ﬁrms may ﬁnd
they can sell in one market without bearing additional market access costs, while in
the other market, entry requires fulﬁlling requirements or overcoming policy-induced
access barriers that add additional cost to goods sold in that market. Consider the
scenario where Country A raises costs on Firms G, Y, and Z, while Country B raises
costs on Firms F, G, and Z.35 Since the additional costs apply to some ﬁrms in both
markets and other ﬁrms in only one market, there will be market distortions in both
domestic and international terms.
In Country A, the additional costs imposed on goods produced by Firms G, Y,
and Z will lead consumers to change their consumption towards goods produced by
34. Subsidizing national winners is analagous to raising costs on all non-subsidized ﬁrms, from the
perspective of intraﬁrm competition.
35. This is analogous to Firm F being given some subsidy in Country A, while Firm Y is subsidized
in Country B.
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Firm F. If the ﬁrms can absorb some of those additional costs as reduced proﬁts,
the eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts is largely the same. This substitution leads to the expected
outcome: Firm F sells more goods in Country A, while Firm G sees losses, creating
a redistribution among Country A ﬁrms. For Firms Y and Z, the additional costs
of market access mean lower sales, fewer exports to Country A, and may lead those
ﬁrms to exit the Country A market.
In Country B, it is goods produced by Firms F, G, and Z that are more costly in the
market. Again, if those ﬁrms can absorb the additional costs as reduced proﬁts, they
experience disutility. If they pass along costs to consumers in the form of increased
prices, there will be substitution away from those varieties towards those of Firm Y
(the privileged ﬁrm), with the related lost sales for the ﬁrms and loss of utility for
consumers.
In this situation, where a subset of ﬁrms have preferential access in certain mar-
kets, there are cross-cutting eﬀects for each of the ﬁrms. While Firm F may gain from
its privileged market position in Country A, it loses in the export market of Country
B. The same holds true for Firm Y, which gains sales in Country B, but loses them in
Country A. Firms G and Z, which face additional costs both home and abroad, lose
twice. Consumers in both countries also lose out, as the ﬁrm-discriminating market
access costs will push them to consume less-preferred alternatives as a function of
increasing costs on their more-preferred varieties.
Overall trade ﬂows should decrease, as the shipment of goods to Country B pro-
duced by Firms F and G in Country A should decrease, as should the shipments of
Firm Y and Z goods to Country A from Country B. This will occur across diﬀerences
in characteristics, and would even occur if those ﬁrms relocated to a third country
(assuming similar underlying production costs). However, the balance of trade ﬂows
is likely less distorted than in the cases where the same ﬁrm was targeted by both
countries or where only one country raised ﬁrm-discriminating costs.
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2.7.3.4 Costs that Apply to Firms as New Entrants
Another group of policies that distort market access applies to any ﬁrm wishing
to enter a market. These often take the form of a registration process or a licensing
rule that ties market access to the identity of the ﬁrm selling the product. In these
cases, a ﬁrm wishing to enter a market, regardless of location, may be forced to
pay an additional ﬁxed cost in order to sell goods there. These kinds of costs have
the eﬀect of suppressing market entry among ﬁrms that may only sell a few units,
or that make little proﬁt oﬀ each unit sold, as the ﬁxed entry cost makes the total
cost of production prohibitively high. In the context of ﬁrm-speciﬁc costs, these
work somewhat diﬀerently than those discussed above. The intraindustry division is
between legacy ﬁrms and new entrants as winners versus losers in this case, assuming
the policy is implemented in a way that exempts existing ﬁrms from paying the cost.
If applied as a new cost to all ﬁrms in a given market, these kinds of policies can
have the additional eﬀect of distributing beneﬁts towards ﬁrms that are better able
to absorb those costs for market access, much in the same way as indiscriminate costs
do.36
2.7.4 Indiscriminate Costs
When governments implement policies that raise the cost of all goods in a market,
regardless of origin, characteristics, or producer, through consumption taxes or pro-
cedural costs like labeling, for example, the eﬀect of these new costs will cut across all
those divisions. These indiscriminately-applied costs will aﬀect ﬁrms diﬀerently, but
those diﬀerential outcomes are a matter of ﬁrm heterogeneity, not overtly discrimina-
tory policies. The salient diﬀerence among ﬁrms is the degree to which the costs can
be absorbed before changing prices to market or, in the extreme, before market exit.
36. This occurs as consumers substitute existing varieties in lieu of potential new varieties or those
produced by more eﬃcient ﬁrms in lieu of those produced by less eﬃcient ﬁrms.
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2.7.4.1 One Country Raises Indiscriminate Costs
If one government implements a new policy that raises costs on all goods sold
within a market, it will have the eﬀect of raising all costs at once. For the most
ineﬃcient producers, these additional costs will likely be too great to bear, leading to
market exit. This aﬀects both imported and locally-produced varieties. Thus, some
importers, faced with total costs that exceed the price that the market will bear for
their variety, will exit. Similarly, some ﬁrms engaged only in domestic production for
the domestic market will exit for the same reasons. Consumers will move away from
these varieties towards near-substitutes produced by ﬁrms that remain in the market,
incurring some loss of utility from the substitution. For these more eﬃcient ﬁrms,
the increased sales will partially oﬀset the decreased margins on each sale that are
the result of the additional indiscriminate costs.
These indiscriminate costs will also aﬀect trade, if some imports to the market
are produced by ﬁrms that are eﬃcient enough to export when market access is cost-
less, but that cannot economically sell those goods in the now higher-cost market.37
Exports from the market where indiscriminate costs are raised should be relatively
unaﬀected.
2.7.4.2 Both Countries Raise Indiscriminate Costs
It is also possible that both governments implement policy that raises indiscrim-
inate costs on goods sold within the respective markets. Perhaps both governments
raise excise taxes or labeling costs that apply to all goods. What is consistent is that,
thanks to increased costs and potential substitution of consumption, consumers in
each market will have lower utility from consumption than in the alternative where
such costs were not imposed. The eﬀect on ﬁrms is from both domestic and inter-
37. There may exist ﬁrms that can continue to access the market with foreign-produced goods
produced eﬃciently enough that the additional costs do not lead to market exit.
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national distortions. In this case, the winners and losers still divide along eﬃciency
lines as expected, but across more complex groupings of ﬁrms.
The most eﬃcient ﬁrms, whose cost structure can absorb the additional policy-
induced costs and who were likely both domestic producers and exporters, will see the
least negative eﬀects of those new policies. For these ﬁrms, the eﬀect of indiscriminate
costs in both reducing the number of foreign entrants (who ﬁnd total costs of market
access now too high to be economical) and some domestic competitors (who are
too ineﬃcient to absorb the additional costs) will oﬀset, in part, their own losses in
margins or sales from the additional costs. For these ﬁrms, additional indiscriminate
costs in both markets will have a modest eﬀect on their proﬁts.
For ﬁrms who are moderately eﬃcient, such that they would export to markets
without the indiscriminate costs, but not to markets with the additional costs, the
loss of access to an export market is clearly a loss. However, there are likely ﬁrms
exporting to their home market in the same situation. Thus, while these ﬁrms lose
on the international market, the eﬀect on the domestic market is more modest than
for less-eﬃcient ﬁrms. It is even possible that, with enough exits by foreign and
domestic competitors in their home market, those ﬁrms may see a small increase in
sales volume (albeit with more modest proﬁts) at home. These ﬁrms, despite reverting
to domestic-only production, fare better than some.
For the least eﬃcient ﬁrms, it is the domestic eﬀect, not the international, that
matters. These ﬁrms were never going to export to the foreign market where the
new costs apply. Thus, there is no direct gain or loss from the foreign market costs.
The eﬀect on competitors in their own market is likely indeterminate, as some foreign
ﬁrms exit and some domestic ﬁrms who exported return to the domestic-only market.
However, the direct eﬀect of new indiscriminate costs in their own market will be
negative. If these ﬁrms are unable to absorb the cost in some way, either by reducing
proﬁts or raising prices, it is likely they will exit the market. In any of those cases,
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the least eﬃcient ﬁrms suﬀer to a signiﬁcant degree.
Overall trade ﬂows here will be reduced as a consequence of ﬁrms in both countries
reducing their exports to the other. While the exact degree of this reduction will vary
according to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, net trade ﬂows will decrease as ﬂows in each
direction decrease.
2.8 Summarizing Winners and Losers
The policies that distort markets can have complex distributional consequences.
For those actors that are most directly aﬀected by these policies (ﬁrms), ending up
on the winning side or the losing side of a policy change depends on a number of
factors. If the policy is one that discriminates on the basis of location of a goods
production, then the lines are drawn along familiar geographic lines. If the policy
discriminates based on the characteristics of a good, then the beneﬁts divide within
industries, along diﬀerences in technologies or techniques. If the policy divides on
the identity of the ﬁrm producing a good, the winners and losers divide according to
which ﬁrm or ﬁrms are targeted by the policy. For indiscriminate costs, it is producer
eﬃciency, and the ability to absorb cost increases, that determines who loses most.
These divisions become more complex when the policies are changed in reaction
to the policies of another government, or when policies are harmonized or made re-
ciprocal. In each of the markets where market access costs change, both the domestic
eﬀects and changes in trade ﬂows and composition apply. Firms may ﬁnd that, with
reduced location-discriminating costs in both their home market and a foreign market
where they sell their goods, they face increased international competition at home
but also have easier access to foreign markets. A ﬁrm whose goods previously faced
characteristic-discriminating costs both home and abroad may be a clear winner from
changes in policies, but if it also opens the door for other competitors with similar
varieties of goods, those gains may be moderated, or another market access cost may
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become a binding constraint on production and sales.
Policies can be quite targeted or quite general, depending on the features of an
industry. Location-discriminating policies may be crafted in such a way as to only
aﬀect some varieties of a good (perhaps by targeting a narrowly-deﬁned subcategory
of goods), or can take the form of broadly-deﬁned quotas or tariﬀs that cover many
varieties of a good. In the same way, policies that impose restrictions on certain
varieties can allow a wide variety of goods to access the market unaﬀected or can
impose costs on all but a few varieties.38
2.9 Conclusions and Moving Forward
This paper introduces a new framework for looking at domestic and international
policies and their eﬀects on trade, both in volume and composition. It is an attempt
to resolve some points of diﬀerence in the evaluation of non-tariﬀ barriers to trade,
which we argue arise because not all non-tariﬀ barriers are alike, and some are more
like tariﬀs than other non-tariﬀ measures. In moving to considering policies according
to how they divide a goods market through the raising of costs, we hope to clarify
the discussion not only of the eﬀects of these policies, but also the politics that
support their raising. Each of these types of policies will create diﬀerent cleavages
of winners and losers, and actual ﬁrms will have expectations of these policies eﬀects
that motivate political action. Sometimes this will occur in ways quite similar to our
understanding of tariﬀ policy creation, as with most location-discriminating policies,
but often will occur in quite diﬀerent ways. Further, the types of policies that ﬁrms
should demand to protect their market position will reﬂect the manner in which each
type of policy will aﬀect them and their competitors. This will often mean intra-
industry cleavages that span foreign and domestic producers, producers of competing
varieties, and producers of diﬀerent size and identity.
38. In some cases, this highly-targeted policy may have the eﬀect of privileging a single ﬁrm.
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This paper does not examine the politics of how these policies come about, nor
does it examine the presence or absence of these policies in diﬀerent markets. A
theory of market access barrier politics, which involves both trade-focused policy and
simple domestic regulation, should follow from combining this typology and existing
theories of lobbying or pressuring for distributive politics. It is also possible that
such arguments would lend new insights into how markets are regulated in light
of international markets. Similarly, if one were to apply this typology to existing
classiﬁcations of NTMs (such as UNCTAD's TRAINS data), it may be possible to
measure the diﬀerences in the types of market access costs across industries and
countries, to examine when these policies are applied and how they distort markets.
It may also be possible to determine how these policies distort markets (in ad valorem
tariﬀ-like terms) by examining price or sales diﬀerences across salient dimensions (for
each type of market access cost) across goods in a given market.
Despite the limitations of this paper, the framework introduced herein does pro-
vide some advantages for understanding trade-distorting policy. Compared to di-
viding on core vs quality or at-the-border vs behind-the-border, or any of the
simplifying assumptions about non-tariﬀ policies as permutations of tariﬀs, a focus
on how costs apply clariﬁes the similarities among tariﬀs and some non-tariﬀ policies
and the diﬀerences between those policies and the wide variety of market-distorting
policies currently considered under the broad umbrella of non-tariﬀ barriers to trade.
Further, this framework puts the distributive eﬀects (and thus the distributive poli-
tics) at the core of the discussion and subsequent theories. To understand the politics
of trade in an era of global ﬁrms, global supply chains, and a global goods market
under mobile capital, we must revise our conception of how diﬀerent policies aﬀect
markets, within and across national borders.
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CHAPTER III
Market Access Barriers and Formation of
Protection-Seeking Coalitions
In recent years, bilateral and multilateral negotiations on trade have shifted from
focusing on tariﬀs and tariﬀ-like measures, such as quotas, towards negotiations over
other trade-distorting measures, such as product standards, licensing rules, intellec-
tual property rights, and government support of local ﬁrms. This shift in negotiation
reﬂects the new reality of protectionism in the global goods market: tariﬀs are no
longer the primary means by which governments regulate access to their domestic
markets. The New Protectionism that Baldwin discussed in 1986 has become the
new normal, with non-tariﬀ measures and domestic market interventions now more
prevalent than ever(Baldwin 1986). The essential boundaries in the global market for
goods are no longer strictly at the border.
The politics surrounding modern free trade agreements, especially multilateral
ones, reﬂect the complex distributive consequences of the kinds of market integration
that these agreements entail. As negotiations move from policies that apply at the
border, like tariﬀs, to policies that are part of the domestic economy, like product
standards, testing and labeling regulations, government support of individual ﬁrms,
or licensing and intellectual property rules, the groups of political actors who rise in
support (or opposition) to those agreements also changes.
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Some industries in some countries remain protected behind tariﬀs or other mea-
sures that look similar to tariﬀs. Other industries are liberalized with respect to
tariﬀs, but are otherwise protected by regulations or policies that restrict market
access, thus reducing trade by deterring market entry. Despite relatively low tariﬀs,
trade ﬂows do not always reach expected levels, or the goods traded are not of the
varieties expected by neoclassical models. Taken together, these features of policy
and trade ﬂows raise questions: Why are some industries protected with policies like
tariﬀs, while others are not? What explains not just the level, but the types of pro-
tectionism diﬀerent industries are able to obtain? When will agreement on lowering
barriers between markets, of the tariﬀ or non-tariﬀ variety, be feasible?
Answering these questions requires one tackle the similarities and diﬀerences be-
tween tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ policies, then explain the logic of protection-seeking in
light of those similarities and diﬀerences. This paper advances a theory of politics of
industrial protection that builds oﬀ a new typology of market access barriers. Rather
than tariﬀs vs. NTBs, this typology compares policies that increase or reduce costs
of goods based on the good's location of origin, process or content of production, or
producing ﬁrm. That typology helps clarify when diﬀerent policies are complements
or substitutes, and thus when the politics of demand for those policies should be
similar or diﬀerent.
This theory argues that features of an industry - how much FDI is present, the
degree to which products are homogeneous or diﬀerentiated, ﬁrm concentration, or
the relative eﬃciency of producers - determine what kinds of protection are politi-
cally feasible. The logic of industrial protection reﬂects tradeoﬀs among these kinds
of policies. Protectionism is the result of a political process where ﬁrms demand pro-
tection that beneﬁts them and oppose protectionist policies that harm their interests.
In this process of lobbying and counterlobbying, ﬁrms' success at obtaining protection
of diﬀerent types depends on how other ﬁrms in the industry will lobby, and how the
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policies they demand will aﬀect consumer welfare. It is not feasible to implement poli-
cies which raise all kinds of costs at once; the degree of market distortion would lead to
political backlash. How policies aﬀect consumer welfare depends on how signiﬁcantly
the policy distorts markets, or how much protectionism there is. How other ﬁrms in
an industry lobby depends on their characteristics, and thus the characteristics of the
industry overall. The form of protection  location-discriminating, characteristic-
discriminating, ﬁrm-discriminating, or policies that impose indiscriminate costs 
will reﬂect a compromise among ﬁrms and between ﬁrms and government.
The logic of protection-seeking industry coalitions suggests that the presence
(or absence) of foreign investment or multinational ﬁrms should lead to less (more)
location-discriminating barriers to market access. In heterogeneous goods industries,
characteristic-discriminating policies are politically feasible, and thus provide an (im-
perfect) alternative to location-discriminating costs. When an industry is concen-
trated, with one or a few large ﬁrms, those ﬁrms may successfully lobby in favor
of policies that create costs for other ﬁrms, thus dividing the market with ﬁrm-
discriminating costs. When enough ﬁrms in an industry are relatively eﬃcient, or
otherwise able to bear costs while still remaining proﬁtable, there may be suﬃcient
political support for policies that levy indiscriminate costs on goods within that in-
dustry, harming ineﬃcient ﬁrms more than eﬃcient ones.
As features of an industry change due to investment, technological change, or nat-
ural ﬁrm growth, death, or merging, the demands for protection from ﬁrms within
that industry will change. As foreign multinationals enter a market or domestic multi-
nationals invest abroad, incentives for location-discriminating barriers fade. Where
possible, ﬁrms will lobby for other kinds of policies - characteristic-discriminating,
ﬁrm-discriminating, or indiscriminate costs - that protect their economic interests
and those of a suﬃciently-large coalition of other ﬁrms. As technological change cre-
ates new diﬀerentiation possibilities within an industry, characteristic-discriminating
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costs may become the most feasible option, and ﬁrms will lobby for those policies over
other types. As ﬁrm concentration increases, the potential for ﬁrm-discriminating
costs to be politically feasible will change. Finally, as tariﬀs, a form of location-
discriminating costs, become politically infeasible, either because of agreements or
because of changes in the nature of industry, the non-tariﬀ alternatives that indus-
try will seek as substitutes will depend on diﬀerences among those policies that the
tariﬀ/non-tariﬀ dichotomy cannot capture, in theory or in measurement.
3.1 Considering NTMs and Existing Explanations for Trade
Barriers
The existing literature on trade barriers and the political incentives that motivate
them in economics and political science is extensive. Literature to date has generally
treated non-tariﬀ trade distorting policies in one of two ways. In one view, these
measures reﬂect the same kinds of distributive (and thus political) dynamics as tariﬀs
do. Non-tariﬀ policies, then, reﬂect the same broad logic as do tariﬀs. The politics of
NTMs are treated as largely similar to the politics of tariﬀs, or are treated as a minor
perturbation of that logic. In the other, NTMs are diﬀerent in important ways from
tariﬀs, and the logic underlying the politics around NTMs are distinct from that of
tariﬀs.
When considering the spectrum of policies that may distort trade, but that are
not tariﬀs, it is not immediately clear why the politics surrounding those policies
should be the diﬀerent.1 Indeed, some research indicates that, following a decline in
tariﬀs, NTBs are implemented as substitutes. In the same vein, when tariﬀs are oﬀ
the table because of international agreements, NTMs appear to serve as replacement
protectionism during macroeconomic downturns (Mansﬁeld and Busch 1995).
1. Indeed, Jagdish Bhagwati once referred to the substitution of non-tariﬀ measures for tariﬀs as
indication of a Law of Constant Protection" (Bhagwati 1988, pg. 53).
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More recent work on the subject has made eﬀorts to highlight the diﬀerences be-
tween NTBs and tariﬀs, even drawing distinctions within the broad category of NTBs
(core vs quality, where the former captures quantitative restrictions and other
"tariﬀ-like" measures while the latter focuses on safety and technical standards, for
instance) (Kono 2006). These arguments have usually been focused on one speciﬁc
feature of non-tariﬀ measures, distinct from tariﬀs. The result has been a body of
theory on NTB that raises many plausible arguments for why the politics of protec-
tionism through non-tariﬀ means is diﬀerent from tariﬀs. Some arguments over the
politics of tariﬀs vs non-tariﬀ measures focuses on the degree to which governments
can get away with distributive policy via each mechanism. Tariﬀs are relatively
transparent, while many non-tariﬀ measures are more diﬃcult to understand. This
lack of transparency incentivizes a switch from tariﬀs to non-tariﬀ measures, because
voters observe non-tariﬀ policy only imperfectly and don't punish governments for
redistributing using NTMs, especially quality NTMs (Kono 2006; Magee, Brock,
and Young 1989).
Research that leverages insights from new new trade theory (NNTT) of het-
erogenous ﬁrms has identiﬁed patterns in trade politics that previous work focusing
factors and sectors could not. An early insight from political economic analysis of
lobbying for trade protection in heterogenous goods industries (new trade theory)
suggests that such lobbying follows the logic of private goods. As each ﬁrm is a mo-
nopolist, any lobbying eﬀort represents a beneﬁt solely to the lobbying ﬁrm. Thus,
in diﬀerentated goods industries, where IIT occurs, ﬁrms are more likely to lobby
for protection (Gilligan 1997b). However, more recent research suggests that when
ﬁrms are heterogenous, the preferences over protection within a given industry will
vary. When ﬁrms are heterogenous, this comes from diﬀerences in competitiveness
and the potential for reciprocal liberalizaton (Osgood 2017). An alternative view
posits that industry-level demand for protection moderates as IIT causes importing
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interests within industry lobbies to grow, and thus lobbying on trade becomes ﬁrm-
speciﬁc (Madeira 2016). In some cases, these intra-industry cleavages can manifest
as highly-variable tariﬀ schedules across tariﬀ lines within single industries, where
individual ﬁrms lobby for protection of just their varieties (I. S. Kim 2017).
Recent discussion of non-tariﬀ measures, speciﬁcally technical barriers to trade,
in light of NNTT, highlights intraindustry divisions. Here, when non-tariﬀ measures
create ﬁxed costs for all ﬁrms then highly productive ﬁrms, including multinationals,
should seek and obtain NTBs  speciﬁcally technical regulations, as these entry
costs disproportionately beneﬁt them (Abel-Koch 2013; Gulotty 2014; Osgood 2016).
The demanded level of these NTM policies again varies with respect to a ﬁrm's
productivity, and may arise under certain conditions. However, there is still some
disagreement on the degree to which NTMs, as ﬁxed costs, serve as substitutes for
tariﬀ measures.
While the existing literature has yielded many insights, an area for further theory
remains. While broad factoral and sectoral theories of trade preferences explain lib-
eralizing and protectionist pressures in general, they have less to say about change in
policy across varieties of trade-distorting policies. Existing work on NTMs that fo-
cuses on transparency and the relative opaqueness of NTMs explains only why tariﬀs
are replaced by NTMs, not why the substitution varies, or why some industries retain
tariﬀs or tariﬀ-like policies. New theory based on theories of heterogeneous ﬁrms has
moved our understanding forward a great deal, but these tend to consider only one
type of policy (tariﬀ or NTM) at a time, focus on variation within a kind of policy, or
consider all NTMs as all similar  usually as universal ﬁxed costs for market entry
 to ease inclusion in the Melitz (2003) model and its extensions. To explain the
variety of policy changes across industries over time, new theory that examines the
politics of protection, in light of alternative policies, is necessary.
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3.2 Motivations for Demanding and Supplying Protection
The politics of trade barriers and the politics of industrial protection are, at their
core, interactions among ﬁrms and between ﬁrms and government. The actors that
drive the demand-side politics of trade protection are ﬁrms. To understand the logic
of lobbying and the provision of protection, wepresent a theory of the interaction
that engages in some necessary simpliﬁcations. However, from these relatively simple
assumptions (actors are self-interested, preferences are shaped by characteristics of
the ﬁrm, etc.), it is possible to describe the politics of protectionism with some detail.
This theory is a partial equilibrium one, focusing only on a single industry, and the
discussion here focuses on politics within one country. Further, while each ﬁrm is a
producer of it's own unique variety, no ﬁrm is assumed to be large enough on a global
scale to directly aﬀect world prices of other varieties to a signiﬁcant degree, so this
may be considered a small economy example.
Individual ﬁrms are assumed to be monopolistic producers of their particular
variety of good. Although other ﬁrms may produce goods with similar characteristics,
those alternative are distinct by virtue of producer identity, at minimum. Within each
broad market category (cars, shoes, sweatshirts, wheat), one can assume an inﬁnite
number of varieties. Firms are endowed with ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology to produce their
good, using a single factor that, for simplicity, is assumed to be perfectly elastic in
supply at ﬁxed relative prices. Thus, the determinant of a good's cost of production
is that ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology, which may diﬀer across ﬁrms. These assumptions are
generally consistent with the logic of new-new trade theories of heterogenous ﬁrms and
intra-industry trade (Melitz 2003). It is within this modern trade theory framework
that this discussion of trade poltics resides.2
Building oﬀ the Grossman-Helpman model and the logic of menu auctions, these
2. This ﬁrm-centric approach is also consistent with approaches from Gilligan (1997b), I. S. Kim
(2017), and others.
63
ﬁrms propose bids across the varieties of market access restrictions (Grossman and
Helpman 1994). In the original model, Grossman and Helpman assume lobbies arise
exogenously, and their bids merely represent the interests of that lobby's membership.
Here, weassume ﬁrms have the opportunity to lobby at all times, and lobbies  groups
of like-minded actors working in concert  arise naturally.3 These bids represent
promises of political support if a certain policy is implemented. The support can
take many forms, and the details of that support are largely unimportant for this
discussion. As in the original Grossman and Helpman model, ﬁrms provide complete
bids for each level of protection that Government may provide. However, each bid
now covers all levels of each type of market access restriction. The complexity of
the ﬁrm's bidding is greater than in Grossman and Helpman, as the policy space is
more complex. In the original model, lobbies bid on levels of protection that act as
ad-valorem increases in the price of imported varieties.4 In this theory, some policies
work in that fashion, while other policies create costs (ﬁxed or variable) that divide
the market in other ways.
This theory of protection-seeking considers lobbying when government has access
to policies which discriminate on location, product characteristics, or producing ﬁrm,
or that apply indiscriminately. It is analogous to the original Grossman-Helpman
model in one way: location-discriminating barriers are costs that apply to imported
varieties, similar to the instruments in the original model. Other variations of the
G-H model, applying additional ﬁxed costs to foreign ﬁrms or ﬁxed costs to all pro-
ducers, reﬂect other kinds of location-discriminating costs and indiscriminate costs,
respectively (Gulotty 2014; Abel-Koch 2013). This necessarily complicates the bid-
ding, but the core logic remains the same. Governments make policy decisions in
light of promised support from industrial coalitions seeking protection. In addition,
3. This endogenous lobby formation is discussed in other work, including Abel-Koch (2013) on
the subject of NTMs.
4. Grossman and Helpman restrict governments' policy instruments in their original model to
tariﬀs and subsidies.
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the insights provided by other variations of the original Protection for Sale model
apply here.
The interaction discussed here diverges from Grossman and Helpman's model in
two other ways. First, lobbies may contain ﬁrms with interests in importing. These
ﬁrms could be importers conducting business at arms-length with foreign partners or
could be multinational ﬁrms with supply chains that cross borders.5 This also includes
ﬁrms that might be considered foreign ﬁrms (because of home location), but that
have inﬂuence or political power within the country because of production location
or other investments. This change reﬂects the realities of trade and industrial politics
in an era of global capital: domestic ﬁrms may have strong interests in importing
if their supply chain crosses borders. Second, the policy eventually adopted may
have a combination of costs from each of the categories discussed in Chapter II. The
government must still set a single policy for the market, but it now has 4 dimensions,
and the policy is a complete set of costs for each category.
3.2.1 Who Can Lobby for Protection?
In discussion of the logic of lobbying for protection, it is necessary to clarify which
ﬁrms have the ability to lobby government for policy in their favor and which ones
do not. A ﬁrm's domestic salience is the degree to which that ﬁrm is a politically-
relevant actor in domestic politics. In some classic models of trade politics, ﬁrms are
clearly divided into domestic and foreign ﬁrms. The former have political voice,
while the latter do not. In an era of global capital ﬂows, the division of ﬁrms into
domestic and foreign is no longer as clear. Firms founded in the US play a signif-
icant role in the domestic economies of countries all over the world. Firms founded
in Europe, Asia, and the Americas play a signiﬁcant role in the domestic economy of
the United States. These multinationals have a degree of political inﬂuence within
5. The preferences of consumers of imports remain part of the social welfare function, as in
Grossman and Helpman.
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markets that ﬁrms who do business at arms-length do not (Lee 2018; Lee and Os-
good 2018; Stoyanov 2009; Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins 2006; Drope and Hansen
2004).
Political salience within a country can come from two sources: capital invest-
ment/presence and employment. The dependence of the state on capital motivates
the ﬁrst, and the political voice of workers in a given ﬁrm motivates the second. For
multinationals, political inﬂuence in another country can come from either source.
As ﬁrms invest in new markets, they gain some degree of political access, which gives
them the power to lobby government for policy.6 The welfare of the ﬁrm aﬀects
the welfare of workers, and thus governments that are responsive to the public will
respond more to ﬁrms as they expand and employ more workers.
In general, ﬁrms that are national ﬁrms have more salience. Domestic-only
producers (ﬁrms with no foreign investment) and domestic multinationals (MNCs
in their home country) have the most political voice with their own government.
Firms that are located and produce domestically have the most political salience
for their size, as all of their investment and all of their employment is domestic.
Multinationals with global supply chains generally have less inﬂuence, given ﬁrm size,
as some investment and employment is domestic, while some is foreign. Multinationals
that produce mostly outside the borders of their home markets will still have some
political voice in their home market, but it will come via the inﬂuence that comes
from capital, not from labor.
Foreign multinationals have some domestic salience in their host markets, and
that inﬂuence increases in the degree to which they invest in their host market.
Foreign multinationals with large production facilities (or other facilities relevant to
their business) will have more political inﬂuence than those with little investment in
6. This is often examined in the context of foreign ﬁrm access in developing economies, but
both anecdotal and empirical evidence from industrialized economies, speciﬁcally the US, suggests
that foreign multinationals lobby and aﬀect policy in the countries where their investments are
made.(Desbordes and Vauday 2007; Hansen and Mitchell 2000)
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a given market. Whether they import for further production or export, these ﬁrms
are an integral part of the domestic macroeconomy. As a foreign multinational's
employment and investment footprint grows or shrinks, so too will its political power.
Foreign ﬁrms who only sell in the market through arms-length exchange, and thus
have no direct investment or employment interests within the domestic economy, have
no (or very little) political inﬂuence.7
In discussions of ﬁrms with domestic political salience to follow, weconsider a
rough ordering across types of ﬁrms that follows the logic above. Domestic ﬁrms
that produce domestically are the most salient, followed by home multinationals,
then foreign multinationals with signiﬁcant investment. Foreign MNCs with little
investment or employment within a market and ﬁrms that do business at arms-length
can be considered to have little domestic political salience, and therefore do not
play a major role in lobbying for industrial protection within an economy. Other
characteristics of ﬁrms, like size and employment, work in the familiar ways. This
expansion of domestically politically salient is necessary for discussing the politics of
industrial protection in the presence of global capital ﬂows. Without considering the
interests of ﬁrms that do not fall cleanly into the domestic versus foreign binary,
any theory of trade-distorting policy would be incomplete, at best.
3.2.2 Revisiting A New Typology of Market Access Barriers
Rather than dividing trade-distorting policies into tariﬀs and not-tariﬀs, the
market access restriction framework situates all trade-distorting policies within a
broader discussion of policies that, by adding costs to certain goods and shaping
consumer choices, redistribute to certain groups within and across industries. Trade
politics is redistributive politics, just as domestic industrial politics is redistributive
politics. This market access-focused approach integrates the two, which is essential
7. Whatever inﬂuence they have may take the form of domestic groups with interest in continued
import of that ﬁrm's goods.
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for understanding not only the politics surrounding modern trade negotiations and
agreements but also for understanding why the nature of protectionism has changed
as global capital ﬂows have created ﬁrms with interests that span borders. This new
framework considers industrial policy as imposing costs in four diﬀerent ways.
The ﬁrst kind of policies, those that are location-discriminating, impose additional
market access costs on goods that are produced outside the market's borders. One
might consider these policies that apply (or not) based on where it's made. The
second kind, characteristic-discriminating policies, impose additional costs on goods
of a certain variety, or that are produced in certain ways. These policies apply
based on how it's made. The third kind of policies create additional costs for some
producers, but not others, even if their goods are produced in the same manner and
in the same location. These ﬁrm-discriminating costs can take a variety of forms, but
all apply in a manner that divide goods market access based on who made it. The
ﬁnal kind of policies impose additional costs on all goods in a particular industry.
These indiscriminate policies add costs to all varieties, from all places, made by all
ﬁrms. With these sorts of policies, everybody pays. All of these policies add cost to
varieties of goods, thus changing the quantities that are consumed. Together, these
four types comprise a typology of policies that spans all kinds of potentially-trade
distorting policies, but that also separates them into groups where policies within the
same category are comparable and policies in diﬀerent categories are not.8
Each of the types of policy adds costs to some or all varieties of a good in the
market. These costs are additive, as well. For instance, if Government chooses a
policy proﬁle for an industry that includes a low level of indiscriminate costs, a low
level of location-discriminating costs (for instance, a small ad-valorem tariﬀ), and a
8. An important omission from this framework is whether these policies raise ﬁxed or variable
costs. The use of ﬁxed versus variable costs will have important implications for the eﬀect of these
policies on ﬁrms of diﬀerent size, or with diﬀerent levels of sales. However, that scale eﬀect should
be roughly consistent across the four types of policies, where ﬁxed costs of a given type aﬀect small
ﬁrms more than large ﬁrms and variable costs have similar eﬀects across ﬁrms size, so are relatively
better for small ﬁrms.
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policy that imposes moderate costs on some varieties, then diﬀerent ﬁrms will face
diﬀerent costs for entering the market. Foreign ﬁrms manufacturing policy-targeted
varieties will face the highest costs of market entry, while local ﬁrms producing va-
rieties unaﬀected by the characteristic-discriminating costs will face the lowest, only
the indiscriminate costs. For some producers, the higher costs, and thus prices, will
drive consumer demand low enough to force them to exit the market.
3.2.3 Consumers, Government, and Firms
For consumers, the additional costs of market access-restricting policies manifest
as higher ﬁnal prices for diﬀerent varieties in the market. The exact composition of
Government-provided protection with respect to type of discrimination is not impor-
tant for consumers. It is merely the eﬀect that said protection has on prices of each
variety in the market that aﬀects consumer choice. Faced with higher costs for some
varieties, consumers reallocate their consumption to other varieties of goods. It is
this reallocation that is critical. Consuming less or consuming less-preferred varieties
due to increased cost of more-preferred varieties means a loss of welfare.9
For government, the key decision is what, if any, additional costs of market access
to impose as part of a policy. The beneﬁt of imposing costs is the political sup-
port that ﬁrms provide to government in exchange for policy. However, the cost of
enacting policies that distort markets is borne as consumers (who also support the
government politically) experience a reduction in welfare. Their support for govern-
ment decreases, which makes government worse oﬀ.10 As in other theories of lobbying
9. While other arguments regarding non-tariﬀ barriers and the politics surrounding their provision
may focus on potential welfare-improving features of these policies, that discussion is set aside here.
It is diﬃcult to conceive of a way of categorizing policies as welfare improving that is both consistent
across markets and static over time. These sorts of welfare improving market restrictions generally
reﬂect changes in tastes within communities over time, often over matters like the environment or
some normative concerns. This makes the eﬀects of such a change diﬃcult to measure and diﬃcult
to theorize. However, it should be clear that, if a market-distorting policy has some kind of welfare-
improving eﬀect, it will be more appealing to consumers. This means that government will be more
likely to implement those policies, all else equal.
10. This can manifest in a number of ways. Democratically-elected governments may face higher
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for protection, it is the government's desire for political support from lobby groups
versus its consideration of consumer welfare that determines the level of protection
and the price lobby groups must pay to obtain it.
For ﬁrms, whether one views a particular policy as beneﬁcial or detrimental de-
pends on whether consumers divert consumption towards or away from the varieties of
goods they produce.11 Firms would prefer to have policies that increase consumption
of their goods. For protection-seeking ﬁrms, the critical decision they face involves
lobbying in an eﬀort to obtain proﬁtable protectionist policies or to prevent costly
protectionist policies from being implemented. This decision requires the ﬁrm to de-
cide how much to commit to lobbying/political support and towards which policies
to commit those resources. They make this decision in light of their own preferences,
and with expectations of what other ﬁrms in the industry may demand.
The process by which market access policy is made or reformed can be simpliﬁed to
a number of steps, which reﬂect the logic of Grossman and Helpman's Protection for
Sale model. First, ﬁrms submit bids, promises of political support that map to each
combination of policies that government may adopt. Firms truthfully reveal their
preferences over market access-restricting policies in these bids. Government then
considers the oﬀers of support in return for setting protectionist policies at a given
level, considers its own loss in welfare from the political backlash from consumers, and
sets policy at some combination of market access-restricting policies. After policy is
set, consumers make purchasing decisions in the newly regulated market to maximize
their utility. The government's utility is a weighted function of the political contri-
butions from ﬁrms, consistent with the oﬀers related to the implemented policy, and
consumers' utility.
risk of removal, or must expend more resources to maintain voter support. In autocracies, widespread
unrest can lead to instability, but it is much less likely to aﬀect leader/government survival. As in
Grossman and Helpman's original model, one can consider the relative weights government places
on beneﬁts from lobbying groups versus public/consumer support to vary. More speciﬁcally, one can
expect these weights to vary with the form of political institutions.
11. This is discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter.
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In this interaction, information is common. All ﬁrms know how others will oﬀer
support for each combination of policies. The government's weighting function on
political contributions versus public/consumer welfare is also commonly known. The
eﬀect of diﬀerent policies on consumer welfare is well understood by all parties. It is
characteristics of industry and political institutions that motivate the interaction, not
asymmetries of information. Also, when ﬁrms submit contribution schedules, they
credibly commit to providing support once policy is set. It is these contributions
that sustain government once market-distorting policies aﬀect consumer welfare, and
withholding them (or even the possibility of withholding them) would negate the
incentives that cause government to implement consumer welfare-reducing policy in
the ﬁrst place.
3.3 Lobbying for Protection
With the basic framework of the political-economic interaction surrounding mar-
ket access policy established, we can turn our attention to the way in which contribu-
tion schedules  the support bids  are generated. At the core of the political-economic
interaction of ﬁrms, consumers, and government is the process of industrial lobby-
ing. Individual ﬁrms or groups of ﬁrms demand policy from government and provide
support and resources necessary to make policy change feasible and desirable for gov-
ernment. In the absence of industrial lobbying, one can assume government would
adopt polices that privileged consumer welfare to a greater extent.
It is not, however, the case that industries lobby as a homogeneous group. As
discussed above, diﬀerent sorts of policies have diﬀerent eﬀects, even on ﬁrms within
the same industry. There is an intra-industry tension of lobbying and the potential
for counter-lobbying for certain kinds of protection that comes from the distributive
consequences of diﬀerent kinds of policies. As organized, politically-salient actors,
ﬁrms with a domestic presence have the ability to inﬂuence industrial policy through
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lobbying behavior. In comparison, consumers face signiﬁcantly higher coordination
problems and experience the costs of protectionism as more diﬀuse costs. Foreign
ﬁrms may be more organized interests, but without legal or institutional access to
government or political salience, do not have a seat at the table. Because of this,
both are less signiﬁcant in the creation of trade and industrial policy.
For clarity, weﬁrst consider lobbying over each type of market access barrier sep-
arately. Simpliﬁed examples of each type of policy are used to explain how divisions
within industries arise, and how lobbying for protection within industries will man-
ifest. Then, weintroduce the logic of lobbying over a basket of policies (of multiple
types) at once and summarize the hypotheses from this theory.
3.3.1 On location-discriminating policies
Tariﬀs, quotas, countervailing duties (CVD) and the like are examples policies
that add costs to goods in a market produced outside that market.12 While tariﬀs are
the most obvious form of location-discriminating cost, other policies, like temporary
geographic restrictions on import of certain agricultural products, also impose costs
based on where a product is made. For consumers of French cheese, it is irrelevant
whether the additional cost on a wedge of authentic Camembert comes from a duty
schedule or from the expense of the customs procedure at the border. What is relevant
is that the cheese costs more because it was produced outside the boundaries of the
country. When weighing a purchasing decision, French cheese entering without duty
12. Broad, industry-wide subsidies are another location-discriminating policy which have been used
more frequently as trade agreements have restricted the use of tariﬀs and quotas (Rickard 2012).
Subsidies can be targeted, even down to the ﬁrm-level, and the diﬀerence in use of general versus
speciﬁc tariﬀs, which might be considered location- versus ﬁrm-discriminating costs, is examined in
Park (2012). CVD and antidumping duties are policies which have grown out of these agreements,
and have received attention in the political economy literature (Wruuck 2015; Naoi 2009). Also, it
is theoretically possible for a government to implement location-discriminating policies that make
locally-produced varieties more expensive, but those policies are not considered here. Deardorﬀ
(1987) considers quotas against other location-discriminating policies, like tariﬀs, but argues that
the quantitative limits on imports oﬀers political beneﬁts that the others do not. The price versus
quantity measure discussion is set aside here, but bears future study.
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and low or no customs cost and a subsidy on locally-produced variety is similar to
duty on the French cheese. What matters is that the diﬀerence in price is due to
where the cheese was produced.
Positions on these policies broadly fall along expected lines  domestic-only ﬁrms
will prefer higher location-discriminating costs. Firms that import, either for ﬁnal sale
or as part of a supply chain, will prefer lower location-discriminating costs. Each ﬁrm
within the lobby has an ideal level of protection: for importers and MNCs it is low
- at or near zero13  while for domestic-only ﬁrms it is higher, to drive consumers
to substitute locally-produced varieties (which don't face the location-discriminating
cost) for imported varieties.
The beneﬁts from location-discriminating policies accrue to all domestic ﬁrms,
although not necessarily equally. As consumers reduce consumption of higher-cost
imported varieties, they substitute post-policy lower-cost alternatives produced do-
mestically, with some loss of utility. Firms who produce their goods domestically,
thus avoiding the additional costs, will earn proﬁts as good as or better than in the
market without the location-discriminating policy. Firms that produce abroad will
earn less proﬁt as a result of those policies.
The lobbying around location-discriminating policies takes two possible forms that
reﬂect those beneﬁts and costs. On the pro-policy side, ﬁrms that produce their
goods domestically will be willing to provide support to government if the proﬁts
from increased sales exceed the costs of that political support. On the other side,
ﬁrms with importing interest will provide political support if the foregone proﬁts
from higher market access costs outweigh the costs of the political support they must
provide to outbid those who seek location-discriminating costs.14
13. Or, if possible, negative, such that imports are subsidized.
14. The free trade interests (where free trade means lower tariﬀs, in particular) of ﬁrms with
global supply chains are well understood. As an example, Milner (1988) establishes the power of
these interests in case studies focusing on comparable industries in the 1920s and 1970s. In the
latter case, industries were divided, conditional on some degree of global intraﬁrm trade.
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There can be only one set of government policies at a time, and so the political
support that government obtains is the combination of committed support of all ﬁrms
for that particular level of location-discriminating costs. For each level of location-
discriminating costs, the government beneﬁts both from the support from ﬁrms and
from aggregate welfare of consumers, which passes through as mass support for gov-
ernment. Government sets policy to maximize the combination of the two, given the
relative importance of each in the government's utility function.
For location-discriminating barriers, the essential feature of the domestically-
salient ﬁrms in an industry is the degree to which those ﬁrms are domestic producers.
While domestic producers will increase political support of government as the level of
location-discriminating costs increase, aggregate consumer welfare, and thus that por-
tion of the government's utility, will fall. In an industry with only domestic producers,
the level of location-discriminating costs will be set at some positive level, where the
combination of political support gains and consumer welfare (which is declining) is at
its maximum. This is the canonical protection for sale logic: Domestic ﬁrms who
produce for the domestic market will seek protection that keeps out imported varieties
of goods and will transfer some of the proﬁts to government as political support.
However, if there are ﬁrms within the industry with interests in importing in their
own industry, the portion of government's utility function that comes from industrial
support will be higher at lower levels of location-discriminating costs.15 Those im-
porting ﬁrms will (credibly) support the government more at lower levels of location-
discriminating costs. The portion of government's utility function related to political
support conditional on policy is no longer as simple. Now, government can expect
15. A third group of ﬁrms, apart from domestic-only producers and producers with importing
interests within their own industry, are ﬁrms in other industries that use imported goods as inputs.
Higher (lower) location-discriminating costs mean higher (lower) production costs for these ﬁrms
if they produce in the protected market. However, these ﬁrms are excluded from discussion here
because of the focus on intra-industry diﬀerences in lobbying behavior. Those input-importing
ﬁrms play an important, but secondary, role in debates over protection in a given industry. This
relationship is examined in greater detail elsewhere, including in Schattschneider (1935).
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some positive support from industry, even if it removes all location-discriminating
costs. In industries where importers are an organized interest, location-discriminating
barriers will be lower, as the government's maximum utility is obtained at a lower
level of location-discriminating costs. Some combination of political support from
importing interests, support from domestic producers and higher consumer welfare
will yield maximum beneﬁts for government.
3.3.2 On characteristic-discriminating policies
Although often not framed explicitly as trade policy, other market-access restrict-
ing policies that discriminate by adding costs to some varieties of goods on the basis
of product characteristics or production process can have trade distorting eﬀects.
Among ﬁrms with political voice, each would prefer the variety it produces (or is best
at producing) to enter the market with no additional costs. They would prefer other
varieties, with diﬀerent characteristics, to face additional costs, thus making them
less attractive to consumers.
For simpliﬁcation, consider a characteristic-discriminating policy that works in one
of three ways. For an arbitrary ordering of varieties according to characteristics16, a
policy may add costs to all varieties above some point in the ordering, to all varieties
below some point in the ordering, or to all varieties between (or outside of) two points
in the ordering.
This policy may be a set of rules dictating a product standard, or one that limits
the use of certain products in a goods production. The policy may be a luxury
tax or a use tax that applies to some varieties but not others.17 Regardless of the
speciﬁcs of the policy, characteristic-discriminating policies have the eﬀect of adding
16. Note that characteristics is a distinct concept from quality, which is used elsewhere in the
literature and generally connotes greater or lesser value. Characteristics is used here to describe
an ordering which does not necessarily correspond to quality.
17. In the auto industry, gas guzzler taxes in the US and CO2 emissions-indexed road taxes are
two examples of this.
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cost to certain varieties of goods, regardless of location of production or identity of the
producer. Policy that generates characteristic-discriminating costs determines both
the subset of varieties that face increased costs and the magnitude of those additional
costs.
The beneﬁts from characteristic-discriminating policies accrue to producers of
goods unaﬀected by those policies which raise costs on other varieties.18 As con-
sumers reduce their consumption of higher-cost varieties, producers of goods with
characteristics unaﬀected by the policy see increased sales and higher proﬁt. The
costs of these fall on producers who are best at producing varieties of goods with
characteristics that are targeted by policy. Note that these kinds of policies create
a group of winners and losers that spans the geographic boundaries that deﬁne na-
tional markets. Foreign producers of varieties targeted by these policies are aﬀected
in the same manner as domestic producers of similar varieties. Foreign produced
varieties that are within the subset of varieties that access the market without addi-
tional cost are winners just as domestic producers of varieties within the same subset
are. These costs apply regardless of where the product is produced, or by whom.
Thus, characteristic-discriminating policies create coalitions of foreign and domestic
producers of protected varieties against foreign and domestic producers of aﬀected
varieties, and industrial politics reﬂect those coalitions.
Domestically-salient ﬁrms that produce goods varieties aﬀected by characteristic-
discriminating costs lose out from those policies. Consumers, too, experience losses as
their domain of product choices is limited or their ability to purchase certain varieties
reduced due to increased costs. Being forced to choose a second-best variety (based
on the consumer's preferences) or pay a higher cost to obtain their most-preferred
variety is what causes the loss in aggregate welfare.
Firms promise to provide the government with support in return for policies that
18. For policies which lower costs of some varieties, like tax credits or refunds, being targeted by
the policy is beneﬁcial.
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add costs to goods with characteristics unlike those in which they have a production
advantage. The degree of support they are willing to oﬀer is proportional to the
increase in proﬁts from consumers reallocating their consumption. If a policy aﬀects
many varieties or induces a large change in consumption habits by adding signiﬁcant
cost to a few targeted varieties, ﬁrms who beneﬁt will provide more support to govern-
ment than they would for a policy that has a smaller eﬀect on their proﬁts. For any
policies that add cost to products with the characteristics of their own products, ﬁrms
will oﬀer no support to government. However, some ﬁrms may also oﬀer some support
to government that implements policies that have few characteristic-discriminating
costs, as a counter-lobby against competitors who oﬀer political support in favor of
costly policy.19
When setting policy that creates characteristic-discriminating costs, government
again weighs the beneﬁts in terms of political support from the winners  the ﬁrms
who specialize in the varieties that enter the market without additional cost  against
the political costs of reducing consumer welfare. As government wishes to maximize
the combination of political support and aggregate welfare, setting characteristic-
discriminating costs at a very high level or over a broad subset of varieties is costly.
Unless the group of ﬁrms who stand to beneﬁt from reallocation of consumption be-
havior provide signiﬁcant political support, government will implement more modest
policies.
For the demand for and supply of policy that adds characteristic-discriminating
costs, one essential feature of the industry is the degree to which goods in that indus-
try are homogeneous or diﬀerentiated. If all producers have expertise in producing
goods with similar characteristics, within a tight subset of the universe of all pos-
sible varieties, that is a homogeneous product industry.20 This, in part, determines
19. The logic here is similar to the location-discriminating case: counterlobbying in a bid occurs
as a response to the pro-cost lobbying in which other ﬁrms may engage.
20. This homogeneity can arise from natural diﬀerences in the nature of product categories: It
is relatively diﬃcult to produce a Cavendish banana that has signiﬁcantly diﬀerent characteristics
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whether policies can be targeted or will aﬀect many (or all) ﬁrms in a given industry.
In industries where goods are largely homogeneous (in terms of these technical
characteristics), where characteristic-discriminating costs will have broad incidence,
one should expect counterlobbying to deter government from implementing signiﬁcant
characteristic-discriminating costs. Put simply, the net reduction in aggregate welfare
will be great, as few varieties will be unaﬀected by the policy, forcing broad reductions
in consumption, rather than substitution. In addition, there will be few ﬁrms willing
to lobby in favor of these sorts of policies, as they are likely to lead to reductions in
their own sales/proﬁts.
In homogeneous good industries, characteristic-discriminating policies should be
less frequent and their costs less onerous. It is only if a concentrated and relatively
large group of producers, outliers in terms of the variety they produce, promise to
provide signiﬁcant political support that characteristic-discriminating policies should
arise. Those policies would signiﬁcantly reduce consumer welfare while also leading
to large increases in proﬁts for those ﬁrms who can remain in the market producing
unaﬀected varieties. Thus, for government to implement such policies, the political
support transfer must be very large, and this is unlikely to be optimal for both ﬁrms
and government.
In industries where goods are naturally diﬀerentiated, where there are suﬃcient
characteristics to discriminate among varieties produced in a targeted way, a more
complex set of promises of political support is oﬀered to government. Firms will still
submit oﬀers where they provide no support for policies that add cost to their own
varieties of goods, but they may provide some support for policies that impose costs on
other varieties with diﬀerent characteristics. Government can now set policies with
than other Cavendish bananas. It is relatively easier to produce children's toys that have unique,
or uncommon, characteristics. An empirically-driven concept of homogeneity comes from Rauch
(1999), which looks to the presence of organized commodity exchanges for a particular good as
evidence of product homogeneity, and the presence of reference pricing as an intermediate between
homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods.
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more modest market distorting eﬀects, excluding some varieties without reducing
overall consumption as much as in the homogeneous goods case.
In diﬀerentiated goods industries, characteristic-discriminating costs will arise if
politically-salient ﬁrms all produce varieties with similar characteristics. If this is
the case, there are policies that redistribute sales and proﬁts from other ﬁrms who
have no ability to lobby government (either because they are foreign ﬁrms or because
the costs of political support are too high) to those ﬁrms that have political access.
Consumers will experience some loss of welfare from the reduction in goods market
choice, which then reduces the government's welfare. It is the political support from
the winners, those ﬁrms who experience growth in sales and proﬁt and transfer some
back to government, which makes this market-distorting policy outcome optimal for
government. Alternatively, if domestically-salient ﬁrms produce goods with a broad
variety of diﬀerent characteristics, the combination of scarce political support for
targeting any subset of varieties and potential counterlobbying against policies that
raise costs of this nature will prevent government from implementing policy with
signiﬁcant characteristic-discriminating costs.
3.3.3 On ﬁrm-discriminating policies
Firm-discriminating policies, like policies that restrict right of sale in a market to
a limited number of companies, or restrictions that raise market entry costs by requir-
ing producers to obtain licenses, create starker intra-industry cleavages. Some forms
of these policies, like ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidies, bailouts, and oligopolistic/monopolistic
market policies are less common. Other policies, like government procurement poli-
cies that privilege domestic ﬁrms, even if they produce goods outside the domestic
market, have similar eﬀect. Some ﬁrm-discriminating policies take the form of a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc cost of market entry, such as registration or license requirements that impose
signiﬁcant costs on new ﬁrms.
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These kinds of policies provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the winning ﬁrms, and are
likely to drive some ﬁrms targeted by the policy out of the market. It is this intra-ﬁrm
redistribution that drives the lobbying behavior around ﬁrm-discriminating policies.
However, diﬀerent sorts of ﬁrm-discriminating policies will have diﬀerent lobbying
dynamics. weconsider two broad kinds of policies. The ﬁrst is a policy that consis-
tently and perpetually imposes costs on some producers and not others. This could
be a discriminatory government procurement policy or a form of subsidy. The sec-
ond is a ﬁrm-discriminating ﬁxed cost of market entry, such that a ﬁrm pays once
and is then in-market with respect to additional costs. These sorts of policies are
analogous to ﬁrm-discriminating policies that impose some cost only on ﬁrms that
are not incumbents. If one supposes an arbitrary ordering of ﬁrms in a market, in-
cluding those ﬁrms that may potentially enter a market, an entry barrier is a cost
imposed on the subset of ﬁrms that are not already in a market.21 In this way, ﬁrm-
discriminating policies follow a consistent logic, but the incentives for each kind of
ﬁrm-discriminating cost are somewhat diﬀerent. weexpect that in industries with one
or a few large ﬁrms, those ﬁrms will lobby for and obtain targeted protection in the
form of consistent ﬁrm-discriminating costs, applied to all other competitors (both
domestic and foreign). Conversely, in industries with lower ﬁrm concentration, the
type of ﬁrm-discriminating policy sought will bar new entrants by raising ﬁrm-speciﬁc
entry costs. The logic behind each is discussed below.
weconsider the consistent costs policy ﬁrst. Each ﬁrm would clearly wish to
have policies in place that gave it unique advantage in the market. For any ﬁrm, the
ideal policy is one that raises prohibitively high costs on all varieties of substitute
goods produced by any other ﬁrm. A policy-induced monopoly is very proﬁtable for
the monopolist, but not nearly as good for consumers and potential competitors. So,
21. The form the costs take, ﬁxed or variable, is a distinction set aside here for tractability. One
may consider ﬁxed costs as being amortized across a ﬁrm's potential sales, and thus equivalent to a
variable cost of the same level.
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while any ﬁrm would likely be willing to pay a high price (in terms of political support)
for this sort of policy, it is unlikely that it has the resources necessary to suﬃciently
compensate government and oﬀset whatever counter-lobbying may occur. Creating a
monopoly through policy would signiﬁcantly reduce the welfare of consumers, as they
are forced to change their consumption behavior to reﬂect the new market conditions.
Government pays a political price for signiﬁcantly distorting markets in this way, in
accordance with institutional features. For even moderately responsive governments,
creating monopolies must either have signiﬁcant beneﬁts in the form of industry
contributions or modest eﬀects on consumer welfare in order to be a utility-improving
choice.
In any industry with more than one ﬁrm, counterlobbying will be an important
part of the politics around these ﬁrm-discriminating costs. Firms may oﬀer some
positive political contribution for governments that implement policies that do not
impose costs on them. In bidding in this fashion, these ﬁrms counteract the pressures
that may come from other ﬁrms' bids in favor of ﬁrm-discriminating policies. The
ﬁrms most likely to bid in favor of lower ﬁrm-discriminating costs are those that ben-
eﬁt most from an undistorted market: those ﬁrms who are most competitive/eﬃcient.
These ﬁrms are proﬁtable in an open market, and so may provide some beneﬁts to
governments that keep costs low. Thus, governments compare the utility they derive
from higher consumer utility, combined with some targeted beneﬁts from ﬁrms who
prefer broadly low levels of ﬁrm-discriminating costs against the reduction in govern-
ment utility from lower consumer welfare and some targeted beneﬁts from ﬁrms who
beneﬁt from ﬁrm-discriminating policies.
The other sort of policy, one that imposes costs solely on new entrant ﬁrms, will
have somewhat diﬀerent support. It is worth noting that these kinds of policies divide
winners and losers along status quo lines: it is as if existing ﬁrms have already paid
the cost, but new ﬁrms must pay costs to enter the market. This will have the eﬀect
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of deterring entry, thus preventing newer, potentially marginally more competitive
ﬁrms, from entering the market. In this sense, ﬁrm-entry cost policies create a kind
of club good22 among existing ﬁrms, and thus the incentives for demanding such
policies are somewhat diﬀerent among domestic ﬁrms than in the previous type of
ﬁrm-discriminating costs. Here, all existing ﬁrms beneﬁt (albeit to diﬀerent degrees)
from ﬁrm entry costs. It is new entrants and consumers who lose.
Among existing ﬁrms, those that face the greatest threat from new entrants are
smaller or less eﬃcient ﬁrms. Consumers' change in consumption to new varieties
produced by new entrants reduce the proﬁts of other ﬁrms, as reallocation of the
consumption basket moves away from existing varieties. For small or ineﬃcient ﬁrms,
this loss in sales may be enough to induce them to exit. Preventing new market entry
matters more for smaller and ineﬃcient ﬁrms than it does for large or eﬃcient ones.
However, barring new entry beneﬁts all existing ﬁrms.23 This prevents the sort of
counterlobbying that existed when ﬁrm-discriminating policies divided winners and
losers among existing ﬁrms. For these sorts of policies, smaller and more ineﬃcient
ﬁrms will be willing to contribute more (relative to their resources) to obtain ﬁrm-
discriminating policies, but larger and more eﬃcient ﬁrms may contribute as well to
obtain the beneﬁts of deterred market entry, as well. For government, these greater
contributions are appealing, relative to lost utility from lost consumer welfare. Also,
there is no positive support incentive in the form of ﬁrm counterlobbying for low
costs against which government must weight their choices. It is only the prospect
of signiﬁcant consumer welfare loss that deters government from creating policy that
imposes cost on new entrants.
Firm-discriminating cost policies will arise under diﬀerent conditions for each kind
of ﬁrm-discriminating cost. Policies that always impose costs on some ﬁrms are less
likely to arise in industries with inter-ﬁrm competition. When there are many ﬁrms
22. One which is excludable but non-rivalrous.
23. Or, at the very least, policies that impose costs on new ﬁrms do not harm existing ﬁrms.
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of similar size, the creation of a suﬃciently-large coalition of ﬁrms lobbying in favor of
such policies is diﬃcult. Counterlobbying against any such policy and the utility loss
from market distortions will reduce incentives for government to provide such a policy.
However, as an industry becomes less competitive (domestically), a coalition of large
ﬁrms may be able to overcome the problems of providing suﬃciently large incentives
for government to implement ﬁrm-discriminating policies. As the ﬁrm concentration,
for instance, within an industry rises, the likelihood that ﬁrm-discriminating policies
(in favor of the large ﬁrms) will arise also increases. The few large ﬁrms have resources
to lobby for targeted protection, and the smaller ﬁrms  with commensurately less
inﬂuence  cannot counterlobby suﬃciently to make provision of that protection
undesirable for government.
For policies that add costs to new entrants, the existence of domestically-salient
ﬁrms with lobbying power signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood that such policies will
be implemented. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is common.) However, some variation
in the likelihood of such policies being implemented does exist. When all ﬁrms in
an industry are relatively eﬃcient (compared to potential new entrants), there is less
incentive to demand ﬁrm-discriminating policy, and it is somewhat less likely to be
implemented. Existing ﬁrms are unlikely to face signiﬁcant competition from new
entrants, and so devote few resources to obtaining policy that would deter them.
When all ﬁrms in an industry are relatively ineﬃcient, thus making new entrants
highly competitive  bad for existing ﬁrms, but good for consumers  it is possible
that existing ﬁrms will be unable to contribute suﬃciently to make these policies
attractive to the government. Consumers would beneﬁt from access to a broader
market with more eﬃcient producers. It is when the existing ﬁrms are relatively
similar (on average) to potential entrants that ﬁrm-entry-discriminating policies may
arise.
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3.3.4 On policies that add costs indiscriminately
Other kinds of policies eﬀectively add cost to all goods sold within a market.
Consumption taxes, labeling requirements, and testing or certiﬁcation requirements
are all examples of indiscriminate costs. These additional costs shift the price of all
goods sold upward, although this price change may diﬀer across products if the cost
is a ﬁxed one. By increasing the cost-to-market of all goods within an industry, these
kinds of policies redistribute among ﬁrms by inducing ﬁrm (or variety) exit.
As these indiscriminate costs raise the price of goods, consumers will consume less
of each variety, all else equal. For some producers, reduced demand for their goods
induces them to exit. The reduced demand makes continued production unproﬁtable
at their particular level of eﬃciency  total costs exceed the price consumers are
willing to pay for their variety. The most eﬃcient ones may be able to absorb some of
the costs by taking lower proﬁts, but costs will still be passed on to ﬁnal prices. The
least-eﬃcient producers exit ﬁrst, and increasing costs leads to more producers exiting
the market as demand falls. Faced with higher costs for all varieties, consumers will
consume less, or will consume less-preferred varieties, thus reducing their welfare as
well. In some circumstances, where consumer demand for a certain class of goods is
fairly inelastic overall (and therefore consumers will substitute across varieties more
than they reduce aggregate consumption) and some eﬃcient ﬁrms can therefore trade
oﬀ reduced proﬁts per unit for increased volume (from consumer substitution), it may
be possible for a segment of the industry to gain from indiscriminate costs.
If these conditions exist, it is the most eﬃcient ﬁrms that will lobby for indis-
criminate costs, while the least eﬃcient ﬁrms will oppose them.24 Among relatively
eﬃcient ﬁrms, each will have an optimum level of indiscriminate costs, where suﬃ-
ciently many ineﬃcient ﬁrms exit the market to increase sales, but where the costs
24. This follows the same logic as the concept of nontariﬀ barriers in Abel-Koch (2013), Gulotty
(2014), and Osgood (2016).
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are not so high as to lead to a net reduction in their own sales. In general, a ﬁrm's
preferred level of indiscriminate costs is increasing in its eﬃciency. To obtain this
higher level of indiscriminate costs, eﬃcient ﬁrms will be willing to support the gov-
ernment politically (as long as the required contribution does not exceed the beneﬁts
from increased, post-ineﬃcient ﬁrm exit sales), and submit oﬀers to government that
include positive support for policy with some positive level of indiscriminate costs.
On the other hand, ineﬃcient ﬁrms may oﬀer some positive support to government
for setting indiscriminate costs at or near zero.25
For government, increasing indiscriminate costs can negatively aﬀect its utility by
reducing consumer welfare. As consumers either consume less or are forced to choose
among fewer remaining varieties (after ﬁrms exit), their overall level of welfare de-
clines. Consistent with the eﬀects of other kinds of market-distorting policies, this has
a negative eﬀect on government, depending on how much weight government places
on consumer welfare. For ﬁrms seeking indiscriminate costs, then, it is necessary
to provide contributions suﬃcient to overcome the eﬀects of lost consumer welfare.
Additionally, low-eﬃciency ﬁrms may counterlobby, oﬀering government with posi-
tive support for implementing low-cost policy. Thus, when government decides what
policy to set, it is deciding between the higher political support and lower consumer
welfare at higher levels of cost versus some (lower) level of political support from
ineﬃcient ﬁrms, but a higher level of consumer welfare. It is the distribution of ﬁrm
eﬃciency among producers that determines which will be greater and at what level
indiscriminate cost policy will be set.
This suggests the conditions under which indiscriminate costs should arise. If all
ﬁrms within an industry are similarly-eﬃcient, the intra-industry redistribution that
motivates lobbying for indiscriminate costs is unlikely to exist. If consumers demand
for an industry's goods is relatively elastic, indiscriminate costs are likely to reduce
25. This might, alternatively, be considered as small/ineﬃcient ﬁrms lobbying in favor of less
regulation.
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demand more than it redistributes it, which eliminates the motivation for ﬁrms to
demand these kinds of policies. However, if there is some ﬁrm heterogeneity and
demand overall is inelastic, then the level of indiscriminate costs should be higher,
and should increase as the number of eﬃcient ﬁrms or size of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm
increases.26 Industries with ﬁrm heterogeneity with respect to ineﬃciency and some
degree of inelastic demand should be where indiscriminate costs play a role in intra-
industry redistribution.
3.3.5 Considering all policies at once, and government incentives
As discussed above, these policies are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to
implement some combination of location-, characteristic-, and ﬁrm-discrmininating
costs, as well as indiscriminate costs, at once. However, the additional costs of these
policies are additive. If imported orange juice (from concentrate) from Juiceco (an
imaginatively-named subsidiary of ConglomCo) faces import tariﬀs based on its im-
ported status and additional regulatory costs related to content of concentrate juices,
buyers of that juice will pay more than if only one (or neither) of the policies applied.
The process of lobbying over multiple policies at once, then, is one of ﬁrms opti-
mizing their oﬀers, and thus their promises of political support, to reﬂect the status
of the industry. Firms would like to be monopolists, bidding for a combination of
policies that just eliminate all competitors. However, such policy would be incredibly
distortionary and would reduce consumer welfare to a signiﬁcant degree, thus making
it very costly. Also, it is clear that every other ﬁrm within an industry would bid for
a monopoly-creating policies, but ones that met their needs within the market. Thus,
oﬀering support for modest levels of policy, which reduce some competition, but not
all, is the politically-feasible solution. As one form of policy becomes politically in-
26. Again, this relationship will be non-monotonic. If the number of relatively eﬃcient ﬁrms
increases too much, the eﬀect on consumer welfare will be greater and the number of less-eﬃcient
ﬁrms forced to exit will decline.
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feasible, ﬁrms will lobby instead for the next-best option, in order to maintain some
degree of protection. This infeasibility arises when the politically-salient ﬁrms in an
industry have certain characteristics. When FDI means many ﬁrms have interests
in cross-border trade, location-discriminating costs become infeasible. When goods
produced by ﬁrms in the industry are homogenous, providing few opportunities for
divisions within that industry, characteristic-discriminating costs become infeasible.
If an industry is composed of many ﬁrms of similar size, targeted ﬁrm-discriminating
costs will either be counterlobbied or will raise costs on consumers too much for
government to support them. Indiscriminate costs are generally unpalatable to con-
sumers (and thus government pays a political cost for imposing them), and when
there are ineﬃcient ﬁrms among the domestically-salient within industry, these costs
will be opposed and thus less feasible.
Faced with increased opposition to one's most-preferred policy, a ﬁrm may instead
substitute a second-best policy in their oﬀer of political support in order to maintain
a suﬃciently-large protection-seeking coalition. In doing so, a coalitions of ﬁrms
within an industry will demand protection that reﬂects the best feasible compromise
among domestically-salient ﬁrms. Firms that cannot obtain policy which suits them
will simply keep their lobby resources in their pockets. To clarify, an industry with
signiﬁcant FDI, which produces homogeneous goods (or heterogeneous goods where a
wide variety are produced by domestically-salient ﬁrms), which is composed of many
similarly-sized ﬁrms, and where domestically-salient ﬁrms are not signiﬁcantly more
productive than their competitors is an industry where market access costs due to
policy should be low overall.
Demands for protection, and thus the structure of market access barriers, can
change over time. Consider an industry that is composed solely of domestic ﬁrms (no
signiﬁcant FDI inﬂows or outﬂows), where varieties are relatively homogenous, and
ﬁrms are generally modestly productive and have modest market share. In this hy-
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pothetical baseline economy, location-discriminating costs are the most likely. The
winners and losers from these policies cleave along the same lines as political salience
does. Domestic ﬁrms will demand protection along the most feasible dimension for
creation of a suﬃciently-large coalition, where most or all domestic ﬁrms are willing
to provide government with support in exchange for policy that redistributes to them.
This is location-discriminating policy.
This lobbying dynamic changes as the features of an industry change. As new ﬁrms
enter or existing ﬁrms leave, or existing ﬁrms change their industrial behavior, the
incentives of industry actors also change. The arrival of more ﬁrms with supply chains
that span national borders will aﬀect the lobbying for location-discriminating barriers.
A sudden technological shift that leads to new market entrants with new varieties of
goods will change demands for certain kinds of characteristic-discriminating policies.
When ﬁrms merge or a previously-small ﬁrm grows rapidly, the lobbying and counter-
lobbying for ﬁrm-discriminating policies will change. Changes in productivity within
a suﬃciently-large segment of a market will alter demands for indiscriminate costs.
In addition to the implications of intra-industry demands for protection, there are
general implications of the relative weight that government places on social welfare
versus political support from industry. As discussed above, governments that are more
beholden to public support will be more responsive to changes in consumer welfare.
In general, market distorting costs will be lower overall  or will have lower net eﬀect
on consumers  in countries where governments are chosen democratically.27 While
ﬁrms may wish to demand more protection, in democracies the political costs that
government faces for distorting markets too much places a limit on the degree of
total distortionary policy that is politically feasible.28 All of the action of lobbying,
counterlobbying, and determination of type and level of policy occurs within that
27. This also implies that more representative democracies will have lower market access barriers
than less representative ones.
28. One may consider this a kind of distortionary policy production frontier.
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limit, shaped in part by political institutions. The substitution of one policy for
another, therefore, is not merely a demand-side matter, but also a practical reality of
politics under constraint: governments cannot maximize policies across all varieties,
lest they distort markets to such a degree that they face political costs.
If there are no domestically-salient ﬁrms within an industry29, there will be no
lobbying to support a government that imposes costs on products within an industry.
In the absence of this political support, governments of all types should, in order to
maximize consumer welfare, keep market access costs low. If there are no domestic
producers, any location-discriminating costs would increase costs on imports the only
available varieties. Characteristic-discriminating costs would limit the varieties of
good that consumers can access, with no beneﬁt to government from ﬁrms produc-
ing the protected varieties. The same logic holds true for ﬁrm-discriminating costs:
the beneﬁciaries are not politically salient, and government bears the costs of lost
consumer welfare. For indiscriminate costs, in the absence of producers who beneﬁt
from intra-industry redistribution, there are no beneﬁts to lowering consumer welfare.
Thus, in the absence of such ﬁrms, there is little political incentive for government
to create policies that raise market access costs. One notable exception, raised here
merely for completeness, is if these policies have revenue-seeking opportunities for gov-
ernment.30 The discussion of incentives for creating costly policy has been discussed
with the implicit assumption that any revenues from policy were small, especially
when compared to the political costs to government of reducing consumer welfare.
In systems where government is relatively unresponsive to mass/consumer interests,
revenue-seeking may be optimal government policy. The majority of this discussion,
however, has assumed a government that is at least minimally responsive to consumer
29. For example, if there are no domestic producers and all varieties of a good are produced by
foreign ﬁrms without domestic investment.
30. This, of course, reﬂects the incentives for imposing tariﬀs in many countries before adoption
of broad scale income and wealth taxation. Tariﬀs and other duties were essential revenues for
government. Other policies that raise revenue for government may have one or more of the cost
implications discussed in the theory.
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welfare.
3.3.6 Hypotheses for unilateral policy creation
The dynamics of lobbying for protection within a single country suggest a number
of testable hypotheses that can be taken to the data to test the theory. These are
generated by considering all of the motivations for ﬁrms to seek one or another form
of protection (as best ﬁts their own preferences and the preferences of others in
their industry), and the incentives for government to use diﬀerent forms of costs to
regulate market access. Each of the types of policies requires an industrial coalition to
demand protection and the absence or relative weakness of a strong politically-salient
counterlobbying group to oppose it. The degree of market distortion possible, and
the price ﬁrms must pay in political support to obtain it, is determined by political
institutions.
In considering the manner in which industry features aﬀect lobbying, and thus
the provision of policy that imposes location-discriminating costs, weadvance these
hypotheses:
H1: Industries with greater degrees of foreign investment, both inward and outward,
will face lower location-discriminating costs of market access.
H2a: In diﬀerentiated goods industries, characteristic-discriminating costs will be
imposed on varieties of goods with characteristics unlike those of politically-
salient producers.
H2b: When an industry's goods are homogeneous, or politically-salient ﬁrms produce
a wide variety of diﬀerentiated goods, characteristic discriminating costs will be
low.
H3a: When ﬁrm concentration is high, politically-salient large ﬁrms will obtain ﬁrm-
discriminating policy that raises costs on other incumbent producers.
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H3b: When ﬁrm concentration is low and politically-salient ﬁrms are, on average,
ineﬃcient, ﬁrms will successfully lobby for policies that raises costs on new
entrants.
H4a: In industries where demand is inelastic and ﬁrm eﬃciency is heterogeneous,
the most-eﬃcient ﬁrms will lobby for indiscriminate costs policies, which will
be provided if eﬃcient ﬁrms are politically salient.
H4b: When all ﬁrms within an industry are of similar eﬃciency, and the government
will not raise indiscriminate costs.
In recognizing that market access distorting costs are additive, and thus the costs
to consumers, to government, and to ﬁrms (in terms of oﬀsetting contributions) are
the same, weargue:
H5: Higher levels of one kind of market-distorting policy will be associated with
lower levels of other policies, all else equal.
Finally, in considering the general incentives that government faces under diﬀerent
economic and institutional conditions, weargue:
H6a: In the absence of a domestic industry to lobby for protection, government
will erect few barriers to market access, consistent with maximizing consumer
welfare.
H6b: More representative governments, those selected by a larger portion of the
population, will set policies that are less distortionary overall.
H6c: Governments that are not responsive to consumer welfare demands may set
policies that extract revenues.
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These hypotheses link the characteristics of an industry and the features of politi-
cal institutions to the type of policy that should arise from the lobbying process over
industrial policy. Governments have a wide variety of policies from which to choose,
as well as the option to reduce intervention in markets. The types of policy chosen,
and the way in which policy changes over time, should reﬂect the hypotheses above.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Understanding and explaining the politics of trade openness and domestic indus-
trial protection in a global economy requires examining trade-focused policies and
potential imperfect substitutes for those policies. In practice, no two policies are
exactly alike. However, many of the same protections aﬀorded by a tariﬀ can be
provided to ﬁrms with a quota or a voluntary export restraint. In comparison, it is
unlikely that a product quality standard, even if it aﬀects many imported varieties
and thus reduces trade to some extent, will provide similar eﬀects. If both quotas
and standards are considered under one broad umbrella, it is unclear how we should
expect the politics of tariﬀs to compare to the politics of non-tariﬀs. Existing liter-
ature has generally treated all NTMs as like tariﬀs, but diﬀerent in one critical way.
By integrating a new typology of market access barriers with core insights about
protection-seeking politics, we can improve our understanding of not just why trade
appears to have opened as it has, but also from where challenges to other forms of
agreement and cooperation may arise.
This logic explains why, in industries where trade agreements limit a government's
ability to implement a most-preferred policy (like tariﬀs), ﬁrms will attempt to obtain
other market access barriers of similar type that are not prohibited, like buy national
campaigns instead of tariﬀs.31 Even if the industry does not change  in foreign
31. There are other options, but these are unique to the context of each country's trade agreement
obligations. This also means that some location-discriminating policies can be used with some trade
partners, but not others. Provisions of GATT/WTO also allow speciﬁc location-discriminating
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investment, product heterogenity, ﬁrm concentration, or relative industry eﬃciency
 other policies within the same class of costs are an option. In this way, changes
in policy from tariﬀs to other non-tariﬀ measures can be better understood as a
substitution of one prohibited policy for another similar, but permitted, policy. But in
some cases, the decline in tariﬀs and rise in non-tariﬀ measures represents a change in
the contours of industrial protection, reﬂecting a change in the demands for protection
within an industry.
The theory advanced here is one of unilateral policy change. It does not incorpo-
rate incentives that arise from reciprocal policy change, or the logic of cooperation
central to some theories of trade liberalization. Indeed, for a comprehensive discus-
sion of trade liberalization, the dynamics of protection-seeking discussed here should
be integrated with insights from that research. However, by focusing on the logic of
changing incentives for or against diﬀerent types of policy, this theory contributes to
our understanding of changes in the use of various trade policy instruments, and by
extension trade ﬂows. Much existing work has focused primarily, or solely, on changes
in tariﬀ rates and agreements, or has treated non-tariﬀ measures in a manner similar
to tariﬀs. A look to the ways in which these policies may be demanded diﬀerently
from one another, and demanded diﬀerently on each side of a negotiation, may im-
prove understanding when returning to the study of agreement (or disagreement) in
trade and market liberalization in bilateral or multilateral contexts.
Critically, the implications of this argument are important for understanding a
long-run trend in the global goods market. Tariﬀs have, through unilateral reduc-
tions and bilateral and multilateral agreements, generally fallen. However, other forms
of protection have risen both in importance and level. The other major trend of the
post-WWII global economy, the rise in multinational ﬁrms and growth of international
investment, is a plausible cause of this new pattern in trade and market barriers. As
policies  countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties  speciﬁcally to disincentivize raising of
general tariﬀs.
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more ﬁrms with political salience within an industry have global ties, the demand for
location-discriminating policies will fall. With less demand (or more counterlobby-
ing) for location-discriminating costs, ﬁrms will demand other kinds of policies, like
characteristic-discriminating or ﬁrm-discriminating, instead. As the characteristics of
demand for protection shift, responsive government changes policies to suit.
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CHAPTER IV
Industry Characteristics and the Contours of Market
Access Restrictions in the US
4.1 Introduction
While tariﬀs have generally declined and their signiﬁcance as barriers to trade
fallen in the period of globalization following the Second World War, the importance
and scale of other barriers to trade have risen. This is due in part to the success of
multilateral agreements on tariﬀs, which have structured a freer-trade system. How-
ever, as challenges to deepening cooperation beyond tariﬀs and oft-repeated claims
of trade discrimination behind borders suggest, tariﬀs are not the sole means of re-
stricting or distorting international goods trade.1 Global trade today is increasingly
intra-industry trade and intra-ﬁrm trade, and varieties of similar goods tailored to
tastes and regulations in diﬀerent markets pass each other on the oceans. Adoption
of common product standards and common certiﬁcation measures are two ways trade
partners may seek to lower trade costs. Meanwhile, exporters attempting to enter
new markets often report regulatory barriers as an important factor in preventing
entry. However, larger multinational competitors producing in the same markets ship
1. Trade in services is another critical part of the global economy, and non-tariﬀ barriers of various
type are a critical distortion to this trade. Much of the logic of market access barriers which motivates
this empirical study applies to services trade, as well, but the focus in this work is on goods trade
and data related to goods trade.
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goods back to their home markets with ease.
This pattern, where trade appears free and yet not, where intra-industry and intra-
ﬁrm ﬂows are prevalent, and where access to markets appears unequal both within
and across industries, raises questions of how and why market access restrictions
vary in this way. Chapter II introduces a framework for considering tariﬀs, non-tariﬀ
barriers, and other policies as market access barriers, moving beyond the tariﬀ/non-
tariﬀ barrier distinction which is the basis of much of the existing discussion. This
framework considers that barriers impose additional costs on goods based on where
they are made, how they are made, who makes them, or indiscriminately. This new
typology motivates a new theory of industrial coalition politics around market access
barriers, as discussed in Chapter III. In this theory, individual ﬁrms change the type
of protection demanded2 in response to features of the ﬁrm and of the industry as a
whole. This framework provides conceptual and theoretical answers to the questions
of which industries receive protection, how they are protected, and why they receive
protection, inclusive of a broad variety of policies that may be either substitutes or
complements.
To improve the answer to these questions and test the claims of the model of
market access politics, we turn to data on extant trade barriers. In this paper,
we examine an existing data source on trade barriers, UNCTAD's Trade Analysis
Information System (TRAINS) Non-Tariﬀ Measures database, and adapt those data
to meet the market access barriers classiﬁcation. After a description of the state of
aﬀairs in market access restriction, we then turn to analyze some potential causes of
diﬀerences in both the level and features of market access restrictions. Using industry-
level measures of foreign direct investment, ﬁrm concentration, industry size, and
product heterogeneity, we examine the relationship between some potential demand
2. For example, a shift from location-discriminating barriers, like tariﬀs or quotas, to
characteristic-discriminating ones, like safety requirements that reﬂect technologies that local ﬁrms
have already developed.
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side causes of market access barriers and the contours of market access restriction
across a wide variety of products in the United States. The results suggest that the
presence or absence of FDI is associated with diﬀerent market access barriers and
diﬀerentiated goods face diﬀerent barriers than more homogeneous ones.
4.2 Some Existing Discussions of Trade Barriers and Causes
of Protection
The discussion of tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers to trade is by no means new. In
the wake of the Kennedy Round of GATT, early work on nontariﬀ trade-distorting
policies focused on those that appeared quite similar to tariﬀs or that were applied
at a border. Measures of any type that caused goods and services to be allocated
in such a way as to reduce potential real world income were considered non-tariﬀ
barriers, and with import duties, comprised all types of trade-distorting policies
(Baldwin 1970).3 However, as expressed by Bhagwati (1988), much of the thinking
of the time considered NTMs as a substitute for tariﬀ policy  Bhagwati's Law of
Constant Protection. As trade economists looked to NTMs and NTBs, the discussion
of the politics around these policies largely paralleled that of tariﬀs, with slightly
diﬀerent economic eﬀects.4 However, over time, it has become clear that the politics
surrounding non-tariﬀ policies is more complex than that.
Subsequent research focused directly on the politics of NTMs. In an attempt to
adjudicate whether pressure politics or a broader national interest and institutions
drive protectionist policy in a cross-national context, Mansﬁeld and Busch (1995) look
to NTMs as a means to better examine distributive politics.5 While the empirical
3. Baldwin (1970) does suggest that a broader deﬁnition including both domestic and international
distortions would be possible, but in practice such an approach is unmanagable, likely a warning
to the future.
4. Discussions of diﬀerences in eﬃciency loss, compared to tariﬀs, were common, but the distribu-
tive consequences were often considered to be similar, if they were considered at all.
5. One of their claims is that successive GATT rounds constrained tariﬀ policy suﬃciently to
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models they estimated were designed as ambivalent to whether NTMs were substi-
tutes or complements to tariﬀs, their argument generally treats NTMs as substitutes,
created by the same political pressures as tariﬀs might be. In contrast, Ray (1987)
considers the US case alone, but focuses on the change in protectionist policy from
tariﬀs to NTMs. In part, the motiviation for this change, Ray argues, is changes
in political pressures and the qualitative diﬀerences between tariﬀs and NTMs. Ray
speciﬁcally focuses on diﬀerences in revenue generation, ability to target protection
towards groups where tariﬀ distortions would be too distortionary, the public's rela-
tive diﬃculty of assessing their eﬀect, and the ability of NTMs to be more speciﬁcally
targeted, thus reducing free rider problems and increasing pressure for NTMs among
declining industries. The idea of NTMs as less observable, and thus preferable for
democracies where public backlash is a concern, appears in some cases to have broader
cross-national support (Kono 2006).
Other work has focused on speciﬁc types of non-tariﬀ policies that have trade
implications. Research on subsidies has shown some similarities to tariﬀs in political
and institutional causes, but suggests that subsidies may be more targetable, which
can change the political dynamics behind their provision (McGillivray 2004; Rickard
2012). The discussion of how targeting of export subsidies aﬀects success of an in-
dustrial support program also suggests that targetability matters, and it aﬀects both
distributive and aggregate economic outcomes (Rodrik 1993).
Another body of research focuses on the sources of domestic market regulation,
including by private actors, and global trade. The move to harmonization of product
and regulatory standards in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, while the body of regulations
expanded, was seen by some as an eﬀort to reduce nontariﬀ barriers to trade. Where
standards are amended to meet an international standard, reducing barriers between
limit governments' responsiveness to pressure. So NTMs were considered a better measure because
they were less constrained by international agreements. This approach, especially focusing on core
NTMs, like quotas, is adopted elsewhere (Busch and Reinhardt 1999).
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markets, this may occur due to domestic regulatory institutions that themselves are
consequences of historical events. Here, it is the standards setters  and the degree to
which they share information and adapt rules at the international level  that shape
regulation, harmonization and the degree to which standards are barriers to trade
(Mattli and Büthe 2003). Alternatively, there is some evidence that trade networks,
and the pressures of export demand, can shape adoption of new standards to harmo-
nize exporting and importing markets, even if that means more standards/regulation
(Prakash and Potoski 2006).
Building oﬀ economic models of trade  Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardo-Viner, Lan-
caster's, Dixit and Stiglitz's, Krugman's and Melitz's new trade theories  to posit
the preferences of market actors and then subsequently which factors, sectors, or in-
dustries obtain protection in a microfoundational way, has a long tradition in political
economy (Brock and Magee 1978; Rogowski 1987; Gilligan 1997b; Bombardini 2008;
Osgood 2016; I. S. Kim 2017).6 Most of this work focuses on tariﬀ barriers to trade,
as those are the foundation of the economic work on which the political economy work
is built. More recently, researchers are adapting these arguments to ﬁt the logic of
NTMs by adapting the underlying economic models with cost structures that reﬂect
an interpretaton of NTMs' eﬀects (Abel-Koch 2013; Gulotty 2014).
The discussion of non-tariﬀ trade barriers does leave some avenues for further re-
search. First, whether NTMs are substitutes or complements for tariﬀs remains an
open question. Research comparing use of diﬀerent trade instruments across indus-
tries and time in Japan point one way forward (Naoi 2009). However, the broader
discussion contains work based on each assumption, without much sign of resolution.
Second, there is some disagreement in the literature over which types of non-tariﬀ
measures are indicative of NTM politics generally, and which kinds of policies are
unique in a way that makes them less comparable to other NTMs. These two ten-
6. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) summarizes the sectors vs factors discussion.
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sions suggest that, both empirically and theoretically, the tariﬀ/non-tariﬀ measure
divide has led to some compromises that make inquiry and debate more complicated.
The central contribution of this paper, and the larger research agenda in which it
resides, is a shift to a types of costs framework that makes comparisons between
and across diﬀerent types of trade- (and domestic market-) distorting measures more
consistent.
4.3 Hypothesized Patterns of Market Access Barriers
There is no shortage of good scholarship on the matter of trade protection, es-
pecially in light of the growth of global supply chains and global capital ﬂows. The
shift to a discussion of market-access barriers is meant to reconcile the similarity in
ﬁndings from the study of tariﬀs and NTMs that look like tariﬀs while also clarifying
why some studies of NTMs suggest other forces at work. A theory of unilateral policy
change in response to lobbying from industry-speciﬁc interests is presented in Chapter
III. In that paper, individual ﬁrms tailor their demands for protection to reﬂect both
their own interests and those of their domestically-salient competitors. As the set
of other ﬁrms changes  in terms of interest in international supply chains, relative
size or ﬁrm concentration, and natural product heterogeneity and the similarity of
varieties  the nature of individual ﬁrm demands and the dominant demands of the
industry as a whole will change.
This theory, which parallels the core logic of Grossman and Helpman (1994),
generates a set of testable hypotheses that link those industry characteristics to the
varieties of protection sought and obtained. For each of the four types of market access
barriers  location-discriminating, characteristic-discriminating, ﬁrm-discriminating,
and indiscriminate  diﬀerent features of an industry's composition are expected to
lead to more or less demand for a particular form of market access costs. In addition,
the level of each type of market access cost for a particular variety of good will
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aﬀect the incentives for governments to raise additional market access costs  of
the same or other types  on that variety of good. As diﬀerent industries have
diﬀerent characteristics  more foreign investment or less, greater ﬁrm heterogeneity
or industry concentration, perhaps a naturally-homogeneous product  the types
of barriers each may request (and obtain, in many cases) should vary according to
underlying industry features. A main claim of the theory is that the growth in global
capital ﬂows drove demands for protection (in the aggregate) away from location-
discriminating barriers in some industries (where foreign investment, both inward
and outward) is greater, to other kinds of market-access-restricting policies.
This paper will attempt to test some of the claims of Chapter III, using the
typology of market access barriers introduced in Chapter II. First, this paper focuses
on testing the hypothesis that the level of location-discriminating costs on a given
product should be inversely related to the level of foreign direct investment in the
industry that produces that good. This is claimed to occur because politically-salient
ﬁrms with global supply chains disprefer protectionist policies that may raise costs
on their varieties of goods, even if they aﬀect other foreign competitors as well. As
a result, the policies that a protection-seeking industry coalition will demand from
government should include fewer location-discriminating costs, and instead substitute
other kinds of costs to protect those politically-salient ﬁrms.
This paper also tests a hypothesis about the presence or absence of characteristic-
discriminating costs. The theory suggests that, in homogeneous goods industries,
attempts to raise characteristic-discriminating costs will either lead to ineﬀective pol-
icy (that doesn't serve the rent-seeking interests of protection-demanding ﬁrms) or
would raise costs on many or all producers. In either case, the theory suggests that
in homogeneous-goods industries, characteristic-discriminating costs should be raised
infrequently, if at all, on that industry's varieties of goods.
The theory also generates additional hypotheses about when ﬁrm-discriminating
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and indiscriminate-cost policies should arise, and those are tested against the data
here, as well. The number of ﬁrms and the degree of concentration within an industry
should aﬀect how many ﬁrm-discriminating costs the products of that industry face.
In particular, ﬁrm-discriminating costs are more appealing when a domestic industry
is more concentrated. However, it is the eﬃciency of politically-salient ﬁrms that
determines whether policies that raise indiscriminate costs on producers are raised.7
When those ﬁrms with political access are relatively ineﬃcient, they should lobby less
for these kinds of policies, which hurt them more than competitors.
4.4 UNCTAD's TRAINS Database and Market Access Barri-
ers
Collection of data on non-tariﬀ barriers to trade is complex. The variety of policies
that may serve as a barrier to international trade, but that are not tariﬀs, is exten-
sive. Further, some of the policies are diﬃcult to observe. Some non-tariﬀ measures
(NTMs) apply at national borders, while others are applied behind the border. It
is also sometimes unclear which policies cause negative distortions in trade ﬂows and
which do not. It is therefore common for these policies to be referred to as non-
tariﬀ measures, rather than non-tariﬀ barriers, in UNCTAD reporting.8 Unlike
tariﬀs, which as a single kind of policy have the beneﬁt of being relatively easy to
measure and compare  ad valorem and speciﬁc duties can be transformed fairly
easily  non-tariﬀ measures must be categorized and coded across a number of di-
mensions. For this reason, UNCTAD's own coding of NTMs has changed a number
7. This is somewhat similar to the logic in Gulotty (2014), where NTMs are all generally considered
as ﬁxed costs of market entry, paid by all producers.
8. It is the implication that these measures may increase trade ﬂows, or distort them in terms of
composition, which makes consideration of the net trade eﬀect of NTMs so complex. Unlike tariﬀs,
which generally result in net trade ﬂow declines, some non-tariﬀ measures may block some trade
ﬂows, but also domestic alternatives, resulting in more imports, or merely reallocate import demand
among available alternatives. Discussion of these possible eﬀects, in the context of distributive
consequences of diﬀerent kinds of market access barriers, is discussed in Chapter II.
102
of times in the past 20+ years. The most recent classiﬁcation system was ﬁnalized
and released in 2012 (Group 2015). The 2012-coded UNCTAD TRAINS database
categorizes trade barriers according to a coding scheme that splits NTMs into sixteen
chapters, split among technical measures, non-technical measures, and export-related
measures.9 These categories are descriptive, and focus primarily on how the policies
are implemented or the proximate goals of the policy (anti-dumping versus counter-
vailing duties and technical barriers to trade (TBT) versus sanitary and phytosanitary
standards (SPS), for instance).
The current TRAINS database is constructed by collecting data on legal measures
from oﬃcial sources in each country in the sample. Industry and voluntary standards,
which are standards and policies enforced explicitly or through mutual agreement by
ﬁrms in a given industry, but that are not explicit legal requirements enforced by
government, are excluded from this collection eﬀort (Knebel and Rial 2016). In-
ternational standards are also not considered in the UNCTAD database, unless a
government adopts the standard through legislation. These data come from cen-
tralized government sources, such as oﬃcial registers or periodical announcements of
regulatory changes, or from decentralized data collection by UNCTAD or UNCTAD-
supporting organizations and data collectors. At times, UNCTAD uses data pur-
chased from private companies that consolidate regulations, if oﬃcial sources and
data collected directly by UNCTAD-aﬃliated bodies are insuﬃcient. After iden-
tifying sources, UNCTAD collects and organizes all documents obtained from those
sources. Then each document is examined to identify all regulations contained in each
document, with an eye to languge that identiﬁes products and countries as targets,
when possible. Once individual regulations are identiﬁed, each is classiﬁed according
to which measure type, tariﬀ line, partner, and objective applies for each regulation.
Particular attention is paid to whether a policy applies in a way that is meant to
9. A complete summary of the codebook can be found in Appendix B.
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support some other policy objective  protection of the environment distinguishes
an SPS measure from a TBT, for instance  and whether a policy contains multiple
measures that must be coded separately.10
The TRAINS database has grown in scale in a number of ways over its his-
tory. In more recent years, more countries are covered by the data collection ef-
forts. Within each country, subsequent years often contain more varieties of policies,
as well. Whereas much of the publicly-available early versions of TRAINS contains
only tariﬀ-like measures  quantitative restrictions and the like  later years in
the database expand into more categories of non-technical measures, some categories
of technical measures, and export measures.11 Whereas early country-years in the
database  Japan in 1989, for example  are relatively sparse in terms of product
and measure coverage, later country years are much more complete. Because of the
nature of the data collection, even the best TRAINS country-year databases are likely
to be incomplete. Speciﬁcally, measures that are more opaque, measures that have
older legal origins, or those that are enforced in an informal way will be missed by the
data collection eﬀort. However, compared to the alternatives, the TRAINS database
remains the best option for comprehensive study of a variety of NTMs.
4.4.1 Translating NTMs to Market Access Barriers
However, TRAINS measures NTMs according to a classiﬁcation that raises a
number of problems for understanding the distributive politics behind trade policy.
To use this existing database, it is necessary to transform the TRAINS typology, which
categorizes measure by speciﬁc type  phytosanitary standards that are temporary
versus import licensing requirements, for instance  into something that reﬂects
10. The speciﬁcs of these classiﬁcations, as well as discussion of more detailed coding principles
can be found in Knebel and Rial (2016), which is oﬃcial guidance for coders of NTMs.
11. This expansion in data coverage follows increased eﬀorts of UNCTAD, a more developed frame-
work for collecting and classifying measures, and also increased participation in data collection eﬀorts
by governments, especially when data collection is explicitly deﬁned as a responsibility in trade and
other international agreements.
104
the typology described in Chapter II. From the typology of market access barriers
discussed in Section 4.3, it is possible to map each speciﬁc type of policy12 to its type
of market access restriction. We do this by examining the description and coding
instructions for each type of TRAINS NTM code, then considering how each type of
measure divides a hypothetical global market with many producers, manufacturing
goods of diﬀerent characteristics in diﬀerent markets. If the policy adds costs to some
producers and not others, it is not an indiscriminate cost. If it discriminates in some
way, we then consider which dimension of the goods deﬁning elements determines
whether the producer must bear additional costs to enter a market.
The measures recorded in the database sometimes clearly identify a particular type
of market access barrier. Quotas  code E2  are location-discriminating costs, for
instance  while other measures overlap multiple types of costs. Importer approval or
registration requirements for agricultural products for phytosanitary reasons  codes
A13, A14, or A15  captures both location-discriminating costs  only imports are
restricted by this policy  and ﬁrm-discriminating costs  each ﬁrm must bear
the costs to obtain a license or complete the registration process if they wish to
import. Policies that require testing on certain varieties of goods  A82 or B82
 can be considered to impose both indiscriminate and characteristic-discriminating
costs. This is common among policies coded in the TRAINS data. Conceptually,
one can imagine this as a policy imposing costs on multiple orthogonal dimensions at
once, or a vector of costs through a multidimensional cost space.
There are two options for addressing this issue. In the ﬁrst, a policy can be
categorized as imposing multiple varieties of costs at once. In the second, one can
select only one cost  the most expansive in coverage of ﬁrms, or the one that beneﬁts
12. The TRAINS database identiﬁes 182 diﬀerent types of non tariﬀ measures, including categories
for measures not elsewhere speciﬁed. Some of these are quite general, others much more speciﬁc.
If time and resources permit, it would be possible to code each speciﬁc measure contained in the
database according to the location/characteristics/ﬁrm/indiscriminate costs typology. For the US
in 2012, this is 5752 diﬀerent measures. Each of these is a particular type of NTM that covers one
or more product lines with one or more trade partners. This measure-level coding is not done here.
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the smallest number of ﬁrms, or the cost that best matches the general eﬀects of
the policy  and identify a policy as representing only one kind of market access
barrier.13 In this paper, we choose to use the former, inclusive coding. This has the
consequence of making individual policies count multiple times, albeit across diﬀerent
categories of market access barriers. As many products face a variety of non-tariﬀ
measures in the TRAINS data, this choice means that comparing the number of costs
per product across products and across types of barriers is roughly equivalent. A
product with more NTM lines will appear to have more Market Access Barriers in
each category and overall.
The speciﬁc coding of every NTM code in the TRAINS data can be found in
Appendix B. In general, diﬀerent sections of the codebook represent similar kinds of
market access barriers, although important diﬀerences do arise. For instance, in both
the TBT and SPS sections of the UNCTAD NTM coding, some measures generally
deﬁne location- or characteristic-discriminating costs, while other measures in the
same section of the codebook  those requiring testing or certiﬁcation  apply
indiscriminate costs that all producers must bear. In the same vein, similar sorts of
measures exist in diﬀerent parts of the codebook, as well. With the TRAINS data
translated to a market access barriers framework, it is possible to use the database
as a set of outcomes against which the hypothesized causes of diﬀerent forms of
protectionism discussed above can be tested.
4.5 Data and Analysis
The data used in this analysis come from a variety of sources. Testing the presence
of hypothesized relationships between industry characteristics and varieties of market
access barriers requires a variety of measures at diﬀerent intra-industry levels of gran-
13. In this case, one may consider the import licenses for phytosanitary reasons discussed above
as only a ﬁrm-discriminating or only a location-discriminating cost, for instance.
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ularity. For many countries and times, the necessary data are either not distributed
outside of government statistics agencies or not collected at all. In order to maintain
focus on the diﬀerences of interest  diﬀerences in the kinds of protections provided
for diﬀerent industries and ﬁrms  the analysis in this manuscript is restricted to a
case where adequate and reliable data are available for many industries.
Testing the potential sources of demand for diﬀerent forms of protection requires
systematic data on industry-level foreign investment positions, characteristics of in-
dustry size and concentration, and a measure of the degree of underlying product
diﬀerentiation within a particular industry.
These data are all available for the United States in a form that allows for intra-
industry comparisons of market access barriers to diﬀerent varieties of goods. The
dataset compiled for this paper covers US market access barriers in 2012, and a variety
of industry measures in that year and preceding years. we discuss the data in more
detail below.
4.5.1 Market Access Barriers
The outcomes of interest are the varieties of protection imposed on diﬀerent prod-
ucts (and thus granted to diﬀerent industries and ﬁrms). As discussed above, the
source for these measures is UNCTAD's TRAINS database, which catalogs reported
and measured incidences of non-tariﬀ barriers to trade at the 6-digit Harmonized
System product code level. The 6-digit level is a fairly granular level of product dif-
ferentiation. For example, HS code 020741  the meat of whole ducks, either fresh
or chilled  is distinct from 020711  the meat of whole chickens, fresh or chilled
 and 020743  just the fatty livers of duck, again fresh or chilled. Many policies
in the TRAINS data cover a variety of product lines, but some cover only one or a
handful of lines. In the TRAINS data, this appears as a single measure that applies
to a number of product lines.
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As data in some years in the UNCTAD database are more comprehensive than
others, case selection is driven in part by the availability of data across many varieties
of NTMs and industries/products simultaneously.14 The TRAINS data collection
eﬀort requires the presence of organized oﬃcial reporting on NTMs, so the most
complete country-years are those for countries with a robust national statistics and
legal archiving framework, or those countries that have been given speciﬁc assistance
for creation of these data. Although the TRAINS data cover over 150 countries with
observations since 1988, there is signiﬁcant missingness, both at the country-year
level and within the country-year level. For many of the 150 countries, only one or
two reports are available over the panel's time coverage. Some country-year panels
may cover only some products or some varieties of measures. This fact, combined
with the need for consistent and broad coverage of the covariates of interest discussed
below, limits the set of cases that provide suﬃcient data for a test of the market
access demands hypotheses. Given the variety of data availability issues, we restrict
the analysis in this paper to one country in one year: The United States in 2012.
In some ways, the United States is a straightforward choice. As a large economy
with signiﬁcant trade ﬂows, there should be suﬃciently large industries with both
political power and economic motive to engage in pressure politics. However, in other
ways, the United States is an outlier case. Despite the size of trade volumes, the
US is nowhere near the global economy's most trade-intensive economy. Future work
should examine these patterns in other countries and across time, but for a variety of
reasons discussed above, and in consideration of using the most complete case feasible,
analysis is restricted to this single country-year.
The format of the TRAINS data lists observations at the product-policy-trade
partner-year level, which signiﬁcantly increases the number of observations per coun-
try year. However, many of these are functionally duplicates15, which requires some
14. This is discussed above, as well.
15. For example, a particular agricultural import licensing policy is the same whether Chile or
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initial summarization of the data. To reduce overcounting of the same policies, only
a single instance of a policy16 for a particular product is considered. This essen-
tially collapses the data on the trade partner dimension of the database, making
all observations equivalent to one where the world is the counterparty. Were this
analysis cross-sectional or k-adic in nature, this would be a greater concern (Poast
2010). Because this is a case study of one country-year, it is possible to keep this
home v foreign comparison consistent across other measures in the dataset and mit-
igate some of the concerns that would be present if focusing on speciﬁc bilateral or
multilateral trade and trade barrier relationships.
4.5.2 Industry Characteristics
The hypothesized causes of varying forms of market access barriers vary not just
at the country, factor, or sector levels, but at the industry and ﬁrm levels.17 As the
demands for protection will vary according to features of a given industry, it is nec-
essary to measure those features in a systematic way. In the US case, comprehensive
data are available for a broad swath of industries that covers the features in question.
The US Census Bureau collects data on industry size and concentration in the Eco-
nomic Census, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis collects data on the net foreign
direct investment positions  both inward and outward  of US industries. The
degree of product heterogeneity or homogeneity in a given industry, and therefore for
each product, is measured using a 2007 revision of Rauch's commodity classiﬁcation
scheme(Rauch 1999).
The concentration of an industry, or subsector of an industry, can be measured in
China is listed as the counter-party.
16. The TRAINS database has a speciﬁc observation code for each reported policy.
17. Here, a distinction is drawn between sectors and industries. Sectors are larger groups that may
include a variety of similar industries, like mining, which contains several distinct industries of ferrous
and nonferrous metal mining as well as coal mining and the like. In some interpretations sectors
span broad categories of goods or services produced, like export oriented ﬁrms. By comparison,
individual industries are more cohesive and represent the producers of a narrower class of products
 just iron mining, for instance  that still often comprise a number of ﬁrms.
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a variety of ways. The asset value or market capitalization of a ﬁrm may represent its
size in a way that is meaningful for the ability to invest in political pressure. A ﬁrm's
employment base may serve as a diﬀerent measure of political inﬂuence. Sales or
revenues data reveal the share of a market that the ﬁrm commands, and indicates the
degree to which a few ﬁrms' (or many ﬁrms') products dominate the market. Looking
to revenues also has the advantage of being roughly comparable across industries,
whereas measures of market capitalization or employment may vary according to the
capital or labor intensity of a given industry. Every ﬁve years, the US Census Bureau
surveys ﬁrms across the country to obtain measures of business activity in the United
States. Their sampling methodology includes a complete sample of all large- and
medium-sized ﬁrms, as well as all multi-establishment ﬁrms.18 For small ﬁrms with
only one establishment, summary data from other federal agencies are used in the
sample. While this does raise questions about accuracy for the smallest ﬁrms, for the
ﬁrms that comprise the majority of economic activity, the complete coverage gives a
good picture of sectors, down to a detailed level.
The Economic Census database provides information on both market value sales
(for retail and service industries) and value added sales (for manufacturing indus-
tries) for each ﬁrm or company in utilities, wholesale and retail trade, services, and
manufacturing sectors. From this, estimates of total industry size and the size of
the top 4, 8, 20, and 50 ﬁrms or companies in each industry are computed. For the
analysis in this paper, only ﬁrms and industries coded in NAICS Chapters 31 to 33
 the manufacturing section of the industrial classiﬁcation  are used.19 For these
sections, only the number of establishments and total value added are summarized.
18. According to Census deﬁnitions, an establishment is a single physical location where business
activities are performed. Firms or companies can be composed of more than one establishment, or
only one. Also, for establishments performing more than one economic activity, the establishment is
coded according to whatever activity comprises the majority of the economic activity at the location.
19. This is a consequence of matching products only to their producing industries, and sections 31-
33 cover industrial manufacturing. For many agricultural products, the matching section in NAICS
 Section 11  is not present in the Economic Census data.
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The Census Bureau computes a Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index for the top 50 ﬁrms in
the industry20 and the share of industry value added produced by the top 4, 8, 20,
and 50 ﬁrms, from these data. With these three measures, we know the size and
concentration of each industry. The aggregate industry value added sales and num-
ber of establishments (roughly the number of locations of business) are included in
models as measures of domestic industry size. We use the Herﬁndal Index of the top
50 companies in each subsector as a measure of industry concentration.
Metrics of foreign investment, both inward and outward, are necessary for estimat-
ing the relationship between foreign ﬁrms with domestic political salience, domestic
ﬁrms with international interests, and demands for kinds of market access restrictions.
In the United States, the BEA collects data on the US business activity of foreign
multinationals (inward FDI) via mandatory surveys completed by all US aﬃliates of
foreign multinationals.21 This same mandate also dictates that US ﬁrms must report
on their economic activity with foreign aﬃliates, giving estimates of outward FDI ac-
tivity. From these annual reports, the BEA summarizes the net investment position
of a number of industries separately in terms of inward and outward ﬂows. These
data are released annually, but have omissions22 and occasionally very sudden shifts
from year-to-year. As the analysis is cross-sectional in nature, we sacriﬁce the time
series coverage for completeness of observations and some degree of smoothing by
taking the average of years leading up to 2012. In addition, this averaging moderates
some of the time trend present in this measure following the 2008 global ﬁnancial
crisis. For FDI inﬂows, this is 2008 to 2012, while for outﬂows years 2009 to 2012 are
averaged.23 These two variables, average FDI inﬂow stock and average FDI outﬂow
20. HHI =
∑N
1 s
2
i , where N is number of ﬁrms and s ∈ [0, 100] is a ﬁrm's market share, and
HHI ∈ [0, 10000].
21. This authority comes from the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act,
the present iteration of the International Investment Survey Act of 1976. More information on the
history of BEA statistics of this nature can be found in Mataloni (1995).
22. These are often from speciﬁcally-censored reporting to protect information about individual
ﬁrms in industries where few ﬁrms are engaged in FDI.
23. This diﬀerence reﬂects diﬀerences data availability for the two series.
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stock, are then used to capture the degree of multinationalization in the industry that
produces a given product.
The coding of products as diﬀerentiated or homogeneous comes from Rauch's
commonly-used classiﬁcation of global commodity markets. This measure classiﬁes
goods as diﬀerentiated, reference-priced, or traded on an organized exchange. From
the ﬁrst to the last category, goods are increasingly homogeneous, even at the same
product code level (4-digit SITC v2 code). While many products' heterogeneity
reﬂects that of their codebook neighbors, variation within broad product groups does
exist. The Rauch coding is cross-sectional and time invariant24, but for this inter-
industry cross-sectional analysis the time-invariance is not a concern. For use in these
models, the Rauch coding is transformed to a zero-to-one scale, where homogeneous
goods are coded zero, reference-priced goods are coded at 1
2
, and diﬀerentiated goods
are coded as one.
4.5.3 Product/Industry Coding and Concordance
One challenge of integrating data from these varying sources, collected and coded
for diﬀerent purposes, is that economic activity is divided diﬀerently and coded with
diﬀerent goals in mind. The TRAINS data, primarily meant for comparison to tariﬀ
data, codes policies according to how they apply to particular products using the
UN Harmonized System (HS) coding. These 6-digit codes classify goods from broad
categories down to variants on similar products. Consider the HS code for Vegemite
 210690. It falls in Chapter 21, Miscellaneous Edible Preparations, Heading
2106, Food preparations not elsewhere speciﬁed or included, and subheading 210690,
"Other". Vegemite's place in a tariﬀ schedule is deﬁned almost by exclusion, but the
grouping narrows as other, diﬀerent, potentially substitute products are partitioned
24. The initial classiﬁcation was devised for a 1999 paper, and the codebook was revised in 2007
to match the revised SITC coding scheme.
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oﬀ into other product codes.25 These are the codes used by many customs agencies
to levy duties, and are the basis of duty schedules for many trade agreements. The
focus of this coding scheme, therefore is on grouping products in a way that makes the
process of customs and duty as consistent as possible. This is not the case for other
coding schemes in the data used here, and those codebooks reﬂect diﬀerent goals.
Measures of industry size and concentration are generated according to the North
American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) codebook. NAICS is primarily
designed for collection of economic data at the ﬁrm and industry level. These di-
visions do not always align with product codings like those in the HS system. The
measures of US inward and outward FDI are coded according to the International
Surveys Industry (ISI) codebook, an adaptation of the NAICS codebook for the task
of surveying both US ﬁrms and foreign multinationals.26 The Rauch product homo-
geneity/heterogeneity measure is developed for the SITC Version 2 codebook. Each
of the measures in question  market access barriers, industry size and concentra-
tion, foreign direct investment positions, and measures of product heterogeneity 
are collected for slightly diﬀerent partitions of the US economy, as deﬁned by dif-
ferent codebooks for industry classiﬁcation. This prevents easy comparison of these
measures in an empirical model.
Given these diﬀerent coding schemes, it is necessary to link the data according
to a set of concordance rules. Data merging is done in a number of steps. First,
the 6-digit HS code for each product serves as the base for all observations. Market
access barriers are summarized for each of the HS codes in the TRAINS data.27 All
other data are then linked to the market access measures by matching them to the
25. We thank Marta Bengoa for bringing this particular example to our attention.
26. This adaptation is largely straightforward, but sometimes splits individual NAICS codes across
multiple ISI codes, or vice versa. This requires one ﬁrst translate data from ISI coding to NAICS
coding before taking steps discussed below.
27. It should be noted that every code in the HS codebook is present in the 2012 United States
NTM data; there are no products at the 6-digit level with no market access barriers of any kind.
This also means that there is no missingness at the product-code level, although missingness within
product codes  policies missed, for instance  may exist.
113
HS codes. As most of the additional data used here come from US Census sources,
we use concordance tables from the Census to make these connections. With every
major release of the Economic Census, an updated concordance table is created to
use the most recent versions of other codebooks for linking. We use the concordance
tables prepared for the 2012 Census data release for linking across the four coding
schemes in the data.
To bridge industry and product data and create single observations, we ﬁrst ﬁnd
the highest level of granularity for each of the independent variables for which data is
consistently available.28 For the FDI measures, this is the 4-digit NAICS coding level.
For measures of industry size and concentration, this is the 5-digit NAICS level. For
Rauch's product heterogenity measure, we match at the 4-digit SITC classiﬁcation.
The merging of these data require overcoming two more matching problems. There
are instances in which multiple codes in one of the source classiﬁcations match a given
product code  for instance, if two or three SITC codes match a single HS product
code. In this case, a simple average of the values for each of the matches is used.29 In
other cases, a single industry in the FDI or concentration data maps on to a number
of diﬀerent products within a certain range. In these cases, those observations apply
to all of those products, a one-to-many merge with repeating values across multiple
products. For each of the variables in the data, the level of aggregation in the data
is consistent across all observations, which requires these transformations.
4.5.4 Data Summary
With these concordance issues addressed, we have a dataset ready for analysis.
We are unable to match some products to complete industry-level data due to missing
28. The highest level of granularity represents the measurement level with the least aggregation
from individual observations to sub-industry or industry totals.
29. There are a number of ways this matter could have been resolved, but we believe a parsimonious
method like this maintains clarity while also acknowledging that, for some products, industrial
interests have characteristics which reﬂect multiple groups' preferences.
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observations in FDI or industry concentration data. There are 5207 product-line level
observations, of which 3080 are complete. These data present both the number of
policy barriers identiﬁed as additional costs imposed on some varieties of goods and
the underlying characteristics of the industries that produce those goods. Those 3080
products represent a sample of the total US goods market, but are the most complete
sample possible with these resources.
A summary of the variables can be found in Table 4.1. The outcome variables,
the number of market access barriers, diﬀer somewhat in the full sample versus the
sample used in the analysis. For the measures of industry characteristics, the full
sample and the complete-case sample used in analysis diﬀer somewhat, as well. The
measures of market access barriers are strongly correlated.30
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
# Loc-Disc Barriers 5,207 18.061 13.909 3 344
# Char-Disc Barriers 5,207 24.297 21.629 4 413
# Firm-Disc Barriers 5,207 9.887 8.776 1 182
# Indiscrim Barriers 5,207 9.702 8.418 0 139
Avg. FDI Out 3,660 10.849 11.517 0.020 53.532
Avg. FDI In 3,601 12.922 17.733 0.009 106.962
Rauch Diﬀ Good 4,674 0.741 0.326 0.000 1.000
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms 4,552 535.971 515.844 18.000 3,755.100
Establishments 4,552 1,642.822 2,480.778 24.000 24,707.000
Value Added 4,552 21.006 25.385 0.246 129.479
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics, Full Sample
# Loc-Disc # Char-Disc # Firm-Disc # Indiscrim
# Loc-Disc Barriers 1
# Char-Disc Barriers 0.889 1
# Firm-Disc Barriers 0.911 0.769 1
# Indiscrim Barriers 0.616 0.642 0.735 1
Table 4.2: Correlation of Barrier Count Across Measures
30. The correlation table is presented in Table 4.2.
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4.5.5 Model Design
The design of the measures of market access restrictions  counts of number of
barriers per product code  motivates the empirical model design. Models are es-
timated using both ordinary least squares and negative binomial regression.31 The
former is chosen for parsimony and ease of interpretation, but is not strictly appro-
priate for these data, where negative values are not possible. In the OLS framework,
we estimate two sets of models. In the ﬁrst, the count variables of market access bar-
riers are included as the count measures explained above. Then, the market access
barriers count is log-transformed32 to address the long right tail in the distribution
of the measure count variable.
The negative binomial model is presented as it is a more appropriate model for
count data, but brings additional restrictions on model speciﬁcation and a more
complex interpretation. By presenting all three, we aim to demonstrate when the
results are consistent and ease interpretation of the direction and magnitude of the
results. All models are estimated with and without the count of other kinds of
market access restriction as covariates, to capture the hypothesis that an increase in
one variety of costs ought to lead to a decrease in other varieties of market access
costs.
Aside from substitution of diﬀerent varieties of market access barriers as out-
come variables and control variables, the models are structured in the same way.
The models are estimated with clustered standard errors to address concerns of het-
eroskedasticity across larger product groups due to legal or industry frameworks that
lead to diﬀerences that divide on larger product group lines. The clusters are deﬁned
on the 2-digit level product code to address concerns about correlated errors within
31. Negative binomial regression is chosen over Poisson regression because of concerns about
overdispersion, where the conditional variance is signiﬁcantly greater than the conditional mean.
A test of the Poisson model's assumption of equal conditional mean and conditional variance is
presented in Appendix A.
32. Speciﬁcally, the variable is ln(Barrier+ 1), to address occasional zeroes in the data.
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similar groups of products.33
4.6 Results
Fitting these models to the data provides some insights on why markets for diﬀer-
ent varieties of goods are restricted in diﬀerent ways. Table 4.3 outlines the general
results from the models. They are described in more detail below. The model es-
timates for each of the four types of market access barriers are presented in Tables
4.4 to 4.15 in their respective subsections. A number of patterns arise that indicate
that diﬀerent kinds of market access restricting policies are associated with diﬀerent
industry features. Some of the hypotheses of the theory are supported, while oth-
ers are  statistically or substantively  not strongly supported by the data. In
some cases, evidence from the US case suggests a more complex relationship between
industry features and the nature of protectionism, where it exists.
As models are estimated for each of the four types of market access-restricting costs
separately, the results from those models are considered individually ﬁrst. Then, the
models estimates are considered together to draw summary conclusions.
4.6.1 Location-discriminating Costs
In models where the outcome of interest is the number of location-discriminating
measures aﬀecting a particular product line, results generally suggest that FDI and
product diﬀerentiation are related to the contours of protection, while other industry
characteristics are not as consequential.
The industry's average FDI inﬂows and outﬂows in the years preceding 2012 ap-
pear to have diﬀerent associations with the number of location-discriminating mea-
sures. In industries where there have been signiﬁcant outﬂows of direct investment
33. As the product coding scheme necessarily puts similar goods in adjacent or nested product
codes, using a higher level of coding, the 2- or 4-digit code, for instance, provides an eﬀective
method for grouping goods that are similar.
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Industry Feature Location-
disc
Char-disc Firm-disc Indisc
FDI Outﬂow +, mixed
signiﬁcance
+, mixed
signiﬁcance
+, mixed
signiﬁcance
+, mixed
signiﬁcance
FDI Inﬂow -, mixed sig-
niﬁcance
∅ ∅ -,
weak/mixed
signiﬁcance
Prod. Diﬀ. -, signiﬁcant - (no con-
trols), ∅ (w
controls)
- (no con-
trols), ∅ (w
controls)
∅ (no con-
trols), + (w
controls)
Concentration ∅ ∅ -, weak ef-
fect
inconsistent
# of Estab. -,
weak/small
eﬀect
∅ -, weak ef-
fect
-,
weak/small
eﬀect
Value Add ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Control
Loc-disc NA + + -
Char-disc + NA - +
Firm-disc + - NA +
Indisc - + + NA
Table 4.3: Summary of model results
capital, where ﬁrms have built supply chains or subsidiaries in foreign markets, prod-
ucts of those industries tend to face more location-discriminating barriers on average.
However, for products produced in industries where there have been signiﬁcant FDI
inﬂows, fewer location-discriminating costs restrict market access. In this case, prod-
ucts in the US that are produced by industries where the United States has seen
signiﬁcant FDI inﬂows are covered by fewer location-discriminating policies.
This pattern is somewhat inconsistent with the expectations from the model of
protection-seeking coalitions discussed above. Whereas the theory suggested that
pressures from domestic ﬁrms investing abroad (FDI outﬂows) and foreign ﬁrms in-
vesting in the US (FDI inﬂows) would both lead to fewer location-discriminating
costs, this does not appear to be the case. In these data, only inward ﬂows have that
eﬀect. While this relationship does not appear in every model, it is roughly consistent
across speciﬁcations and estimators.
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# Loc-Disc Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.456∗ 0.002
(0.267) (0.036)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.131 −0.063∗∗
(0.178) (0.029)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −12.074∗∗∗ −1.058∗∗∗
(0.604) (0.187)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.001 0.0004∗
(0.001) (0.0002)
Establishments −0.001∗∗ 0.00003
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Value Added 0.153 0.032
(0.096) (0.022)
# Char-Disc Barriers 0.304∗∗∗
(0.060)
# Firm-Disc Barriers 1.219∗∗∗
(0.098)
# Indiscrim Barriers −0.425∗∗∗
(0.129)
Constant 21.895∗∗∗ 3.203∗∗∗
(4.396) (0.923)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.369 0.949
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.949
Residual Std. Error 9.998 (df = 3073) 2.844 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.4: OLS with clustered standard errors
With other industry characteristics, such as product diﬀerentiation, industry size,
and industry concentration, the relationships vary. Products face somewhat fewer
location-discriminating market access barriers when they are diﬀerentiated goods.
As the range of this variable is zero-to-one, the overall eﬀect on the market is modest,
but the relationship is statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. However, the
number of location-discriminating barriers to market access do not appear to have a
statistically or substantively signiﬁcant relationship to industry concentration or the
measures of industry size in these models.
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log(# Loc-Disc Barriers + 1)
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.030∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.013) (0.001)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.009 −0.001
(0.008) (0.001)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.480∗∗ −0.057∗
(0.187) (0.031)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.00003 0.00001
(0.0001) (0.00001)
Establishments −0.00004∗∗∗ −0.00000∗
(0.00001) (0.00000)
Value Added 0.006 0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
log(# Char-Disc Barriers + 1) 0.484∗∗∗
(0.042)
log(# Firm-Disc Barriers + 1) 0.590∗∗∗
(0.041)
log(# Indiscrim Barriers + 1) −0.279∗∗∗
(0.035)
Constant 2.864∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.069)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.365 0.963
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.963
Residual Std. Error 0.478 (df = 3073) 0.115 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.5: Log-linear model with clustered standard errors
In a model where the counts of other policies are included as controls, it is possi-
ble to examine the relationships among the various types of market access barriers,
given the industry characteristics considered above. In these models, the relation-
ship between the number of location-discriminating barriers and quality- and ﬁrm-
discriminating barriers is positive. Also, given the changes in magnitude of other co-
variates in the model, when added as controls the other barriers capture a signiﬁcant
portion of the variance in location-discriminating costs in the model. Products for
which there are more characteristic- and ﬁrm-discriminating barriers in the TRAINS
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# Loc-Disc Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.027∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.003)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.011 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.003)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.583∗∗∗ −0.129∗
(0.188) (0.071)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.00000 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.00002)
Establishments −0.00005∗∗∗ −0.00000
(0.00002) (0.00000)
Value Added 0.009∗∗ 0.002
(0.004) (0.001)
# Char-Disc Barriers 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002)
# Firm-Disc Barriers 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006)
# Indiscrim Barriers −0.004
(0.004)
Constant 2.976∗∗∗ 2.116∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.086)
N 3,080 3,080
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Model with clustered standard errors
data also have more location-discriminating barriers.
This relationship does not hold between location-discriminating and indiscrimi-
nate costs. The greater the number of indiscriminate cost barriers, the fewer the
number of location-discriminating costs a particular product faces. This suggests
that, when accounting for industry-speciﬁc factors, the measures that divide markets
along production location, product characteristic, or producer identity lines are com-
plements, but indiscriminate cost policies and location-discriminating cost policies
are substitutes. Given the choices made in coding the TRAINS measures as market
access barriers, this is expected. While the theory of protection-seeking might suggest
121
that all of the policies should be substitutes34, this analysis does not support that
hypothesis as clearly.
These model estimates are consistent with some of the hypothesized relationships
between industry characteristics (and the other kinds of market access barriers) that
arise from theories of protection-seeking coalitions. Products of industries where ﬁrms
with global links (as measured by inward FDI) are more politically salient face fewer
location-discriminating barriers.
4.6.2 Characteristic-discriminating Costs
Results from models testing an association between industry characteristics and
the presence or absence of characteristic-discriminating costs imposed on a particular
product are somewhat less clear. The relationships between industry characteristics
and the number of characteristic-discriminating measures diﬀer signiﬁcantly when
other market access costs are included as controls versus when they are not. In mod-
els where characteristic-discriminating costs are regressed on industry characteristics
without those controls, many of the industry characteristics in the model have statis-
tically signiﬁcant relationships with the number of barriers. However, when including
other measures as controls, many of the industry characteristics measures no longer
covary with the outcome of interest in a meaningful way.
The primary hypothesis related to characteristic-discriminating barriers is that
they should be less frequent in homogeneous-good industries. However, evidence
from the models estimated here does not support that hypothesis. In some cases,
there is no statistically-distinguishable relationship between product diﬀerentiation
and the presence or absence of characteristic-discriminating costs. In other mod-
els, a relationship that is opposite to the theory appears to hold. Products that
the Rauch classiﬁcation categorizes as diﬀerentiated goods face fewer characteristic-
34. This is due to the aggregate eﬀect on prices and utility as all policies distort goods markets.
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# Char-Disc Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.599 0.014
(0.365) (0.060)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.315 0.023
(0.246) (0.040)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −17.771∗∗∗ −1.579
(6.510) (1.857)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Establishments −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Value Added 0.253∗ −0.011
(0.144) (0.019)
# Loc-Disc Barriers 2.133∗∗∗
(0.194)
# Firm-Disc Barriers −2.360∗∗∗
(0.332)
# Indiscrim Barriers 1.287∗∗∗
(0.240)
Constant 31.176∗∗∗ −1.869
(6.659) (1.845)
N 3,080 3,080
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.242 0.860
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.859
Residual Std. Error 17.492 (df = 3073) 7.535 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.7: OLS with clustered standard errors
discriminating costs in these models.
Other industry characteristics do not appear to be strongly related to these mea-
sures of characteristic-discriminating market access costs. In some speciﬁcations, es-
pecially those without the additional measures as controls, some parameter estimates
appear statistically signiﬁcant at canonical thresholds, but the eﬀect sizes appear
modest. When additional market access barriers are included in the models, these
estimates generally do not hold, and in some cases an even weaker eﬀect of oppo-
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log(# Char-Disc Barriers + 1)
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.037∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.015∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.0005)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.508∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.038) (0.012)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.00003 −0.00002∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Establishments −0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00000)
Value Added 0.007∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.0002)
log(# Loc-Disc Barriers + 1) 1.365∗∗∗
(0.018)
log(# Firm-Disc Barriers + 1) −0.713∗∗∗
(0.019)
log(# Indiscrim Barriers + 1) 0.559∗∗∗
(0.012)
Constant 3.056∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.029)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.282 0.934
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.934
Residual Std. Error 0.635 (df = 3073) 0.193 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.8: Log-linear model with clustered standard errors
site direction appears. The instability of these estimates, combined with their small
magnitude, suggests no strong relationship in these models.
When they are included as controls, the relationship between other forms of market
access barriers and characteristic-discriminating costs is both strong and signiﬁcant.
In general, across the models, the number of location-discriminating barriers is pos-
itively associated with the number of characteristic-discriminating ones. The same
positive relationship holds true for indiscriminate costs, as well.35 However, these
35. This may be in part because characteristic-discriminating barriers are sometimes administered
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# Char-Disc Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.027∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.005)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.015∗ −0.006
(0.009) (0.004)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.605∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.205) (0.102)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms 0.00001 −0.00003
(0.0001) (0.00004)
Establishments −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.00002
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Value Added 0.010∗∗ −0.001
(0.005) (0.002)
# Loc-Disc Barriers 0.058∗∗∗
(0.006)
# Firm-Disc Barriers −0.063∗∗∗
(0.012)
# Indiscrim Barriers 0.053∗∗∗
(0.007)
Constant 3.309∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.123)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.9: Negative Binomial Model with clustered standard errors
data suggest that when there are more ﬁrm-discriminating costs, fewer characteristic-
discriminating costs are present, on average and with all other covariates considered.
As discussed in relation to location-discriminating costs, the positive relationships
may be a consequence of the coding rules chosen, speciﬁcally the decision to count
single measures as imposing multiple types of costs.
From these results, one may conclude that if there exists a relationship between
industry characteristics and these characteristic-discriminating costs is not well iden-
tiﬁed using these measures. This may be in part because of the way UNCTAD codes
the NTMs in the database. Many diﬀerences in technical standards are not consid-
using policies that raise indiscriminate costs on products.
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ered, or are only considered in some cases. These standards are likely to be the most
prevalent type of characteristic-discriminating cost, and their omission from the data
may go some way towards explaining the inconsistent ﬁndings here. These results
also suggest that, in commodities markets, or markets where goods are considered
commodities or index-priced goods, characteristic-discriminating policies are a means
of creating diﬀerentiated markets, conferring diﬀerent beneﬁts than the theory of
protection-seeking coalitions would suggest. In either case, this evidence does not
strongly support the theory as it is.
4.6.3 Firm-discriminating Costs
Results from the models where ﬁrm-discriminating costs are the outcome of inter-
est are mixed. For some industry characteristics, like FDI ﬂows, ﬁndings are unstable.
For others, like the number of establishments in a given sector, results are stable, but
modest in magnitude. As with the previous models, links between varieties of market
access costs remain strong in this coding.
Theory suggests that ﬁrm-discriminating costs should be more prevalent in in-
dustries where a small cadre of ﬁrms can collude to block new entrants, or where
a suﬃciently-concentrated segment of ﬁrms can raise costs on others. However re-
lationships between the number of ﬁrm-discriminating costs and both the number
and concentration of ﬁrms from these models do not match those predictions. While
the parameter estimates for the association between concentration and the number
of ﬁrm-discriminating costs may be statistically signiﬁcant, they are substantively
very modest. Also, the modest relationship is opposite to that predicted by the
theory. While theory would suggest a positive relationship between the Herﬁndal
index (that is larger the greater the degree of concentration) and the number of
ﬁrm-discriminating barriers, the opposite appears to be the case.
The same modest relationship appears for the link between number of establish-
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# Firm-Disc Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.329 0.031
(0.205) (0.035)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) 0.018 0.047∗∗
(0.132) (0.023)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −5.596∗∗ −0.547
(2.230) (0.467)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.001 −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0002)
Establishments −0.001∗∗ −0.00004
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Value Added 0.054 −0.014
(0.042) (0.011)
# Loc-Disc Barriers 0.505∗∗∗
(0.067)
# Char-Disc Barriers −0.139∗∗∗
(0.044)
# Indiscrim Barriers 0.501∗∗∗
(0.049)
Constant 10.718∗∗∗ −0.541
(2.520) (0.450)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.415 0.955
Adjusted R2 0.414 0.955
Residual Std. Error 6.589 (df = 3073) 1.831 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.10: OLS with clustered standard errors
ments in a given industry and the number of ﬁrm-discriminating costs that products
of that industry face. However, where models reveal a substantively weak but statis-
tically signiﬁcant relationship, it is in the direction that theory would predict. The
greater the number of US establishments associated with a certain product line, the
fewer the number of ﬁrm-discriminating policies that apply to that product line. How-
ever, over the range of the variable in the sample, this is not consequential when all
covariates are considered.
Other industry characteristics, like the degree of foreign investment (inward and
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log(# Firm-Disc Barriers + 1)
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.033∗∗ −0.002
(0.016) (0.002)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.006 0.003∗∗
(0.010) (0.001)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.458∗∗ −0.005
(0.188) (0.039)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.0001 −0.00003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.00001)
Establishments −0.0001∗∗ 0.00000
(0.00002) (0.00000)
Value Added 0.006 −0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
log(# Loc-Disc Barriers + 1) 1.018∗∗∗
(0.069)
log(# Char-Disc Barriers + 1) −0.436∗∗∗
(0.056)
log(# Indiscrim Barriers + 1) 0.560∗∗∗
(0.039)
Constant 2.182∗∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.100)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.336 0.961
Adjusted R2 0.334 0.961
Residual Std. Error 0.626 (df = 3073) 0.151 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.11: Log-linear model with clustered standard errors
outward) and the degree of product diﬀerentiation, have similarly weak relationships
with the number of ﬁrm-discriminating barriers. In some models, the presence of
outward FDI ﬂows appears related to more ﬁrm-discriminating market access costs,
but this relationship is somewhat inconsistent across models. Similarly, inward FDI
ﬂows appear positively related to the number of ﬁrm-discriminating barriers in some
models, but negatively so in others.
Across the models where other market access barriers are included, the number
of ﬁrm-discriminating market access barriers is positively related to the number of
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# Firm-Disc Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.034∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.005)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.007 −0.005∗
(0.011) (0.003)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.464∗∗ −0.104
(0.188) (0.070)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.00001 −0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.00004)
Establishments −0.0001∗∗ −0.00002∗
(0.00003) (0.00001)
Value Added 0.007∗ 0.0001
(0.004) (0.002)
# Loc-Disc Barriers 0.033∗∗∗
(0.005)
# Char-Disc Barriers −0.008∗∗
(0.004)
# Indiscrim Barriers 0.041∗∗∗
(0.005)
Constant 2.231∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.095)
N 3,080 3,080
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.12: Negative Binomial Model with clustered standard errors
location-discriminating and indiscriminate cost barriers, but negatively associated
with the number of characteristic-discriminating ones, when all of the industry-speciﬁc
features are included in the models.
The estimates from these models do not clearly indicate a relationship between the
industry-speciﬁc characteristics discussed above and the number of ﬁrm-discriminating
barriers that apply to a particular product. In cases where estimated coeﬃcients are
consistent in direction and statistical signiﬁcance, their magnitude is modest. For
those variables where magnitudes are more substantial, direction of relationship and
statistical signiﬁcance are not consistent. While these measures are clearly associated
with the presence or absence of other policies, those relationships are a consequence
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of coding decisions when translating TRAINS data into the typology of market access
barriers.
4.6.4 Indiscriminate Costs
In looking to policies that raise costs on all products of a given type, such as ﬁxed
costs of market entry, the relationships are somewhat diﬀerent than those for other
types of market-access costs. The theory of protection-seeking coalitions suggests
that it is industry eﬃciency that determines whether the products of a given industry
face costs that apply indiscriminately to all varieties. Without a direct measure
of domestic industry eﬃciency, it is not possible to test this hypothesis directly.36
However, the weak link between value added (which is associated with greater output
and productivity) and the number of indiscriminate barriers suggests that there isn't
strong evidence for that relationship here.
The link between foreign investment (both inward and outward) and indiscriminate-
cost market access barriers is mixed. In the models where other measures are not
included as controls, there appears to be a positive relationship between outward FDI
ﬂows and a greater number of indiscriminate-cost barriers. However, when including
the other measures as controls, that relationship fades. On the other hand, where FDI
inﬂows appear to be unrelated to indisciminate-cost policies in the models without
other policies as controls, when considering them in the model, a weak and negative
relationship emerges. As with other measures as outcomes, this does not suggest a
strong relationship.
For diﬀerent reasons, the link between product diﬀerentiation and the number of
indiscriminate costs a particular good faces is inconclusive. In the models where other
barriers are not included, any relationship  where one appears to be distinguishable
 is negative. However, when controlling for other kinds of market access barriers,
36. An avenue for future research is comparing eﬃciency to these costs using measures of Total
Factor Productivity, although use of these measures for inter-industry comparison can be diﬃcult.
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# Indiscrim Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.301∗ −0.019
(0.182) (0.037)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.013 −0.033
(0.126) (0.023)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −2.838 2.161∗∗∗
(1.862) (0.735)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.00003 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.0004)
Establishments −0.001∗∗ −0.00003
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Value Added 0.052 0.004
(0.034) (0.015)
# Loc-Disc Barriers −0.435∗∗∗
(0.142)
# Char-Disc Barriers 0.187∗∗
(0.076)
# Firm-Disc Barriers 1.236∗∗∗
(0.111)
Constant 9.053∗∗∗ −0.519
(2.294) (0.961)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.276 0.887
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.887
Residual Std. Error 7.279 (df = 3073) 2.875 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.13: OLS with clustered standard errors
diﬀerentiated goods appear to face more indiscriminate costs in the US market. This
inconsistency makes it impossible to draw strong conclusions about an association
between product diﬀerentiation and the raising of indiscriminate cost policies.
For measures of industry size and concentration, there is no strong evidence that
any of those metrics are strongly associated with greater or fewer indiscriminate cost
policies. The Herﬁndal index of the industry producing a particular good doesn't
have a consistent positive or negative relationship across the models, and even in
cases where it is statistically signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the eﬀect is modest at best.
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log(# Indiscrim Barriers + 1)
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.038∗∗ 0.002
(0.016) (0.002)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.010 −0.002∗
(0.010) (0.001)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.334∗ 0.083∗
(0.174) (0.049)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms −0.00005 0.00003∗
(0.0001) (0.00002)
Establishments −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.00001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00000)
Value Added 0.007∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
log(# Loc-Disc Barriers + 1) −1.005∗∗∗
(0.132)
log(# Char-Disc Barriers + 1) 0.714∗∗∗
(0.077)
log(# Firm-Disc Barriers + 1) 1.170∗∗∗
(0.069)
Constant 2.068∗∗∗ 0.212
(0.207) (0.132)
N 3,080 3,080
R2 0.269 0.934
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.933
Residual Std. Error 0.723 (df = 3073) 0.218 (df = 3070)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.14: Log-linear model with clustered standard errors
In contrast, while the coeﬃcient estimates for the variable capturing the number of
establishments in a producing industry is consistently negative, the magnitude of that
parameter is quite small. Only at the very maximum of the sample range for that
variable would there be a relationship large enough to reach the magnitude of one
additional policy.
As with the other models where location-, characteristic-, and ﬁrm-discriminating
costs were the outcomes of interest, when including other market access costs as con-
trols, there are strong and signiﬁcant relationships. Location-discriminating costs ap-
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# Indiscrim Barriers
(1) (2)
Avg. FDI Out (USD bil) 0.031∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.015) (0.004)
Avg. FDI In (USD bil) −0.008 −0.010∗∗
(0.011) (0.004)
Rauch Diﬀ Good −0.185 0.170∗
(0.176) (0.088)
Herf. Index, top 50 ﬁrms 0.00003 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.00003)
Establishments −0.0001∗∗ −0.00002∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00001)
Value Added 0.007∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
# Loc-Disc Barriers −0.042∗∗∗
(0.009)
# Char-Disc Barriers 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004)
# Firm-Disc Barriers 0.099∗∗∗
(0.013)
Constant 2.104∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.132)
N 3,080 3,080
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Table 4.15: Negative Binomial Model with clustered standard errors
pear to have a negative relationship with indiscriminate costs. However, characteristic-
and ﬁrm-discriminating costs appear positively associated with the number of indis-
criminate cost policies.
From these models, it appears that any relationship between industry characteris-
tics and the presence or absence of policies that raise costs on goods indiscriminately
is modest. While the FDI measures appear to have some eﬀect, it is modest or in-
consistent. Diﬀerentiated goods appear to have face more indiscriminate costs, but
only when controlling for other kinds of policies. Industry size and concentration do
not appear to be consistently related to more or fewer of these policies, either. The
strongest relationship, as in the other models, is with other kinds of policies.
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4.6.5 Summary of Results
The results from the individual models taken together provide some insights into
the nature of market access across products in the US. First, foreign investment, both
inward and outward, is related to the number of market access costs of diﬀerent types.
While the theory suggested that FDI should aﬀect location-discriminating costs, there
is evidence that both FDI inﬂows and FDI outﬂows are related to the presence or
absence of multiple types of market access barriers. Where there is more outward
FDI in an industry, those products are generally face more market access costs of all
types.
Another observation from these results is that the relationship between industry
characteristics and the number of policies of any type in place is modest. In the
models where other policies are included as controls, the coeﬃcients suggest that
the diﬀerence in outcome  of counts of any type of policy  is at most one or
two additional policies of a speciﬁc type over the range of the industry characteristic
variables.
The areas of diﬀerence in the relationships across the measures are in FDI in-
ﬂows, industry concentration, product diﬀerentiation, and the size of an industry as
measured by the number of establishments.
The strongest relationships from these models are the relationships among the
varieties of market access costs. With this coding and these data, it appears that
there is complementarity among most pairs of policy types, but not all. The negative
relationship between location-discriminating costs and indiscriminate costs, as well as
between characteristic-discriminating and ﬁrm-discriminating costs, suggests a degree
of substitution between them.
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4.6.6 Areas for Future Research
The evidence here is by no means conclusive. In some ways, it raises more ques-
tions than it answers and also points towards improvements that can be made in
future research. Some of those improvements concern measurement of core concepts
raised by the theory of market access barriers, while others concern expanding the
scope of the project across cases and time.
The market access costs coding scheme used for this analysis can be improved.
The high degree of correlation across the measures, created partially by construction,
also makes examining diﬀerent relationships between industry characteristics and
protectionist policies more diﬃcult. While the goal of being inclusive, or conservative,
when translating the descriptions of measures from the TRAINS codebook to the 4
costs typology has some beneﬁts, it also created a situation where one measure
counted multiple times, and is somewhat inconsistent with the theory's conception
of those costs as independent dimensions of the barriers facing a particular good.
Rather than measuring the policy as imposing greater discriminatory costs on one
feature of a product and lesser costs on others, this choice makes all costs imposed by
an NTM equally signiﬁcant. A weighting scheme across dimensions for NTMs where
descriptions suggest multiple types of costs may be more appropriate, although more
diﬃcult to construct.
More critically, this coding scheme, while a best eﬀort to adapt existing data to a
new theory, also conﬂicts with a core argument of the market access barriers frame-
work. Each of the types of policies is, in theory, orthogonal to the others. While a
given policy may raise multiple types of costs, those costs are themselves independent
factors. The one policy, multiple costs coding for those TRAINS measures that are
not clearly one type or another is a second-best solution for measuring these costs.
Another avenue for future improvement may be text analysis of policies where content
dimensions are constrained to match these four types of costs more closely. Alterna-
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tively, with more detailed market data, it might be possible to recover price wedges
across these dimensions, albeit with signiﬁcant model structure and assumptions.
Expanding the domain of study across cases is also necessary for one to have
greater conﬁdence in the validity of the theory of protection-seeking coalitions. While
limiting analysis to the United States meant better access to ﬁne-grained data, it also
reduces conﬁdence in the external validity of the ﬁndings. It is possible that the US's
trade politics at the particular period of study is anomalous in some way. Institutional
features of the US may make the dynamics of protection-seeking behavior signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent than in other countries. While they rarely exist for more than one year,
there are NTM panels for other countries in the TRAINS dataset that may serve
as comparison cases for the US. Looking to these other cases may reveal whether
the ﬁnding here are artifacts of the US speciﬁcally, or other fundamental patterns,
including those hypothesized above.
4.7 Conclusion
This evidence, provided by looking to existing data on NTMs through a slightly
diﬀerent lens, links empirical insights to a new body of thinking on how trade-
distorting measures work. By looking to diﬀerent kinds of policies based not on
whether they are import taxes or not, but rather based on what features of a hypo-
thetical good they aﬀect, we see a slightly diﬀerent picture of protectionism. While
there are relationships that persist across all varieties of policies, there is also some
diﬀerence in the relationships across measures. This suggests, to some degree, that
NTMs are not all alike, and ought not be treated as such.
These estimates provide initial insights into what drives the provision of diﬀer-
ent kinds of protectionist policies for diﬀerent segments of an economy. Some of the
ﬁndings are consistent with existing evidence from the study of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ
measures. In particular, the relationships between industries with greater degrees
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of international investment and market access barriers reﬂect existing argument and
evidence. Other ﬁndings, such as the varying covariance of product diﬀerentiation
and industry size and concentration across diﬀerent market access barriers open the
door for further inquiry. The substitution-versus-complementarity evidence from the
models with controls may suggest a more complex relationship among the measures
than extant theory suggests, but is more likely the product of the process that gen-
erated the data. Future research, less reliant on existing databases of NTMs (which
necessarily focus on the location-discriminating nature of a policy) or armed with a
revised coding strategies that more clearly distinguish between policies, may yield
stronger and more consistent ﬁndings with respect to the varieties of protection and
the ways in which and reasons why global goods market access has changed over time.
The overarching takeaway from this analysis is that not all trade-distorting policies
are driven by the same industry pressures. Moving away from theory and empirical
analysis that either treat all NTMs as similar to tariﬀs, or all NTMs as fundamentally
diﬀerent from tariﬀs (but still homogeneous as a group) is a step forward in under-
standing the policies that regulate and shape the global goods market, both across
and within countries.
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APPENDIX A
Testing the Negative Binomial Model's
Overdispersion Assumption
One of the motivations for using the negative binomial model, which like the
Poisson model estimates expected values of count variables, is a concern that the
conditional mean and conditional variance of the outcome variable are not equal. In
a Poisson model, both the mean and variance are deﬁned by a single parameter. If the
outcome variable (here, counts of market access barriers) are overdispersed, it may
be necessary to include additional model structure to address that overdispersion. In
the negative binomial model, this is captured by an additional parameter α, which is
ﬁxed to unity in the Poisson model. To justify use of the negative binomial model,
rather than the Poisson, it is necessary to test the additional assumption.
One way of testing this assumption is by comparing the model ﬁt when estimated
as a Poisson model (where α is ﬁxed at unity) against the negative binomial model.
As both are estimated using maximum likelihood, a likelihood ratio test can be used
to test the hypothesis that the negative binomial model (where α is a free parameter)
has better ﬁt than the Poisson model (where α is constrained). If the conditional
means and variance are not equal, the ﬁt of the negative binomial model will be
superior to that of the Poisson model in a statistically-distinguishable way.
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The assumption of overdispersion is tested for each of the models speciﬁed in
the body text. Each of the models is reestimated as a Poisson model, then the log-
likelihood ratio statistic of the negative binomial model and the Poisson model is
computed.1 Then, a classical likelihood ratio test is performed. The one-tailed p-
value of this statistic, which is distributed chi-squared, is the measure that indicates
whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in ﬁt between the two models. Both the
statistic and the p-value are presented in Table A.1.
Model D p-value
Model 1a 6, 575.022 0
Model 1b 295.301 0
Model 2a 20, 634.060 0
Model 2b 3, 590.341 0
Model 3a 4, 851.644 0
Model 3b 437.502 0
Model 4a 7, 025.719 0
Model 4b 1, 266.179 0
Table A.1: Overdispersion Assumption Test
The results are fairly conclusive. For every speciﬁcation of the model examined,
the negative binomal model clearly ﬁts better than a Poisson model. The overdisper-
sion in the count data for market access barriers is too great to support the assump-
tions of the Poisson model in this case, and thus including the extra free parameter
is appropriate.
1. Here, the negative binomial is the alternative model and the Poisson model the null model.
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APPENDIX B
Coding of Market Access Barriers, UNCTAD
TRAINS NTM Codebook
Table B.1: Recoding of TRAINS NTM Measures
NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
A Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures
A1 Prohibitions/restrictions
of imports for SPS
reasons
A11 A110 Temporary geographic
probibitions for SPS
reasons
1 1 0 0
A12 A120 Geographical restrictions
on eligibility
1 1 1 0
A13 A130 Systems Approach 1 1 0 0
A14 A140 Special authroization re-
quirement for SPS rea-
sons
1 1 1 0
A15 A150 Registration require-
ments for importers
1 0 1 0
A19 A190 Probibitions n.e.s. 1 1 0 0
A2 Tolerance limits for
residues and restricted
use of substances
141
NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
A21 A210 Tolerance limits for
residues of or con-
tamination by certain
non-microbiological
substances
0 1 0 0
A22 A220 Restricted use of certain
substances in foods and
feeds and their contact
materials
0 1 0 0
A3 Labelling, marking, and
packaging requirement
A31 A310 Labelling requirements 0 0 0 1
A32 A320 Marking requirements 0 0 0 1
A33 A330 Packaging requirements 0 1 0 0
A4 Hygienic requirements
A41 A410 Microbiological criteria of
the ﬁnal product
0 1 0 0
A42 A420 Hygenic practices during
production
0 1 0 0
A5 A500 Treatment for elimi-
nation of animal pests
and disease-causing
organisms in the ﬁnal
product
0 1 0 0
A51 A510 Cold/heat treatment 0 1 0 0
A52 A520 Irridation 0 1 0 0
A53 A530 Fumigation 0 1 0 0
A59 A590 Treatment for elimina-
tion of animal pests and
disease-causing organ-
isms in the ﬁnal product,
n.e.s.
0 1 0 0
A6 A600 Other requirements on
production of post-
production processes
0 1 0 0
A61 A610 Plant-growth processes 0 1 0 0
A62 A620 Animal-raising or -
catching processes
0 1 0 0
A63 A630 Food and feed processing 0 1 0 0
A64 A640 Storage and transport
conditions
0 1 0 0
A69 A690 Other requirements n.e.s. 0 1 0 0
A8 A800 Conformity assessment
related to SPS
0 1 0 1
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NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
A81 A810 Product registration re-
quirement
1 1 0 0
A82 A820 Testing requirement 1 1 0 0
A83 A830 Certiﬁcation requirement 1 1 0 0
A84 A840 Inspection requirement 1 1 0 0
A85 A850 Traceability requirement 1 1 1 0
A851 A851 Origin of materials and
parts
1 1 0 0
A852 A852 Processing history 0 1 0 0
A853 A853 Distribution of products
after delivery
0 1 0 0
A859 A859 Traceability require-
ments, n.e.s.
0 1 0 0
A86 A860 Quarantine requirement 1 1 0 0
A89 A890 Conformity assessment
related to SPS, n.e.s
0 0 0 1
A9 A900 SPS measures, n.e.s. 0 1 0 0
B Technical Barriers to
Trade
B1 Prohibitions/restrictions
of imports for objectives
set out in the TBT
agreement
B11 B110 Probibition for TBT rea-
sons
1 1 0 0
B14 B140 Authorization require-
ment for TBT reasons
1 1 1 0
B15 B150 Registration requirement
for importers for TBT
reasons
1 1 1 0
B19 B190 Prohibitions/restrictions
of imports for TBT
agreement reasons, n.e.s
1 1 0 0
B2 Tolerance limits for
residues and restricted
use of substances
B21 B210 Tolerance limits for
residues of or con-
tamination by certain
substances
0 1 0 0
B22 B220 Restricted use of certain
substances
0 1 0 0
B3 Labelling, marking, and
packaging requirement
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NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
B31 B310 Labelling requirements 0 0 0 1
B32 B320 Marking requirements 0 0 0 1
B33 B330 Packaging requirements 0 1 0 0
B4 Production or post-
production requirement
B41 B410 TBT Regulations on pro-
duction processes
0 1 0 0
B42 B420 TBT regulations on
transport and storage
0 1 0 0
B49 B490 Production or post-
production requirements,
n.e.s.
0 1 0 0
B6 B600 Product identity require-
ment
0 1 0 0
B7 B700 Product-quality or -
performance requirement
0 1 0 0
B8 B800 Conformity assessment
related to TBT
1 1 1 1
B81 B810 Product registration re-
quirement
1 1 1 1
B82 B820 Testing Requirement 1 1 1 1
B83 B830 Certiﬁcation requirement 1 1 1 1
B84 B840 Inspection requirement 1 1 1 1
B85 B850 Traceability information
requirements
1 1 1 1
B851 B851 Origins of materials and
parts
1 0 0 1
B852 B852 Processing history 1 1 0 1
B853 B853 Distribution of products
after delivery
1 0 1 1
B859 B859 Traceability require-
ments, n.e.s.
1 1 1 1
B89 B890 Conformity assessment
related to TBT, n.e.s
0 1 1 1
B9 B900 TBT measures, n.e.s. 0 1 1 1
C1 C100 Pre-shipment inspection 1 0 0 0
C2 C200 Direct consignment re-
quirement
1 1 0 0
C3 C300 Requirement to pass
through speciﬁed port of
customs
1 0 0 0
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NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
C4 C400 Import-monitoring and -
surveillance requirements
and other automatic li-
censing measures
1 0 1 0
C9 C900 Other formalities, n.e.s 1 0 0 0
D1 Antidumping Measures
D11 D110 Antidumping Investiga-
tion
1 0 0 0
D12 D120 Antidumping Duty 1 0 0 0
D13 D130 Price undertaking 1 0 0 0
D2 Countervailing measure
D21 D210 Countervailing investiga-
tion
1 0 0 0
D22 D220 Countervailing Duty 1 0 0 0
D23 D230 Undertaking 1 0 0 0
D3 Safeguard measures
D31 D310 General (multilateral)
safeguard
1 0 0 0
D311 D311 Safeguard investigation 1 0 0 0
D312 D312 Safeguard duty 1 0 0 0
D313 D313 Safeguard quantitative
restriction
1 0 0 0
D314 D314 Safeguard measures,
other form
1 0 0 0
D32 Agricultural special safe-
guard
D321 D321 Volume-based agricul-
tural special safeguard
1 0 0 0
D322 D322 Price-based agricultural
special safeguard
1 0 0 0
D39 D390 Safeguard , n.e.s. 1 0 0 0
E1 Non-automatic import-
licensing procedures
other than authorizations
for SPS or TBT reasons
E11 Licensing for economic
reasons
E111 E111 Licensing procedure with
no speciﬁc ex ante criteria
1 0 1 0
E112 E112 Licensing for speciﬁed use 1 1 1 0
E113 E113 Licensing linked with lo-
cal production
1 0 1 0
E119 E119 Licensing for economic
reasons, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
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NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
E12 E120 Licensing for non-
economic reasons
1 0 1 0
E121 E121 Licensing for religious,
moral, or cultural reasons
1 0 1 0
E122 E122 Licensing for political
reasons
1 0 1 0
E129 E129 Licensing for non-
economic reasons, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
E2 Quotas
E21 E210 Permanent Quotas 1 0 0 0
E211 E211 Global allocation 1 0 0 0
E212 E212 Country allocation 1 0 0 0
E22 E220 Seasonal Quotas 1 0 0 0
E221 E221 Global allocation 1 0 0 0
E222 E222 Country allocation 1 0 0 0
E23 E230 Temporary 1 0 0 0
E231 E231 Global allocation 1 0 0 0
E232 E232 Country allocation 1 0 0 0
E3 Prohibitions other than
for SPS and TBT reasons
E31 Prohibition for economic
reasons
E311 E311 Full prohibition (import
ban)
1 0 0 0
E312 E312 Seasonal prohibition 1 0 0 0
E313 E313 Temporary prohibition,
including suspension of
issuance of licenses
1 0 0 0
E314 E314 Prohibition of importa-
tion in bulk
1 1 0 0
E315 E315 Prohibition of products
infriging patents or other
intellectual property
rights
1 1 0 0
E316 E316 Prohibition of used,
repaired, or remanufac-
tured goods
1 1 0 0
E319 E319 Prohibition for economic
reasons, n.e.s.
1 0 0 0
E32 Prohibition for non-
economic reasons
E321 E321 Prohibition for religious,
moral, or cultural reasons
1 1 0 0
146
NTM Code Subcode NTM Name Loc. Char. Firm Indiscr.
E322 E322 Prohibition for political
reasons (embargo)
1 0 0 0
E329 E329 Prohibition for non-
economic reasons, n.e.s.
1 0 0 0
E5 Export-restraint arrange-
ment
E51 Voluntary export-
restraint arrangements
(VERs)
E511 E511 Quota agreement (VER) 1 0 0 0
E512 E512 Consultation agreement
(VER)
1 0 0 0
E513 E513 Administrative coopera-
tion agreement (VER)
1 0 0 0
E59 E590 Export-restraint arrange-
ments, n.e.s.
1 0 0 0
E6 E600 Tariﬀ-rate quotas (TRQ) 1 0 0 0
E61 E610 WTO-bound TRQs, in-
cluded in WTO schedules
1 0 0 0
E611 E611 Global allocation, WTO-
bound TRQ
1 0 0 0
E612 E612 Country allocation,
WTO-bound TRQ
1 0 0 0
E62 E620 Other TRQs included in
other trade arrangements
1 0 0 0
E621 E621 Global allocation, other
TRQs
1 0 0 0
E622 E622 Country allocation, other
TRQs
1 0 0 0
F1 F100 Administrative measures
aﬀecting customs value
1 0 0 0
F11 F110 Minimum import prices 1 0 0 0
F12 F120 Reference prices 1 0 0 0
F19 F190 Other administrative
measures aﬀecting the
customs value, n.e.s
1 0 0 0
F2 F200 Volutary export-price re-
straints (VEPRs)
1 0 0 0
F3 F300 Variable charges
F31 F310 Variable levies 1 1 0 0
F32 F320 Variable components 1 1 0 0
F39 F390 Variable charges, n.e.s. 1 0 0 0
F4 F400 Customs surcharges 1 0 0 0
F5 F500 Seasonal duties 1 1 0 0
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F6 F600 Additional taxes and
charges levied in con-
neciton to services
provided by the gov-
ernenment
F61 F610 Customs-inspection, -
processing, and -servicing
fees
1 0 0 0
F62 F620 Merchandise-handling or
-storing fees
1 0 0 0
F63 F630 Tax on foreign exchange
transactions
1 0 1 0
F64 F640 Stamp tax 1 0 0 0
F65 F650 Import license tax 1 0 1 0
F66 F660 Consular invoice fee 1 0 0 0
F67 F670 Statistical tax 1 0 0 0
F68 F680 Tax on transport facilities 1 0 0 0
F69 F690 Additional charges, n.e.s. 1 0 0 0
F7 Internal taxes and
charges levied on imports
F71 F710 Consumption taxes 0 0 0 1
F72 F720 Excise taxes 0 0 0 1
F73 F730 Taxes and charges for
sensitive product cate-
gories
0 0 0 1
F79 F790 Internal taxes and
charges levied on im-
ports, n.e.s.
0 0 0 1
F8 F800 Decreed customs valua-
tions
1 0 0 0
F9 F900 Price-control measures,
n.e.s.
G1 Advance payment re-
quirement
G11 G110 Advance import deposit 1 0 1 0
G12 G120 Cash margin requirement 1 0 1 0
G13 G130 Advance payment of cus-
toms duties
1 0 0 0
G14 G140 Refundable deposits for
sensitive product cate-
gories
1 1 0 0
G19 G190 Advance payment re-
quirements, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
G2 G200 Multiple exchange rates 1 0 0 0
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G3 Regulation on oﬃcial for-
eign exchange allocation
G31 G310 Prohibition of foreign ex-
change allocation
1 0 0 0
G32 G320 Bank authorization 1 0 1 0
G33 G330 Authorization linked
with non-oﬃcial foreign
exchange
G331 G331 External foreign ex-
change
1 1 1 0
G332 G332 Importers' own foreign
exchange
1 0 1 0
G339 G339 License linked with non-
oﬃcial foreign exchange,
n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
G39 G390 Regulation on oﬃcial for-
eign exchange allocation,
n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
G4 G400 Regulation concerning
terms of payment for
imports
1 0 1 0
G9 G900 Finance measures, n.e.s.
H1 State-trading enterprises,
for importing: other se-
lective import channels
H11 H110 State-trading enterprises,
for importing
1 0 1 0
H19 H190 Other selective import
channels, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
H2 Compulsory use of na-
tional services
H21 H210 Compulsory national in-
surance
1 0 1 0
H22 H220 Compulsory national
transport
1 0 1 0
H29 H290 Compulsory national ser-
vice, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
H9 H900 Measures aﬀecting com-
petitions, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
I1 I100 Local content measures 1 1 0 0
I2 I200 Trade-balancing mea-
sures
1 1 1 0
I9 I900 Trade-related investment
measures, n.e.s.
1 1 1 0
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J1 J100 Geographical restriction
(on distribution)
0 0 0 1
J2 J200 Restriciton on resellers
(on distribution)
1 0 1 0
K K000 Restricitons on post-sales
services
1 1 1 0
L L000 Subsidies 1 0 0 0
M M000 Government procurement
restrictions
0 0 1 0
N N000 Intellecutal property 0 0 1 0
O O000 Rules of origin 1 0 0 0
P Export-license, -quota, -
prohibition, and other
quantitiative restricitons
1 0 0 0
P11 P110 Export prohibition 1 0 0 0
P12 P120 Export quotas 1 0 0 0
P13 P130 Licensing- or permit re-
quirements to export
1 0 1 0
P14 P140 Export registration re-
quirements
1 0 1 0
P19 P190 Export quantitative re-
strictions, N.e.s
1 0 0 0
P21 P210 State-trading enterprises,
for exporting
1 0 1 0
P29 P290 Other selective export
channels, n.e.s.
1 0 1 0
P3 P300 Export price-control
measures
1 0 0 0
P4 P400 Measures on re-export 1 0 0 0
P5 P500 Export taxes and charges 1 0 0 0
P6 P600 Export technical mea-
sures
1 1 0 0
P61 P610 Inspection requirement,
for export
1 1 0 0
P62 P620 Certiﬁcation required by
the exporting country
1 1 0 0
P69 P690 Export technical mea-
sures, n.e.s.
1 1 0 0
P7 P700 Export subsidies 1 0 1 0
P8 P800 Export credits 1 0 1 0
P9 P900 Export measures, n.e.s. 1 0 1 0
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